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## CHAPTER 7

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# The Personal Risks of Party Development

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As the other chapters in this volume demonstrated, market reform in the former Soviet Union has impeded the development of democracy through phenomena such as state withdrawal, misguided donor conditionalities, and powerful business lobbies. Yet, despite these negative side effects, market reform can facilitate the development of political parties, a critical ingredient for responsive government or democracy. Under certain circumstances, market reforms can increase people's economic independence from the state, and only when citizens are economically autonomous from local authorities will they engage in the civic activities, such as political party work, that enable newly created democratic institutions to function. Otherwise, people fear loss of their jobs or sanctions on their businesses in retaliation for challenging local authorities. This finding suggests that another reason for weak party development in democratizing post-Soviet states is people's reluctance to risk their livelihoods for long-term political activity.<sup>1</sup>

I reached these conclusions through interviews in 1997 and 1998 with leaders of all former and current major political organizations in four post-Soviet regions—the oblasts of Samara and Ulianovsk along the Volga River in Russia and the provinces of Naryn and Osh in central and southern Kyrgyzstan, respectively.<sup>2</sup> Variation in the

degree of economic autonomy between the provinces within each country and the institutional, cultural, and socioeconomic differences between the two countries reveal how market reform can facilitate the development of political parties. To illustrate these connections between market reform, economic autonomy, and party development, this chapter first provides a brief overview of existing studies of post-Soviet party development, then turns to former and current party leaders' accounts of the impediments they face, including limited economic autonomy, and finally explores how market reforms can enhance economic autonomy.

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## PARTIES IN THE POST-SOVIET CONTEXT

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Political parties in democratizing post-Soviet states were expected to perform the functions of their Western counterparts. In democracies parties aggregate and express the interests of their supporters, promote territorial integration, inform voters about political issues, serve as gatekeepers to candidacy, and prepare candidates for political office. In contrast, parties in the former Soviet Union have little contact with voters except during electoral periods and often never reach people outside of capital cities or major metropolitan areas. Many parties lack concrete platforms and programs, and those that have prepared policy prescriptions often do not follow them once in office. Moreover, many parties survive for only short periods of time and independents, not partisans, are the most common candidates.<sup>3</sup>

Students of post-Soviet party development tend to attribute the weak party systems to macrolevel institutional, cultural, and economic conditions. The timing of elections has been poor, "party substitutes" exist, and the design of electoral institutions is suboptimal, they claim. Others argue that Soviet legacies including a negative association with the term "party," a weak civil society, and inexperience with democratic party politics have hampered party development. Some scholars find the lack of socioeconomic cleavages or the combination of economic and political reform troubling.<sup>4</sup> Another economic impediment is that funds and technology are in short supply in democratizing countries of the former Soviet Union.

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## IMPEDIMENTS TO PARTY DEVELOPMENT: THE ACTIVISTS' ACCOUNTS

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Leaders of existing and defunct parties in the four regions confirmed that certain institutional, cultural, and economic conditions hinder party-building, as national

activists have indicated. The regional leaders also offered a local perspective on these obstacles, explaining, for example, how poor links with national organizations further worsened the economic positions of oblast divisions of parties. However, those regional activists who had circumscribed their activities, dissolved their organizations, and failed to expand memberships attributed these reactions mainly to threats and to sanctions on their livelihoods.

### *General Institutional, Cultural, and Economic Obstacles*

Electoral laws, public and media culture, and relations between regional branches of parties and their national affiliates hinder the development of strong party systems in Russia and Kyrgyzstan. Namely, aspirants to regional political office do not need to be affiliated with a party to build a successful political career. Electoral laws do not require a party affiliation to run for regional parliament or governor, citizens seem to prefer nonaffiliated candidates, media outlets often misrepresent candidates, and regional parties and candidates receive little assistance from the national affiliates; therefore, potential office seekers have little incentive to align themselves with parties. Consequently, parties are poorly represented in regional political institutions and thus cannot implement their programs, further weakening their position in society.

### *INSTITUTIONAL OBSTACLES*

In the Russian and Kyrgyzstani provinces, electoral laws allow candidates to run for regional office without a party affiliation, and as a result most candidates do run independently.<sup>5</sup> To become a candidate in a provincial parliamentary or gubernatorial race in Samara or Ulianovsk, an individual needs a nomination from a regional electoral association or a group of voters, according to oblast electoral laws. Regional parliamentary and gubernatorial candidates in Samara and regional parliamentary candidates in Ulianovsk may also nominate themselves.<sup>6</sup> Political parties fall under the "regional electoral association" category.<sup>7</sup> These associations must register six months before the call for elections, and their charters must list electoral nominations as one of their activities. In Kyrgyzstan national electoral laws govern regional parliamentary races and resemble the regulations in Russia. Governors in Kyrgyzstan are appointed, so there are no gubernatorial elections.

Most candidates for provincial office in the Russian and Kyrgyzstani oblasts were nominated by groups of voters, typically coworkers or neighbors, not political organizations. Often regional parliamentary candidates were bosses whose subordinates nominated them. In Samara employees of a state publishing concern nominated their boss. An Ulianovsk doctor was nominated by the employees of two medical clinics, one of

which she heads. In Osh a candidate received a nomination from a kindergarten she directs. The president of a bank there was nominated by employees of schools and enterprises and members of NGOs. He claimed that teachers supported him because their salaries came from the bank. In Naryn, a candidate was nominated by employees of the hospital he headed. Some gubernatorial candidates in Samara and Uliianovsk also received nominations from their employees.

In the four provinces fewer candidates for regional office received nominations from political parties. In Russia the regional divisions of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (*Liberalnaia Demokraticheskaia Partia Rossii* or LDPR) and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (*Kommunisticheskaia Partia Rossiskoi Federatsii* or KPRF) nominated a few candidates. Otherwise, regional electoral associations that nominated candidates were not focused on politics. For example, in Samara a society for the disabled nominated the head of a charity fund, which had donated goods to the organization.

The opportunity to become an independent candidate for provincial office weakens the party systems in Russia and Kyrgyzstan because potential office seekers do not have to build relationships with political parties in order to run, and successful candidates do not represent a particular organization. Aspirants to political office simply nominate themselves or ask their subordinates to nominate them, register, and have friends and family members collect the required signatures on petitions. While voter groups support candidates, they do not provide them with clear mandates and thus do

not take the place of parties. In Russia the requirement that regional electoral associations register six months in advance further hinders party-building. For example, the Samara division of Iabloko could not nominate candidates because it had not registered in time. Instead, one of its members was nominated by the LDPR but ran on Iabloko's platform, thus muddying the distinctions between different political parties.

