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### FROM THE EDITORIAL BOARD

This is an issue for farewells. Our symposium is a celebration of the work and life of Guillermo O'Donnell, a towering figure in the study of democratization who passed away on November 29, 2011. We asked several of his colleagues, collaborators, and admirers to pen short recollections about him and his contributions. This ensemble attests to the regard in which the discipline held him. We also present three

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## O'DONNELL THE CONCEPTUAL ARTIST

Michael Coppedge, *University of Notre Dame*



There are many ways to contribute to the collective enterprise we call comparative politics. Some of us derive the logical implications of basic assumptions; some get inside the heads of the actors they study; some reconstruct causal processes; some gather data; some develop better research methods; some test hypotheses. And some, like Guillermo O'Donnell, change the way we see the world.

Guillermo O'Donnell made many kinds of contributions to social science, including mentoring generations of students and building CEDES and the Kellogg Institute; but his greatest contributions were the concepts he created. It may seem easy to coin a new term, but inventing a concept that captures an important phenomenon so well that everyone picks it up and uses it is a rare achievement. Robert Dahl (and Charles Lindblom) did it with "polyarchy," Juan Linz with "authoritarianism," Arend Lijphart with "consociational democracy," Theda Skocpol with "social revolution"; and there are a few others. Guillermo accomplished this feat repeatedly, with "bureaucratic-authoritarian regime," "impossible game," "brown areas," "delegative democracy," and at least some of the many evocative

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## A TRIBUTE TO GUILLERMO O'DONNELL

Robert Kaufman, *Rutgers University*



I had the great privilege of knowing Guillermo for almost forty years and of working with him at various points along the way. He was both an intellectual model and a political inspiration. As an academic, he left a major mark on at least three generations of scholarship on Latin America, beginning with his brilliant work on bureaucratic-authoritarianism and extending through his writing on democratic transitions, democratic accountability, and rule of law. In his thinking and writing, he was not only ahead of the curve; he shaped it.

O'Donnell's influential work on bureaucratic authoritarianism was spurred by the emergence of right-wing military dictatorships in the two most industrialized countries of Latin America—Brazil in 1964 and Argentina in 1966.<sup>1</sup> His analysis of these events provided a significant challenge to widespread assumptions about the positive effect of development on democracy. It focused instead on "technocratic" responses to the exhaustion of import-

1. Guillermo O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics*. *Politics of Modernization*, no 9. (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1973).

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## Articles

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### GUILLERMO O'DONNELL AND AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE

Laurence Whitehead

*Nuffield College, Oxford University*



Guillermo O'Donnell died in Buenos Aires in November 2011 at the age of 75. As a *porteño* this was where he belonged at the end of his life, and in March 2012 he was accorded a fine commemoration there. But he was also a citizen of the world, and a most influential and distinctive voice in democratization studies and comparative politics, first at Yale and the Wilson Center, and for the last quarter century at Notre Dame, where he was founding director of the innovative Helen Kellogg Institute. He was also a powerful contributor to a buoyant strand of research of American Political Science, both as an insider and an outsider.

Here it is worth pausing for a moment, both over the labels “American” and “Political Science.” If by “American” we understand a citizen of the Americas who lived and breathed the hopes and tragedies of political life in many parts of the western hemisphere over the past half century, then indeed he was more of an American than most. Not only the bitter turmoil of Argentina, but also the complex and mood-switching *jeitinho* of Brazilian politics, and the more orderly, but not necessarily more admirable politics of the USA absorbed his daily energies and helped to inspire his comparative and theoretical creativity. Beyond his direct engagement as a citizen as well as a scholar in those three nations, he was closely exposed to political realities in other American republics where his ideas acquired resonance and/or where colleagues and students drew him in. Beyond the western hemisphere he also exerted influence, for example in Spain and Taiwan, but above all he was grounded in the Americas. At the same time, and no doubt as a consequence of this continent-wide background, he was also very firm in his insistence that the “American” designation should not be improperly appropriated by just one of the countries to which it refers.