### CULTURAL OBSTACLES

A cultural aversion to political activity and to the term "party" reinforces the institutional deterrents to party-building. Activists in the four provinces recounted how people have negative reactions to political parties: "When the founders of the Samara division of the Russian United Industrial Party (*Rossiskiaia Ob'edinennaia Promyshlennnaia Partia*) began to form the organization, many heads of industry asked, "Why do we need another party?" Party leaders in Uliianovsk and Naryn described how heads of enterprises, oblast and county leaders, and regular people asked the same question. Leaders of Erkin in Naryn heard similar doubts despite widespread initial support for the group. As an informal organization in the early 1990s, the party had demonstrated and petitioned for improvements in the oblast, such as better electrical service. Even after the organization's efforts were partly successful, many government officials and average people asked: "Why do we need an opposition party? There are so many parties. What will you do? What have you done?"

For the average person political organizations seem to be of little use and the term party evokes memories of the Soviet-era Communist Party and the obligatory party rituals. Because of negative public attitudes, potential regional office seekers are not eager to run on a party platform. A regional candidate in Samara explained that his campaign team decided it was better for him to be nominated by a voter group than by their party, Russian People's Republican Party (*Rossiskiaia Narodno-respublikanskaia Partia*) because "the population does not have faith in parties."

Members of the more liberal parties in the Russian provinces were especially likely to seek nominations from voter groups or nominate themselves since the term "democratic" often included in the name of their parties, has acquired a negative connotation in recent years. Candidates felt that people associate "democracy" with declining living standards, increased crime, and rampant corruption. Consequently, the leadership of Democratic Russia (*Demokraticheskaia Rossia*) in Uliianovsk decided that its nomination would be harmful to candidates. A nomination from a "democratic" organization can make it difficult for a regional candidate to win votes. The leadership of Democratic Russia even considered registering for the elections under the name "For Russia." This practice of strategic misrepresentation is so common that party candidates try to disparage it to their advantage: an LDPR candidate criticized this custom

### Nominations to Regional Parliaments\*

TABLE 7.1

Source	Percentage of Candidates	
	Samara	Uliianovsk
Voter Group	84	71
Regional Electoral Association	16	18
Self-Nomination	0	10

\*Data about the source of nomination were available for all but one of the candidates from Samara and seven of the candidates from Uliianovsk. Similar data were not available for Osh and Naryn, but interviews were conducted with samples of winning and losing candidates in each region, enabling me to draw conclusions about nominations.

in his published biography, writing "I am running honestly and openly as a Samara *Gubernskia Duma* [parliamentary] candidate from the LDPR's electoral association—not concealing my party affiliation and not hiding behind the back of an initiative [voter] group."<sup>8</sup>

The media culture also hinders the development of party programs and party identification. The widespread practice of payment for media coverage makes it difficult for citizens to discern the goals and accomplishments of different parties and offers no incentive to party leaders to create concrete platforms. Candidates can usually pay for positive coverage (or negative coverage of their opponents) without the publication or broadcast noting that the piece is an advertisement. As one journalist in Osh described the practice, the media outlet signs a contract with the candidate, and that candidate has the right to choose whether or not the piece is identified as an advertisement.

One journalist at an independent newspaper in Samara estimated that 95 percent of candidates pay journalists or editors for positive coverage or "hidden advertisements." Positive coverage included a report from an event the candidate held or attended, a glowing interview with the candidate, or a favorable analysis of the candidate and his platform. Candidates also paid for negative coverage of their opponents. Ninety-five percent is likely an exaggeration since many candidates were short on financial resources; however, half of the print journalists or editors with whom I discussed this issue in Samara claimed to have received proposals to be paid for positive coverage.<sup>9</sup> Likewise, media representatives in Uliianovsk had heard of journalists in their province receiving payments or gifts, such as an apartment, for positive coverage, but none claimed to have received proposals themselves.

In Kyrgyzstan regional candidates more often "entertained" representatives of the media, most likely because money and luxury goods are scarcer. One member of the media recounted how candidates would meet journalists at home or take them in their car to a park, provide vodka and *zakuski* (appetizers), and extract a promise for favorable coverage. While none of the journalists in Osh and Naryn whom I interviewed claimed to have received payment or to have been "entertained," they said their colleagues openly discussed the favors they had received from candidates. One journalist I interviewed did claim to have been offered gifts from a national parliamentary candidate—apparently one of great resources: the candidate offered the journalist money, a car, and a dictaphone.

Payment or gifts for coverage are a legacy of Soviet journalistic practices and a response to the dire economic circumstances of most media outlets. As a media representative in Naryn explained, current practices are not so different from those of the Soviet era when journalists, a candidate, and a party organization representative would meet, and the journalists would be told to write favorably about the candidate. Today elections are an opportunity for media correspondents and editors to make money, and

media representatives in all four oblasts considered payment for coverage part of the profession. As one journalist in Osh said, "That is business."

### ECONOMIC OBSTACLES

The economic difficulties in these countries affect parties not only indirectly through media practices, but also directly through the lack of resources for "grassroots" party activities. The weak links between national organizations and their regional affiliates exacerbate this problem. Only 29 percent of political organizations in the two Russian provinces and 14 percent in the two Kyrgyzstan provinces receive funds or equipment from their national organizations.

In Samara and Uliianovsk only the regional organizations of the LDPR and the KPRF typically receive material assistance. For example, the LDPR in Uliianovsk receives a little money for overhead from the federal party, but even this regional organization relies mostly on membership dues, sponsors, and its own side businesses. Other regional organizations are lucky to see funds from the national organization during the election period. The Russian National Assembly (*Russkii Nacional'nyi Sobor*) in Samara, for example, receives no money from its national affiliate and survives on donations from businesspeople and voluntary membership dues, a problematic approach considering some members are unemployed. The financial relationship is also weak in the other direction: only the regional branches of the communist parties in Russia and Kyrgyzstan reported that they shared membership dues with the national organization.

Overall, the evidence from the four provinces indicates that there has been little interaction between oblast divisions of political parties and their national affiliates. As of 1998 a regional political party at most periodically received a party newspaper or brochure from a national office, sent a report about its work in the region to Moscow or Bishkek, attended a national party conference, or received a visit from the national leader. The weak links between most regional divisions and national affiliates are evident in the party coalitions that have formed in the Russian provinces.<sup>10</sup> During elections regional divisions of parties whose national affiliates refuse to cooperate have joined forces and campaigned for candidates. The exceptions are the LDPR and KPRF, which maintain strong center-periphery connections. For example, one regional branch leader of the LDPR reported that oblast coordinators for the party meet every month in Moscow.

The weak ties between national and regional groups mean that the national party organizations have little influence in the provinces. But do the regional groups have an impact on national politics? Of the regional political groups in these provinces only the LDPR and KPRF influence national politics. The LDPR and KPRF have

been successful in putting their members into the lower house of the national parliament, whereas most other regional parties in Samara and Uliianovsk have no representatives in the national legislature.<sup>11</sup> Representation in Kyrgyzstan is even more rare.

While ties have not developed beyond formal affiliations, national party organizations did influence the formation of the local divisions in these regions. Two formation scenarios were most common. An informal, local political discussion group or movement existed and its members decided to form a political party so they sought an affiliation with a national organization. This approach was most common among the communist parties. Although the former Communist Party was initially banned in the 1990s, its most ardent supporters continued to be active. In Samara, communist activists took part in the Social Party of Workers (*Sotsialnaya Partiya Trudiashechivtsin*) and the Russian Communist Labor Party (*Rossiskaia Kommunisticheskaia Rabochaina Partia*) during the ban and formed an oblast union of communists in 1992. Once the new Communist Party of the Russian Federation held its congress in Moscow in February 1993, the local group affiliated with it.

This approach was not, however, limited to communist groups. The Naryn Oblast division of the democratically-oriented national political party Erkin was formed in 1993 from a movement that began in the oblast in 1990. Residents of the Naryn region, then joined with the neighboring oblast of Issyk-Kul<sup>12</sup>, began to question why the two provinces had been united. Acquaintances held meetings about the loss of population from Naryn to Issyk-Kul<sup>13</sup>, where construction was under way in the capital of the unified regions. Concerned about the lack of attention to Naryn, a group of residents sent a letter to Bishkek. Despite the division of the oblasts in 1991, concern over Naryn's socioeconomic situation continued. In 1993 there was a "general democratic demonstration," according to one activist, and a hunger strike for three days in the provincial capital Naryn. Protestors sent a list of ten concerns to the oblast administration and President Askar Akaev. Concerns included the difficulty of living at a high altitude, problems with electrical utilities, and the poor approach to privatization; the protestors also demanded a prohibition on the purchase of apartments by Chinese. Later that year the activists decided to affiliate themselves with the national party Erkin.

Regional party divisions also formed when an individual or couple of individuals from a province attended a national meeting of an existing political party and decided to create one in their oblast. The Uliianovsk branch of the Social Democratic Party of the Russian Federation (*Sotsial-Demokraticheskaya Partia Rossiiko Federativn*) formed in this manner. The chair of the oblast branch and other local party officials visited Moscow for work in the *glasnost* period and came in contact with democratic clubs "where people could freely express their opinions." One of these clubs then developed into the Social Democratic Association, the predecessor of the Social Democratic Party. Based on their prior connection with the club members, the Uliianovsk activists

attended a congress of the national party in Moscow in 1990, and the delegates at this conference elected the oblast party chair to his position. By 1991 he and his fellow activists had formed a division of the party in Uliianovsk.

The hopes of regional activists that these national affiliations would result in financial support for local activities have largely been dashed. As a result, most local divisions of parties in these provinces tend to engage only in electoral campaigning, although a few that own businesses, such as the LDPR in Uliianovsk, have also managed to provide social assistance to the community. Moreover, regional organizations with very different platforms, such as democratic parties and national-patriotic parties, often work together, diluting the meaning of party affiliation; and candidates who do seek a party nomination may accept support from the party with the best offer of resources—not the one that best matches their beliefs. The lack of programmatic guidance from national affiliates and the scarce interaction with national party officials further weakens party platforms and party identification.

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## LIMITED ECONOMIC AUTONOMY

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While certain aspects of electoral laws, public and media culture, and minimal support from national affiliates hinder local party activity and the development of strong party systems in Russia and Kyrgyzstan, the most immediate obstacle to political activism is limited economic autonomy. Individuals cannot maintain local party activity if the receipt of their incomes or the success of their businesses depends on local authorities.<sup>12</sup> In such cases party members circumscribe their activities, relinquish their membership, and even dissolve the organization for fear that challenging local government will result in loss of their livelihoods. Consider, for example, a former party leader in Uliianovsk who abandoned his organization because he was fired three times from his government job for party activities and could find no other employment.

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## CURRENT PROFESSIONS

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In order to be economically autonomous in the post-Soviet context, an individual should work at an enterprise that is neither directed nor owned by regional authorities, have skills essential to the local government, or run a business that earns income from outside the borders of the region.<sup>13</sup> Regional officials can easily fire or convincingly threaten to fire people who work for provincial government bodies, schools, hospitals, enterprises, and privatized companies in which the regional government, its leaders, or

their friends and family own a controlling number of shares. A party leader in Ul'ianovsk described how he was fired from his job at a state enterprise because of his political activities, but he has continued to head the party because he managed to find a job at a private firm where the owner "closes his eyes" to the leader's political pursuits. Activists in the former Soviet Union who work at national, county, city, or village government organs are also at risk of job loss because regional officials have influence over these institutions through the appointment of their leaders and the provision of offices, utilities, and employee housing.<sup>14</sup>

Although most doctors are also government employees, they are protected from job loss because their skills, obtained only after years of training, are critical to local governments and their talents are easily transportable, particularly during the health and education crises in the former Soviet Union. A doctor in an administrative post in Naryn credited his medical diploma for his resistance to government attempts to dissuade him from campaigning for an opposition candidate: "If I lose work as head doctor, I can work as a regular doctor. I have a medical diploma," he explained. Another doctor who ran for office in Naryn described how oblast officials tried three times to convince him not to run, but he refused because his status as a doctor protected him. "How could I face [my supporters if I dropped out] . . . I have a medical diploma." Other professionals, including teachers, managers, and engineers, are at greater risk of job loss because their training is not as extensive and their services are not as immediately crucial to the well-being of the population.