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### AN INTELLECTUAL REBEL – WHO CHANGED THE MAINSTREAM

Robert M. Fishman

*University of Notre Dame*



Guillermo O'Donnell was an intellectual rebel through and through, yet he changed mainstream academic work far more than many gifted scholars who have consistently worked within the parameters established by existing convention. He leaves behind a wealth of work that will amply reward those who read—and reread it—in depth. His challenge to the mainstream was at once theoretical, methodological, substantive and stylistic yet he consistently sought to engage with the work that he critiqued in an ongoing dialogue—through which he fundamentally transformed several literatures.

O'Donnell's work exemplifies the virtue of refusing to choose between intellectual poles or options that most conventional scholars tend to see as alternative approaches to social scientific work. Both in the extraordinary thematic breadth of his interdisciplinary reading and in his commitment to formulating theorizations rooted in contextually rich—and often case-specific—knowledge, O'Donnell was a distinguished practitioner of the neo-Weberian school, characterized by its simultaneous embrace of the search for historically embedded complexity and generalizing theory.<sup>1</sup> Yet he was as adept as any of his peers at engaging the latest arguments in comparative political science, political theory, political sociology and political economy.

1. Robert M. Fishman, “On Being a Weberian (after Spain's 11 – 14 March): Notes on the Continuing Relevance of the Methodological Perspective Proposed by Weber,” in Laurence McFalls, ed., *Weber's 'Objectivity' Reconsidered* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 261-289.

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## REFLECTIONS ON THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF GUILLERMO O'DONNELL

**James Mahoney**

*Northwestern University*



It is impossible to imagine what the field of comparative politics would look like without the contributions of Guillermo O'Donnell. He is responsible for so many of our best concepts—bureaucratic authoritarianism, delegative democracy, horizontal accountability, brown areas, to name a few—and so many of our most profound theoretical insights that the exercise of envisioning a comparative politics without O'Donnell violates the “minimal rewrite” rule of counterfactual analysis. When Guillermo O'Donnell died, political science lost one of its greatest thinkers and most influential scholars.

During his career, O'Donnell repeatedly set the theoretical and empirical agenda for work in comparative politics. His analysis of the technocratic and harsh brand of authoritarianism experienced in South America in the 1960s forever changed the field of comparative politics. To this day, *Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism* stands as a stunning example of theoretical elegance, conceptual originality, and the utility of political science for the analysis of humanly important questions.<sup>1</sup> When I once tried to assess knowledge accumulation concerning authoritarianism, I found that O'Donnell's work had triggered such a large and fruitful stream of research as to constitute a distinctive “Guillermo O'Donnell Research Program.” This stream of research is responsible for a good deal of what we now know about the onset and workings of authoritarianism.

1. Guillermo A. O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics* (Berkeley: Institution of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1973).

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## CONCEDING AND THRIVING: STRONG-STATE DEMOCRATIZATION IN ASIA

**Dan Slater**, *University of Chicago*

**Joseph Wong**, *University of Toronto*



It is widely argued that ruling parties help sustain authoritarian regimes. One of the most influential arguments for why this is the case centers on party cadres' will to power. “The preferences of party cadres are much simpler than those of [military] officers,” Geddes persuasively argues. “Like democratic politicians, they simply want to hold office.”<sup>1</sup>

Beyond having institutional capabilities that militaries lack, authoritarian ruling parties typically have stronger inherent incentives than their military counterparts to cling to power.

Yet there is an additional fundamental difference between ruling parties and militaries that has not been adequately explored, and which holds important implications for the likelihood of democratization in party-led regimes. For ruling militaries, democratization and withdrawal from office are one and the same. Yet unlike ruling militaries, ruling parties can democratize without losing power. For authoritarian parties, democratization entails the substantial concession and risk to hold free and fair elections, but not necessarily to lose those elections and withdraw from office. What Przeworski memorably called the “institutionalized uncertainty”<sup>2</sup> of democracy may mean eschewing certain victory, but it does not mean accepting certain defeat. Ruling parties can maintain power—and have maintained power—without maintaining authoritarian rule. Democratization may thus be more incentive-compatible for authoritarian parties than the conventional wisdom suggests.

1. Barbara Geddes, “What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?” *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1999), p. 129.

2. Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

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## Articles

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### CAN PEACE BE ENGINEERED? INSTITUTIONS, POLITICAL INCLUSION, AND ETHNIC CONFLICT

Andreas Wimmer

Princeton University



This research note addresses the long-standing debate among constitutional engineers and comparative political scientists about which institutions represent the best “tools” for preventing conflict in ethnically divided societies. The most often discussed candidates are democracy, federalism, proportionalism or majoritarianism, and presidentialism or parliamentarism. By contrast, I show on the basis of systematic quantitative evidence that these institutions are not effective in preventing armed conflict or civil war.

Rather, I argue, the underlying power configuration in a country is crucial to understand the conditions for peace. I rely on a series of previous findings,<sup>1</sup> which represent the backdrop for the following analysis. Using the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset that codes politically relevant ethnic groups and their access to government power in all countries and years since 1945, this previous research has shown that two power configurations are particularly war-prone: When large, ethnically defined segments of the population are not represented at the highest level of government, armed rebellion in the name of excluded populations may emerge. Second, a high number of power sharing partners increases insecurity about future alliances and thus commitment problems in the present, making it more likely that competition between ethnic elites sharing power escalates into armed conflict. Such “infighting” between power sharing partners, however, is much less frequent than rebellions by excluded groups (20 vs. 90 armed ethnic conflicts fought in the world since 1945). The power configuration is

1. Andreas Wimmer, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Brian Min, “Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict. A Configurational Analysis of a New Global Dataset,” *American Sociological Review* 74 (April 2009): 316–337.

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### IMPROVING THEORIES OF REGIMES, REGIME CONTINUITY, AND REGIME CHANGE THROUGH SUBNATIONAL RESEARCH: THE UTILITY OF THE VARIETIES OF DEMOCRACY DATASET

Kelly M. McMann

Case Western Reserve University



The growth of subnational democratization studies during the last two decades has helpfully complicated our understanding of democracy and, more broadly, regimes and regime continuity and change. We now have evidence that undemocratic enclaves exist in numerous countries, which we had comfortably labeled as democratic or democratizing. And, we have identified causes to account for these enclaves in specific countries. The next step is to expand the scope and depth of our knowledge so that we can refine regime typologies and theories of regime continuity and change. This article examines how subnational data generated by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project can help us achieve this. In doing so, it follows from the previous newsletter, which called for new approaches and data in studying subnational democratization.<sup>1</sup> Here, I examine challenges subnational democratization studies have posed to the conventional wisdom. Then, I consider questions that need to be answered in order to improve existing typologies and theories, and, finally, assistance that the V-Dem subnational data can provide.<sup>2</sup>

1. See, in particular, Tomila Lankina, “Sisyphian Endeavor or Worthwhile Undertaking?” *The American Political Science Association Comparative Democratization Newsletter* 10 (January 2012) and Agustina Giraudy, “Subnational Democracy: Lessons from Latin America,” *The American Political Science Association Comparative Democratization Newsletter* 10 (January 2012).

2. This article benefited from suggestions from Agustina Giraudy, participants in the Measuring Democracy Working Group at University of Notre Dame’s Kellogg Institute for International Studies, and other members of the V-Dem team. All errors and omissions are my own.

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**FROM THE EDITORIAL BOARD, CONTINUED***(continued from page 1)*

other pieces in this issue. Dan Slater and Joe Wong reflect on one-party states in Asia and what their particular legacies entail for processes of democratization. Andreas Wimmer presents some early and provocative findings from a line of research on democratic institutions and ethnic conflict. And finally, Kelly McMann, following up on our last issue on subnational democratization, discusses her efforts to compile a global dataset to explore such questions.

The second farewell is my own. This will be the last issue of the newsletter that I will serve as the executive editor. Two years went by quickly. While I will continue to serve on the editorial committee, my esteemed colleagues Ben Smith and Staffan I. Lindberg will succeed me as coeditors. It is my hope that any differences you may notice in the future will be improvements.