Similarly, entrepreneurs who do not rely on profits from outside their home province are not protected from government harassment such as unfounded fines for tax, sanitation, and fire safety "violations." A party leader in Ul'ianovsk has avoided government harassment and remained politically active despite sanctions on other party members because, he explained, his business operates in the regions of Moscow, Dagestan, and Tatarstan so his political activity in Ul'ianovsk cannot threaten his livelihood.

## REGIONAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES

Economic autonomy is influenced not only by one's current employment, but also by regional job opportunities. If potential and current activists believe they can find jobs outside the influence of local officials if they lose their current positions, they will create and maintain political parties. The impact of regional job opportunities on the decisions of potential and current party activists is evident when one compares the provinces within each of the countries. Ul'ianovsk and Naryn provide less economic autonomy than Samara and Osh, respectively. Although civic organizations exist in all four regions, political groups have significantly greater difficulty operating in

Ul'ianovsk and Naryn than in Samara and Osh. In Naryn fear of government punishment of activists is so great that the single political organization to emerge in Naryn no longer functions. In Ul'ianovsk leaders and members of political organizations have faced sanctions on their livelihoods and practice self-censorship by limiting their activities or disbanding their groups. Twenty-two percent of political groups in Ul'ianovsk have dissolved due to sanctions or fear of sanctions. No group in Samara or Osh has disbanded for this reason.

To begin to understand the influence of economic autonomy on political activism, consider the comments of activists in Osh who claim that they do not fear losing their "stare" jobs because they have already created—or can easily create—businesses on the side, whereas activists in Naryn "are fearful because they all work in 'government' . . . they are all subordinates." Similarly, an activist in Samara explained that entrepreneurs are not afraid of political involvement in that province because "there may be administrative pressure, through tax inspections for example, but businesses in this oblast can withstand this pressure" since they are "larger and stronger" than those in Ul'ianovsk.

Party leaders in Samara and Osh can work within the reach of local officials because they can find other work that affords more economic autonomy if they lose their jobs because of their party activities. In contrast, because of the limited opportunities for economic autonomy in Ul'ianovsk and Naryn, party activists in these regions work only in jobs outside the influence of local officials, and those who abandon their party activities work "under the thumb" of government authorities. For example, in Ul'ianovsk none of the leaders of political organizations—excluding those who head the previous "party of power", Our Home is Russia (*Nash Dom Rossi*)—works for provincial, county, or city governments. Instead, one activist works mostly in Moscow, earning his income from a federal government institution, and another receives a salary from a profitable, independent sports association in the region. Those party leaders and members who are entrepreneurs tend to be very successful and earn much of their income from outside the region. The leader of one opposition party has a food production firm, and, while he declined to reveal the details of his business, colleagues in other regions of Russia described his company as being financially successful and possibly tied to the Russian mafia. In order to engage in party activities, other entrepreneurs registered their firms in other oblasts and have only divisions in Ul'ianovsk. In Naryn a doctor of an oblast hospital heads the one independent party in the province, although so many members have left out of fear that the party is essentially defunct.<sup>15</sup>

By contrast, in Samara and Osh, which provide greater economic autonomy, approximately 30 percent of the leaders of independent political organizations are provincial, county, and city employees, such as workers at state-owned firms or analysts in government departments. These activists did not express concern that they would lose their livelihoods because jobs free from the influence of local authorities are available. In Samara, one of these leaders, a schoolteacher, claims to have lost his

TABLE 7.2

**Professions of Leaders of Political Organizations (percentages)**

	Russia		Kyrgyzstan	
	Samara	Uliianovsk	Osh	Naryn
Under Control of Local Authorities	30	0	33	0
Independent of Local Authorities	70	100	67	100

job because of his oppositional activity, but he found other employment and continues to protest regional policies.

The limited economic autonomy in Uliianovsk and Naryn is also evident in the jobs of those who have abandoned party activities. For example, in Uliianovsk former party activists include the party leader who was repeatedly fired and fellow members who, suffering similar livelihood sanctions, were forced to leave the organization, thus destroying it. When a key leader of the "democratic" bloc in Uliianovsk had to abandon politics because he was a struggling entrepreneur whose business could not survive pressure from the administration, the whole movement suffered.

## SOURCES OF ECONOMIC AUTONOMY

Party activists in Uliianovsk and Naryn attributed their decisions to initiate and continue or, alternatively, abandon party work to their degree of personal economic autonomy, whereas people in Samara and Osh stated that party activities did not put their livelihood at risk because of the economic autonomy their provinces provided. But what are the sources of economic autonomy? The ability to find a job free of government harassment depends on one's own skills, as in the case of doctors, but also on the extent to which the characteristics of one's home province allow one to easily earn income from outside the borders. Local officials cannot employ Soviet-era workplace harassment techniques on businesses operating outside the province because these ventures tend to be newly created, under new ownership, or experienced in operating illegally during the Soviet period.<sup>16</sup> Local authorities cannot fire employees from companies over which they have no control, and they cannot inspect business operations outside their jurisdiction. To effectively sanction these businesses, local officials need to understand the new market economy and create novel institutions, such as marketing boards—efforts in which they have not invest-

ed. Moreover, activists are aware that their livelihoods are at greatest risk in the old economic sectors and that success in the new market economy, where government sanctions are ineffective, provides economic autonomy from local authorities.

Earning income free from the influence of local authorities is easier in Samara, as compared to Uliianovsk, because Samara companies have healthy profits and strong foreign connections, and the governor supports the development of independent businesses. Similarly, residents of Osh are less dependent on officials than are people in Naryn because of the wealth of marketable goods produced in the region and the good trade routes.

## SAMARA AND ULIIANOVSK

Dominated by automobile and aircraft industries as well as electrical power production, food processing, and chemical and petrochemical manufacturing, the economies of Samara and Uliianovsk are primarily industrial. Moreover, the large industrial complexes in both oblasts have been faced with declining state orders, disruptions of inputs, shrinking markets, and the need to convert defense plants. Despite these similarities in economic sectors and problems, the degree of economic autonomy in the two regions differs considerably. Relative to their counterparts in Uliianovsk, large enterprises and small businesses in Samara have greater economic freedom due to the strength of their businesses and their international contacts, and to the pro-market orientation of the regional government.