It has been a daunting task to expand the newsletter into a serious forum for the discussion of our work. I owe a debt of gratitude to many people. My colleagues at the University of Florida who served on the editorial committee have been an inspiration. Many of them came up with the thematic foci for issues and recruited first rate contributors (and in this issue Ben Smith was my partner in crime). Others helped with the editing and in providing critical feedback to authors. Tristan Vellinga, who served as my editorial assistant for two years was indispensable. Tristan read everything produced at least twice, and worked assiduously to make sure everything appeared in the best possible light. Two chairs of the Department of Political Science, Steve Craig and Michael Martinez, and Dean Paul D'Anieri of the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences at the University of Florida encouraged us and

provided material support to make this possible. For this I am grateful. I am also indebted to all the authors who worked with us on the issues. The quality of the newsletter reflects their passion and ingenuity. Finally, we owe a huge debt to our colleagues at the National Endowment for Democracy who composed, helped to edit, and distributed the newsletter. I cannot imagine how we could have done this without the managing editor, Melissa Aten-Becnel. Melissa's sense of humor, patience, indefatigability, and commitment to the substance of democratization was essential to the whole enterprise.



Michael Bernhard  
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**Coppedge, CONTINUED***(continued from page 1)*

concepts from his collaboration with Phillippe Schmitter. The only social scientist I can think of who introduced as many new concepts was Max Weber, who had the advantage of helping to found the discipline.

The value of these conceptual contributions transcend any one dataset, regression, model, article, or book. They appeal directly to our intuitions. We don't feel the need to test them because we sense that they are true. Intuition plays a more important role in science than some realize. Our own informal understandings of how the world works may be less reliable than mathematical or logical tools, but consciously or not, we rely on them all the time. Our

intuitions are essential in bridging the chasm between the symbolic language of theory and things we can actually observe. Our intuitions also help us judge immediately whether a proposed causal connection deserves to be taken seriously. They determine whether the reaction to a new idea is applause or laughter. Few hypotheses in comparative politics have been derived purely from the formal assumptions of a theory. In almost all cases, at some point, researchers draw on their common-sense knowledge of the political world to translate the *logical* implications of a theory into observable implications. Without such translation, no theory would be testable.

Naming phenomena makes them more real to us. Guillermo had a talent for bestowing catchy names, like "brown areas" and "impossible game." This is a dangerous talent to have because we humans too easily confuse cleverness (such as alliteration, rhyming, and paradoxes) with insight. But I can't think of an instance in which Guillermo abused this talent. His concepts appropriately called attention to phenomena that were truly important: a chilling new type of authoritarian regime, the dehumanizing impact of authoritarianism, the disappointments of new democracies, and the failings of the state.

## Coppedge/Kaufman

The concepts he coined are deceptively simple: condensations of whole, complex stories (I would say theories, but Guillermo demurred from claiming the term) with actors, settings, motives, and tensions. Telling a satisfying story is really what it means to explain something. Guillermo's concepts were titles for dramas. The impossible game was a tragedy, brown areas a lament, delegative democracy a warning, and bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes a horror show.

When we use Guillermo O'Donnell's concepts, we speak his language, see the world through his eyes, and share his concerns. When we adopt his concepts,

we also become a community: a group of people sharing a common language, a research agenda, even a political agenda and an identity.

I was Guillermo's colleague for fifteen years at the Kellogg Institute, where I had the opportunity to see him at work on a regular basis, but how he arrived at these insights is still a mystery to me. I know it required passion, brilliance, deep scholarship, and engagement with unfolding events, but I am sure there is no recipe for combining these ingredients. It is an art, and Guillermo was an artist. Who knows what future political or social phenomenon will pass unnoticed because Guillermo

O'Donnell is not here to point it out to us?

*Michael Coppedge is professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame. He is the author of Democratization and Research Methods (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2012) and (with John Gerring et al.), "Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: A New Approach," Perspectives on Politics (June 2011): 247-267. He received his Ph.D. in 1988 from Yale University and now chairs the American Political Science Association Task Force on Indicators of Democracy and Governance.*

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## KAUFMAN, CONTINUED

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substitution industrialization and the structural constraints that it implied. Not surprisingly, the work was controversial, and it served, among other things, to provoke alternative approaches which downplayed socioeconomic explanations and emphasized perverse institutional incentives and strategic miscalculations of political actors.<sup>2</sup> But O'Donnell's analysis was seminal precisely because it engaged on a wide variety of intellectual traditions – from dependency approaches to “mainstream” sociology and political science. And although Guillermo himself turned more directly to “actor-centered” approaches in the next phase of his career, many of the structuralist themes elaborated and systematized in his work on bureaucratic-authoritarianism remained relevant to understanding the constraints of globalization and capital mobility faced by new democracies in an era of debt crisis and structural

adjustment.

O'Donnell's contribution to the literature on democratization, and particularly his path breaking collaboration with Philippe Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead,<sup>3</sup> had an even more profound and enduring influence. Led by O'Donnell and Schmitter,<sup>4</sup> the contributors to this project brought political actors “back in.” In somewhat ironic contrast to criticisms of the work on bureaucratic authoritarianism, this line of research can be criticized for overemphasizing voluntarism and “fortuna,” for focusing too narrowly on negotiations among elite actors, and attaching too much

3. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

4. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, “Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies,” in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

importance to “pact making” as a foundation for successful democratic transitions. But writing in an era where military dictators still dominated in a large number of countries, O'Donnell's emphasis on strategic opportunities of political actors intentionally addressed democratic activists as well as scholars.

More important, O'Donnell's initial intuition that there was no tight relationship between transitions and socioeconomic or cultural prerequisites has received considerable support in econometric research.<sup>5</sup> Although these findings have not gone unchallenged,<sup>6</sup> experience “on the ground” also bears out the looseness of the socioeconomic constraints on the initial establishment of democratic regimes. Movement toward democracy during

5. Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi. “Modernization: Theory and Facts” *World Politics* 49 (January 1997): 176.

6. See Carles Boix and Susan Stokes, “Endogenous Democratization,” *World Politics* 55 (July 2003): 517-549.

2. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds. *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

the “third wave,” as O’Donnell and Schmitter argued, has in fact occurred in a substantially wider variety of socio-economic circumstances than “developmentalist” explanations might have led us to expect.

Finally, as democratic regimes struggled to consolidate in the 1990s and 2000s, O’Donnell again led the way to discussion on major questions. His conceptualization of “delegative democracy” – elected governments that are relatively unconstrained by “horizontal accountability” provided a very early recognition of a pattern that has become widespread in Latin America, even among countries which have not – like Venezuela – moved decisively toward competitive authoritarianism.<sup>7</sup> Similarly, his discussion of “brown areas” where the state had limited reach provided a vivid metaphor that highlighted the distinction between democratic regimes and the bureaucratic infrastructure of

the state itself.<sup>8</sup> In articles and papers, finally, O’Donnell also provided an important reflection on the relation between citizenship, civil law and political rights, and on how the historical sequencing of the establishment of these rights distinguished experiences in Western Europe and Latin America.<sup>9</sup> Here, O’Donnell’s brilliance as a social scientist combined with his deep interest in issues of law and justice.

I could, of course, elaborate much more extensively on these contributions, and many others that Guillermo made in his long academic career. But what I want to emphasize here is not only the scholarly writing per se – as important and insightful as that was – but the extent to which all of his work was infused by a deep passion about rule of law, democracy, and human liberty. Guillermo was a political philosopher

as well as a political scientist – and above all, a committed democrat. Our community – and I personally – will profoundly miss his wisdom and his commitment.

*Robert Kaufman is a professor of political science at Rutgers University. He has written widely on authoritarianism and democratic transitions in Latin America and the political economy of economic reform. His current research is on democratization and social policy reform in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and East Asia. His most recent book is Development, Democracy, and Welfare States: Latin America, East Asia, and Eastern Europe (2008), coauthored with Stephan Haggard. Their previous book, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions, won the Luebbert Prize for best book from the Comparative Politics Section of the American Political Science Association in 1995.*

7. Guillermo O’Donnell, “Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies,” *Journal of Democracy* 9 (July 1998) 112-126.

8. Guillermo O’Donnell, “On the State, Democratization and Some Conceptual Problems (A Latin American View with Glances at Some Post-Communist Countries,” Working Paper #192, The Kellogg Institute For International Studies, April 1993.

9. O’Donnell, “Why the Rule of Law Matters,” *Journal of Democracy* 15 (October 2004), p. 40.

## Whitehead

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### WHITEHEAD, CONTINUED

(continued from page 2)

It was therefore under protest that he allowed his last essay to be published in *Democratization in America*, a volume edited by Desmond King, Robert C. Lieberman, Gretchen Ritter, and myself, despite its exclusive focus on the USA.<sup>1</sup> Guillermo knew enough to write about the United States, of course, but his desire was to view it comparatively and from without. It was only because the Johns Hopkins Press favoured an implied reference to Tocqueville that he allowed the restricted use of “America” to pass.