Enterprises in Samara have the benefit of dominating Russian and, in one case, even world markets. In fact, Samara is home to the manufacturers of 18 percent of the goods that are monopolized on the Russian market.<sup>17</sup> This monopoly status helps ensure that these companies remain powerful in the region and the country. In contrast to Samara, Uliianovsk is a leader in only one somewhat narrow field—heavy air freight—and most Uliianovsk firms produce goods similar to those manufactured in Samara and thus face Goliath-sized competition.

Access to foreign capital and buyers further increases the autonomy of Samara businesses relative to those in Uliianovsk. Samara's economy, primarily the industrial sector, received nearly 29 times more foreign direct investment than Uliianovsk's in 1997 and nearly 285 times more in 1996. Approximately 5 times as many companies with foreign capital operate in Samara, and 20 times as many workers are employed at enterprises and organizations receiving foreign assistance (*Regiony Rossii 1999*, vol. 2, 814–15, 848). Samara exports 25 times more goods to countries outside the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and nearly six times more within the CIS than Uliianovsk (*Regiony Rossii 1999*, vol. 2, 846).<sup>18</sup> These are considerable differences, even taking into account that Samara has twice as many people.

Healthy profits and foreign ties provide large companies with some protection from local authorities, but in decentralized Russia the firms still may suffer from the policies of antimarket or corrupt local governments. Moreover, smaller companies, even successful ones with foreign contacts, have little bargaining power because they provide relatively small amounts of revenue and employ fewer people. Consequently, government policy is also a critical component of economic autonomy in Samara and Uliianovsk. The Samara regional government supports entrepreneurship and marketization, providing some assistance to old and new companies without interfering in their operations; whereas the Uliianovsk regional administration has been antimarket and the governor at the time of the study, Iurii Goriachev, had created a personal economic monopoly.

In Samara there is “no strict control of business” and “no one will break you if your business is honest.”<sup>19</sup> Entrepreneurs in Samara claim that the provincial officials have never tried to interfere in their business ventures, and instead the regional government has supported business development through its Department of Support of Entrepreneurship and Small Business. By contrast, in Uliianovsk an entrepreneur described the business environment in this way: “There is a monopoly held by the governor’s entourage. One hundred percent. If you want to create a business—a business in a new sphere that is not part of [their] monopoly—officials will simply say, ‘No.’” Businesspeople explained how only those individuals in the favor of the governor at the time could create new businesses, and, for existing businesses to survive, owners need to have good relations with the governor.

Overall, residents of Samara, as compared to people in Uliianovsk, are more economically autonomous of regional authorities because local industries dominate markets and enjoy foreign funds and partnerships. And the policies of the oblast administration have not challenged the business sector, but instead have enabled it to prosper.

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## OSH AND NARYN

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The extent of economic autonomy also differs between the Kyrghyzstani provinces; however, the sources of independence are not the same as in the Russian regions. The topography of Osh Oblast allows for production of more desirable goods and far better market access, enabling residents of Osh to be more economically independent of local officials than their neighbors in Naryn. Osh Oblast is in the Fergana Valley, an area that is home to more than ten million people of southern Kyrghyzstan, eastern Uzbekistan, and northern Tajikistan. Melting snow from the mountains surrounding the valley irrigates farms below, making Osh one of the best regions for agriculture in the country. By contrast, Naryn is home only to animal husbandry, because 70 percent of the oblast is mountainous and the remainder is high mountain valleys (*National*

*Human Development Report for the Kyrgyz Republic 1999*, The Kyrgyzstan Development Gateway Project).

The agricultural goods produced in Osh are desired in nearby countries with less hospitable growing conditions, and a relatively extensive transportation infrastructure has facilitated small-scale international trade. Farms in Osh sell many of their goods directly to private traders (*The Kyrgyz Republic: Osh Regional Economic Strategy*, June 1996, 25). Small-scale entrepreneurs from Osh can drive trucks 262 kilometers from Osh city to Ilkeshtham in China, exchange agricultural products for construction materials in southern Russia, or even take a bus to Iran. Traders can also make use of regular flights from Osh airport, one of only two international airports in Kyrghyzstan, to countries inside and outside the CIS (Raczka 1998, 373–407; *National Human Development Report for the Kyrgyz Republic 1999*, The Kyrgyzstan Development Gateway Project; Nunn, Barnett, and Lubin 1999, 70; *The Kyrgyz Republic: Osh Regional Economic Strategy*, 35–36; *General Investment Opportunities in Osh Oblast: Business Information Service for the Newly Independent States*). In the most populated regions in northern and western Osh Oblast, income comes from trade with the Uzbekistani and Tajikistani towns that are only a few hours away by car or bus. Thriving entrepreneurship is most evident in the center of Osh city, where one of the largest open markets in Central Asia operates.

Producing limited goods and sharing an international border only with China, Naryn offers considerably fewer trade opportunities. International air travel is impossible for Naryn residents since the airport has no regular flights. The trip from the provincial capital Naryn to Kashgar, the most accessible Chinese city, can take two to three days.

Large-scale enterprise also differs in Osh and Naryn in terms of products and market access. From Osh, agricultural products and processed foods travel along the railroad to Uzbekistan and more distant countries, and industrial goods from at least three firms supply world markets.<sup>20</sup> By contrast Naryn has few products to export. The infrastructure does not exist to exploit the regions ore deposits, and electricity generated from the Naryn River does not power facilities in China. Naryn was designated a Free Economic Zone in 1993, meaning local businesses with foreign investors and export potential receive tax and customs privileges; however, most companies neither collaborate with foreign firms nor export goods. Providing jobs for only 1,062 people,<sup>21</sup> Naryn’s status as a Free Economic Zone has little influence on employment. Indicative of the attractiveness of goods and transportation, \$71 million of foreign direct investment flowed into Osh Oblast between 1995 and 1999, whereas Naryn received only \$3.98 million.<sup>22</sup>

Local traditions strengthen the differences between the trading environments of each region. Centuries ago sedentary peoples lived in Osh, trading, farming, and serving merchants along the Silk Road. In contrast, nomads roamed the territory of present-day Naryn. During the Soviet era, trade between Osh and towns in what are



now Uzbekistan and Tajikistan thrived, whereas Naryn's border with China was closed for a quarter of a century. The presence in Osh of a large Uzbek minority with family ties to Uzbekistan further encourages cross-border trade.

From the trade in Osh Oblast, a private sector that offers haircuts, dining, and additional conveniences to merchants and other residents has grown, whereas it has yet to appear in Naryn. This economic activity is reflected in the share of services in each region's gross product, 36.2 percent for Osh and only 17.2 for Naryn (*National Human Development Report for the Kyrgyz Republic 1999*, The Kyrgyzstan Development Gateway Project).

While Samara and Osh both offer greater economic autonomy than Ulianovsk and Naryn, respectively, the sources of autonomy in each country differ. In industrialized and relatively decentralized Russia, strong market shares, foreign investment, and local economic policies contribute to greater economic independence in some provinces. In developing and comparatively centralized Kyrgyzstan, topography and traditions favorable to cross-border trading create more economic autonomy in certain oblasts and local leaders have little impact on economic policy.

The relationship between economic autonomy and civic activism holds not only in 1997 and 1998 in these four provinces, but across time and regions. For example, in the December 1999 gubernatorial elections in Ulianovsk, successful challenger Vladimir Shamanov was economically independent of the oblast administration. A commander in the Russian army, Shamanov had not relied on local authorities for his salary, and reports indicate that his campaign funds came from firms outside the province. Moreover, in other regions of Russia we have seen financial-industrial groups, with businesses outside the provinces or in multiple provinces, challenge governors' monopolies on the economy and their administrations.

## MARKET REFORM AND DEMOCRATIZATION

Market reforms are critical to party development or, more broadly, to democratization to the extent that they bolster economic autonomy in a region through the promotion of, for example, foreign direct investment and trade. This conclusion contrasts with those of the other chapters in this volume that find market reform detrimental to democratization, and it builds upon other studies that claim that market reform and democratization are merely compatible.

### *Existing Literature*

As countries of the Eastern bloc, as well as some Latin American states, began to liberalize their political systems and economies, scholars initiated studies of the interaction

between democratization and market reforms or the "simultaneous transition."<sup>23</sup> Most investigations focus on the influence of political reform on economic outcomes (Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Hellman 1998, 203–34); however, a subset of the literature examines the effects of marketization on democratization.

In the first wave of studies of simultaneous transitions, most scholars argued that marketization would hinder democratization. Students of politics theorized that marketization would have significant short-term costs for certain sectors of the population, leading these citizens to vote reformers out of office. Fearing loss of office, reformist incumbents could respond in four ways, scholars hypothesized: First, the incumbents could slow down or end economic reforms, meaning that the transitions would no longer be simultaneous (Haggard and Kaufman 1992a, 338). Second, reformist leaders could continue with economic reforms by insulating the state from voters' demands, through the strengthening of the executive and the entrenching of the legislature and judiciary, for example (Przeworski 1991, 138; Haggard and Kaufman 1992b, 18–20; Evans 1992, 139–81; Nelson 1994, 22). In this case, leaders would essentially abandon democratic reforms for economic goals. Third, incumbents could attempt to continue both economic and political reforms by lying about their economic policies, both in the halls of government and on the campaign trail (Nelson 1994, 22). However, this deceit would undermine citizens' faith in democratic institutions by demonstrating that their demands do not influence policy (Przeworski 1991, 186; Przeworski 1993, 180). Finally, officials could ignore the threat of removal and continue openly with both marketization and democratization, but according to scholars of simultaneous transitions, an antinarket and antidemocratic movement may grow and topple the incumbents as a result (Nelson 1994, 21–22).

Empirical evidence does not, however, support these arguments about the detrimental effects of economic reform on democratization. Recent scholarship indicates that because many of the underlying assumptions of these theories do not hold, economic and political reforms may be compatible. Economic effects did not meet expectations. For example, in a study of postcommunist countries, Joel Hellman found that the sharpest economic declines have not occurred in the countries that undertook the most radical economic reforms (Hellman 1998, 209), so marketization is not necessarily a great threat to incumbents. Similarly, Barbara Geddes argues that in countries such as Ghana the costs of economic liberalization have been lower than predicted (Geddes 1995, 64). Furthermore, suffering from economic reform is dispersed; therefore, disgruntled citizens face a collective action problem in removing leaders from office (Hellman 1998, 223; Geddes 1995, 66–67). And potential protesters may be further weakened by unemployment, which reduces their resources and bargaining power (Geddes 1995, 67).

Nor have individuals reacted in the ways that theorists predicted. Even if voters do decide to oust reformist leaders, electoral reversals have not meant the abandonment of reform (Hellman 1998, 215). Interestingly, incumbents may not even

insulate the state in order to implement economic reforms; Hellman found that the more inclusive the polity, the more extensive the economic reforms (Hellman 1998, 230). Similarly, Geddes argues that even when popular opposition to reforms does develop, leaders tend to slow reforms or exclude a few, but they do not abandon their overall efforts (Geddes 1995, 66–67). In sum, empirical evidence indicates that economic and political reforms can be compatible.

Some scholars of simultaneous transitions have theorized that economic reform may actually be beneficial to democracy. Market reform may increase the long-term legitimacy of democracy by improving the economy (Nelson 1994, 20). By distributing state property, marketization may build support for further reform (Mizsei 1994, 114), and it may create a class of people invested in reform (Nelson 1994, 25). Finally, privatization aids democratization by reducing the perception that the state is a large pie to be divided (Mizsei 1994, 141). Even in cases where private property exists and the state merely intervenes often in the economy, a reduced economic role for the state refocuses entrepreneurs' attention away from the executive as the distributor of funds and maker of decisions and toward mediators, such as parties, which express businesspeople's interests to legislators and officials (Nelson 1994, 26).

### *Market Reform and Economic Autonomy*

Unlike the studies that focus on voters' possible reactions to economic reform and incumbents' preemptive responses, this chapter examines the behavior of another important group of actors—current and potential activists. It is these activists who connect voters and politicians and bring newly created democratic institutions, such as parties and legislatures, to life. To the extent that market reform creates economic autonomy, individuals are more likely to engage in the civic realm. For this reason, marketization and democratization are not merely compatible, as other investigations suggest, but market reforms can be *essential* to democratic development.