In a similar vein, he was both an insider and a skeptical critic of the profession of “political science.” He was an insider as one of the brightest stars of his generation of US-trained scholars, who owed much of his English language formation to such authorities as Apter, Dahl, and Hirschman. He was also an insider through the professional leadership role he assumed at Kellogg, and as President of the International Political Science Association, not to mention many other related distinctions. The fourth volume of the *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* project, which he authored jointly with Philippe Schmitter, was one of the most influential and widely cited texts

1. Guillermo O'Donnell and Laurence Whitehead, “Two Comparative Democratization Perspectives: “Brown Areas” and “Immanence,”” *Democratization in America: A Comparative-Historical Analysis*, Desmond King, Robert C. Lieberman, Gretchen Ritter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), pp. 28-56.

in American political science over the past two generations, and remains a key reading to this day.<sup>2</sup> Later work, for example on “horizontal” accountability and “delegative” democracy, still continues to shape the field. At the same time, he refused to confine himself to the template of professional political science. He used data sets sparingly, and theorized on the basis of the grand sweep of western social theory, rather than from the methodological toolboxes and journal citations currently in vogue in many departments. He soaked up the intensity and complexity of “real political practices” as experienced by citizens, social movements and *fuerzas vivas*, as well as by Presidents and elected representatives. He responded to the value cleavages and selective truths of contemporary political debate by taking a public stand where he felt it necessary, while at the same time attempting to find a higher level of theoretical analysis on which to base his judgments. In pursuit of this goal he resorted extensively to the comparative method, comparisons based on taking seriously the multiple perspectives and diverse angles of vision available to him from across the whole hemisphere, which provided him with distance and perspective when hegemonic certainties were more likely to mislead.

2. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, “Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies,” in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

And he did not hesitate to draw on unfashionable, or at least extra-professional, sources of guidance where they seemed relevant—anthropological, sociological, jurisprudential, historical, and structural as well as ethical insights informed his world view.

So, yes, we have lost an eminent American Political Scientist, but more than that we have lost a bold thinker and a free spirit who contributed as much from outside the standard confines of contemporary academia as from within.

*Laurence Whitehead is an Official Fellow in Politics at Nuffield College, Oxford University, and Senior Fellow of the College. In March 2011 he takes up a one-year post as Senior Proctor of the University. His most recent books are Latin America: A New Interpretation, (Palgrave, 2006), second revised updated edition 2010 and Democratization: Theory and Experience (OUP, 2002). Whitehead has published numerous articles in academic journals, including, most recently, Democratization, Taiwan Journal of Democracy, and Perspectives on Politics. He is the editor of an Oxford University Press series, “Studies in Democratization” and President of the Conseil Scientifique of the Institut des Ameriques in Paris. He is also a member of the steering committee of the Red Eurolatinoamericano de Gobernabilidad para el Desarrollo.*



## FISHMAN, CONTINUED

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O'Donnell shared the neo-Weberian approach<sup>2</sup>—and thus the practice of theorizing broadly on the foundation of case-sensitive and historically embedded analysis—with several other great pioneers in the study of democracy, authoritarianism and political regime change, but O'Donnell's work was distinctive even within that group. Among those using this approach to the study of democracy and authoritarianism, Guillermo O'Donnell stands out clearly as the scholar most consistently devoted to the analysis of possible tensions between supposedly felicitous economic dynamics and the fate of democracy—an area of inquiry that continues to attract broad interest. In other ways as well he searched for meaningful shortfalls in contemporary democratic outcomes; his work built in innovative ways off his breadth of reading in political and legal theory, political economy and sociology, anthropology and history. But O'Donnell also incorporated into his work a wide range of insights culled from his direct observation of the world surrounding him both in his native Argentina and elsewhere. His methodology was pragmatically eclectic.