The relationship between market reform and economic autonomy is complex. In the post-Soviet context, market reform has meant greater freedom to produce and sell goods across local borders and greater access to buyers and capital in distant countries—developments that tend to increase the economic autonomy of the population. Yet the extent of economic autonomy in a region does not depend on market reform alone, and market reform is not a surefire guarantee of economic autonomy. For example, the ability of a number of firms in Samara to dominate domestic and even world markets has bolstered economic autonomy in the region, but “monopolies” are not usually associated with free markets. In Naryn and Uliianovsk other factors have reduced the impact of market reform on economic autonomy. Greater freedom to trade has meant little in Naryn where the topography hinders the production of coveted goods and access to

markets, and the right to create and own a business has been hampered in Uliianovsk where Governor Gorlachev tried to control entrepreneurs.

The complexity of the relationship between market reform and economic autonomy emphasizes that neither privatization nor pro-market leadership is the “magic potion” that will create democracy in the former Soviet Union. The term “private” is misleading in this part of the world, where governments, officials, and their relatives and friends often own controlling numbers of shares, and leaders manipulate state inspections, credit, and leasing to dominate businesses owned by their adversaries (Couloudon 1997; Staniszki 1991, 127–41; Stark 1996, 993–1,027). Instead, those businesses with outside profits, capital, and connections provide economic autonomy in a region. Furthermore, while pro-market leaders, such as those in Samara, can encourage the development of truly independent businesses, they are no guarantee of economic autonomy. In Naryn local officials have not interfered with entrepreneurial pursuits, but the topography of the region has hindered independent trade, so most citizens lack economic autonomy from local authorities, relying instead on government subsidies, and thus remaining in fear of party activities. In sum, market reform can facilitate economic reform, but this relationship exists within the context of other institutional, cultural, and broader economic factors.

### *Policy Implications*

How can this chapter conclude that market reform can promote democratization, whereas the other chapters find that marketization has been detrimental to democratic development? My finding that market reform can increase economic autonomy and consequently facilitate democratization does not contradict the conclusions of the other authors; it merely emphasizes that market reform has neither a completely harmful impact nor a completely beneficial impact on democratic development. The contributors to this volume include in their definitions of market reform foreign investment, privatization, and overall reduced state involvement in the economy, and they argue that the short-term consequences of these factors are not conducive to democracy. Yet while foreign investment and privatization can lead to economic-political monopolies and decreased state involvement can produce antidemocratic public sentiment, these reforms can also promote economic autonomy. Foreign investment and private property can be captured by local elites, but when elites are market-oriented or when businesspeople engage in entrepreneurship in different regions, these factors contribute to economic autonomy. Whereas declining state support may anger former beneficiaries, it also reduces citizens' reliance on government authorities for their livelihoods or, in other words, increases economic autonomy. As long as these citizens abide by the “rules of the game,” which I found even the communists in these provinces do, then their anger and consequent activism or their support for

antireformist organizations contributes to party development and the functioning of newly created democratic institutions.

For market reform to facilitate democratic development to a greater extent than it undermines it, both domestic and foreign policymakers must consider how the local context will influence their market reforms and programs. For example, democracy could better thrive in Naryn Oblast if the right to trade were coupled with investment in the transportation infrastructure. Similarly, to build democracy in Uliianovsk, international organizations supporting small business development in neighboring oblasts should consider including residents of Uliianovsk in their programs. In sum, the interaction between employment and activism suggests that market reforms that promote economic autonomy from the state can facilitate the development of political parties in the former Soviet Union. Improvements in institutional design, the ebbing of cultural legacies, and greater access to resources will have only limited effects on party development if people are fearful of losing their jobs as a result of civic involvement.

## NOTES

1. The author is grateful to Joel Moses for his assistance in editing and updating this chapter and to Henry Hale for his comments on an earlier version. This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. SBR-9729989. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation. Grants from the Institute for the Study of World Politics and the University of Michigan also funded this research.
2. Former and current major political organizations are those that were active in these regions during or prior to the period under study. Activities included supporting candidates for local, regional, or national elections, and holding regular meetings.

As part of a larger project, I also conducted interviews with leaders of nonpolitical organizations, winning and losing candidates for regional political office, regional government officials, and members of the local mass media, for a total of 252 interviews. I also collected socioeconomic data for each region, including lists of public groups and employment statistics.

3. For recent descriptions of parties' weaknesses, see: John T. Ishiyama, "Political Integration and Political Parties in Post-Soviet Russian Politics," *Demokratizatsiya* 7, no. 2 (1999): 188–203. Richard Rose et al., "Voting in a Floating Party System: The 1999 Duma Election," *Europe-Asia Studies* 53, no. 3 (2001): 419–43; Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, "Central Weakness and Provincial Autonomy: Observations on the Devolution Process in Russia," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 15, no. 1 (1999): 87–106; Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, "The Limited Reach of Russia's Party System: Underinstitutionalization in Dual Transitions," *Politics and Society* 29, no. 3 (2001): 385–414; Daniel Treisman, "Dollars and Democratization: The Role and Power of Money in Russia's Transitional Elections," *Comparative Politics* 31, no. 3 (1998): 1–21.

Another set of works argues that parties exhibit some strengths. For example, some scholars have found that partisanship has developed among elites and masses and that party blocs influence legislators' preferences: Ted Brader and Joshua A. Tucker, "The Emergence of Mass

Partisanship in Russia, 1993–1996," *American Journal of Political Science* 45, no. 1 (2001): 69–83; Timothy Colton, *Transitional Citizens: Voters and What Influences Them in the New Russia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000); Arthur H. Miller et al., "Emerging Party Systems in Post-Soviet Societies: Fact or Fiction?" *The Journal of Politics* 62, no. 2 (2000): 455–90; Robert G. Moser, "Independents and Party Formation: Elite Partisanship as an Intervening Variable in Russian Politics," *Comparative Politics* 31, no. 2 (1999): 147–65; Thomas F. Remington and Steven S. Smith, "Theories of Legislative Institutions and the Organization of the Russian Duma," *American Journal of Political Science* 42, no. 2 (1998): 545–72; Henry Hale describes in detail the differences between the two sets of findings and provides an explanation of how both sets can be accurate. Specifically, Hale argues that in Russia parties have begun to perform some traditional functions, but the party system has been weakened by the presence of "party substitutes." Henry E. Hale, "Why Not Parties: Supply and Demand on Russia's Electoral Market," unpublished manuscript (2001).

4. On electoral timing and "party substitutes," see Richard Sakwa's *Russian Politics and Society* and Hale's "Why Not Parties?" respectively. On electoral institutions, refer to Colton, Ishiyama, Sakwa, and Jerry F. Hough's "The Failure of Party Formation and the Future of Russian Democracy." For cultural explanations, see Hough, Ishiyama, Sakwa, and *How Russia Votes* by Stephen White et al. For the socioeconomic cleavages and dual transitions arguments, see Sakwa and Stoner-Weiss's "The Limited Reach of Russia's Party System," respectively. Richard Sakwa, *Russian Politics and Society* (New York: Routledge, 1996); Jerry F. Hough, "The Failure of Party Formation and the Future of Russian Democracy," *Growing Pains: Russian Democracy and the Election of 1993*, ed. Timothy Colton and Jerry F. Hough (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 1998); and Stephen White et al., *How Russia Votes* (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1997).
5. The elections under consideration in this chapter are the December 1996 gubernatorial and December 1997 regional parliamentary elections in Samara, the December 1996 gubernatorial and December 1995 regional parliamentary elections in Uliianovsk, and the February 1995 regional parliamentary elections in Osh and Naryn. The electoral laws examined are those that applied to these elections.
6. A voter group is comprised of citizens, one of whom must register with the oblast electoral commission on behalf of the group. Candidates who wish to nominate themselves also need the support of a certain number of residents of their electoral districts.
7. Regional electoral associations are defined as oblast divisions of federal parties, political movements, or public associations as well as regional and interregional parties, political movements, and public associations.
8. Biography of Ivan Viktorovich Maslak. "Kandidat v deputat Samarskoi Gubernskoi Dumii: Bazmianskii izbratel'nyi okrug N 6," *Volshebnaia Kommuna*, 25 November 1997: 4.
9. A report from the National Democratic Institute confirms my findings. Candidates and political groups paid journalists to write articles on specific subjects. According to journalists at the seminar, money usually went to the editor who then assigned reporters to write articles. Elections are an income boost for journalists. Joe Keohane, "Media Coverage of Politics, 10/9–11/94," National Democratic Institute memo, 10/21/94.
10. The weak relationship has also manifested itself more recently in disagreements about which candidate to support. In the December 1999 gubernatorial elections, the Uliianovsk division of Unity (*Edinstvo*) supported the incumbent Gorbatchev, whereas the national affiliate supported army commander Vladimir Shamanov. "Federal, Regional Yedinstvo Splits in Ulyanovsk Elections," *Russian Regional Report* 5 (37), East-West Institute, October 2000.
11. "The party of power" at the time, NDR, also did well in Samara.
12. The exceptions to this are individuals in parties that are led by the governor of which the governor

- is a member. In the approach to the 2000 presidential elections governors increasingly created and joined parties.
13. Most activists are not unemployed, unpaid, or retired. Activists who had lost their jobs or were not being paid their wages—a common occurrence in the state sector—began to engage in petty trade or some other business within months in order to survive. Those who had difficulty finding work were not likely to become activists, as they had to spend their time searching for employment. A few of the activists interviewed retired from the military at a young age and were living primarily on retirement benefits, but most retired people are senior citizens and are unlikely to establish an NGO or a media outlet, for example, because of their age. In both Russia and Kyrgyzstan, however, we have seen pensioners engage in protests, a form of civic involvement that does not require a long-term commitment or adaptation to the new economic and political orders.
14. A hostile relationship between the mayor of a provincial capital and the governor of a region, as in Uliianovsk, does not seem to afford residents greater economic autonomy by, for example, allowing them to work for one authority and challenge the other. Most likely this is because governors tend to control city budgets and ultimately the fate of city employees.
15. Doctors may also have incentives to engage in civic activity because their status may make them more attractive to voters and thus more likely to win elections. Moreover, as one of the groups most negatively affected by wage arrears, doctors may be civically active in hopes of improving their economic situation. No doctors I interviewed referred to these motivations, but their profession could provide these incentives in addition to the protection described in the text.
16. For descriptions of Soviet-era workplace harassment techniques, see: Stephen Crowley, *Hot Coal, Cold Steel: Russian and Ukrainian Workers from the End of the Soviet Union to the Post-Communist Transformations* (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1997), 51, 82–91. M. Steven Fish, *Democracy From Scratch: Opposition and Regime in the New Russian Revolution* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 162–65.
17. Interview with Aleksei Novikov, analyst at Institut ekonomiki goroda, Moscow, 17 December 1997.
18. These data are from 1997 and are in U.S. dollars.
19. These statements are from an owner of a large business and a representative of the media in Samara during interviews with the author on 28 January 1998 and 26 January 1998, respectively. The identities of interviewees, besides scholars who provided background information, are not given to ensure their safety and privacy. Conclusions about the business climate in each region are drawn from interviews with businesspeople and media representatives in each region.
20. Unlike these other products, illicit opium from Afghanistan and local fields had not become a major trading good in the region, despite fears in the early 1990s. *Global Illicit Drug Trends 1999* (New York, NY: United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, 1999), 19–20.
- 22, 125. “UN Drug Programme to Launch Regional Law Enforcement Project Linking Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.” United Nations International Drug Control Programme press release, UN/IS/NAR/605 (2 May 1997). *Calming the Fergana Valley*, 72, 92. *The Kyrgyz Republic: Osh Regional Economic Strategy*, 25–26.
21. Author’s interviews with a Naryn Free Economic Zone representative on 1 and 11 July 1997.
22. Data obtained from the Kyrgyzstan National Statistics Committee on a former Web site of The Kyrgyzstan Development Gateway Project, State Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic on Foreign Investments and Economic Development.
23. The transitions in Latin America were not as severe because those countries already had experience with markets and democracy. Latin American countries undergoing simultaneous transitions included Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil. Joan M. Nelson, “How Market Reforms and Democratic

Consolidation Affect Each Other.” *Intricate Links: Democratization and Market Reforms in Latin American and Eastern Europe*, ed. Joan M. Nelson et al. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1994), 2, 4.

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**CHAPTER SEVEN**

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