O'Donnell is best known for three fundamental contributions—on the paradoxical emergence of bureaucratic authoritarianism in the relatively developed southern cone of South America,<sup>3</sup> on the dynamics of transitions from authoritarian rule (in collaboration with Philippe Schmitter

and Laurence Whitehead)<sup>4</sup> and more recently on crucial underpinnings of democracy in the state and in conditions promoting widespread *agency* on the part of citizens<sup>5</sup>—but many of the insights found in his work stand outside those three thematic arenas. His exploration of authoritarian legacies in micro-contexts located far outside the political arena in its narrowest sense, his ethnographic comparison of social hierarchies and driving practices in Brazil and Argentina and his pioneering work on accountability underscore the great thematic breadth of his writing and intellectual creativity. He turned to the essay as the writing form most suited to many of his insights;<sup>6</sup> O'Donnell's creativity and depth were not constrained by the conventional career calculations that shape so many scholarly publication strategies. Throughout it all, O'Donnell wrote on themes that mattered to him, on which he had something fundamentally new to say and through which he could engage in ongoing debate with other scholars.

The work that resulted from this approach bears careful rereading for it is constructed with unusual intellectual care and style that provide it with enduring interest and relevance. To take up but one example, O'Donnell's discussion of technocratic roles and standards in his classic work on bureaucratic authoritarianism is of

4. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

5. Guillermo O'Donnell, *Democracy, Agency and the State: Theory with Comparative Intent* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

6. Guillermo O'Donnell, *Counterpoints: Selected Essays on Authoritarianism and Democratization* (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1999).

2. I remain indebted to O'Donnell for discussions with him on this point.

3. Guillermo O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics* (Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, 1973).

ongoing relevance in contexts far removed from the southern cone countries on which his analysis was based. In that instance and others he endeavored to theorize in ways that could travel beyond the settings in which his insights were initially rooted. Much of what he wrote on the dangers of an excessive reliance on technocratic mentalities in South America rings as true today—on other continents—as it did at the time in the societies on which he was writing. Indeed, students of the contemporary Euro crisis have as much to learn today from that work as do Latin Americanists. O'Donnell's writing will continue to offer readers a vivid reminder that scholarship can be simultaneously articulated around the specific historical trajectories of particular cases and the drive to identify broad theoretical implications of such analyses for numerous other contexts.

O'Donnell's work is also marked by the combination of incisive critique with hope—and a commitment to the idea of progress. Yet his scholarship is not in any sense 'utopian.' It is thoroughly embedded in a sharp critique of contemporary or recent practice alongside the identification of bases for overcoming, or striving to overcome, unsatisfying outcomes. O'Donnell made an enormous impact not only through his writing but also in his direct scholarly interactions from his time as a graduate student at Yale onward. At Yale, where the distinction between professor and student became a mere formality in this case, his ideas developed alongside those of other giants in the study of democracy and development—including Juan Linz, Alfred Stepan, David Apter, and Robert Dahl. The scholar at Yale with whom

## ***Fishman/Mahoney***

O'Donnell had perhaps his closest academic connection at the time, the late David Apter, often admonished graduate students to avoid becoming—as he put it—‘research assistants for the dominant paradigm.’ Few scholars have followed that advice so fully and consistently as O'Donnell—whose work reconfigured existing paradigms. In his scholarship there is much that social scientists will return to for insight and fruitful hypotheses but there are also lessons both for those engaged in the political arena and for scholarly life itself. Indeed, O'Donnell's concern for

conditions promoting agency holds as many implications for scholarly life as for politics. The wide-ranging intellectual creativity and tireless methodological eclecticism of O'Donnell serve as reminders of how profoundly those virtues can reconfigure mainstream scholarly debates.

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*writing a book that theorizes enduring consequences of pathways to democracy on the basis of a comparison of democratic practice and societal outcomes in Spain and Portugal. His most recent books are Democracy's Voices (2004) and (with Anthony Messina) The Year of the Euro (2006). His articles have appeared in World Politics, Politics & Society, Studies in Comparative International Development, Comparative Politics, Contributions to Political Economy, and other journals.*

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## **MAHONEY, CONTINUED**

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*Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, which O'Donnell co-authored with Philippe Schmitter, is surely the most influential book ever written about the wave of democratic transitions that swept the globe beginning in the 1970s.<sup>2</sup> The book's focus on the internal contradictions within authoritarian regimes (e.g., between hardliners and softliners) became the point of departure for a whole generation of work on democracy in comparative politics. Some scholars adapted its theoretical ideas, extending its argument to new regions and cases. Others took critical issue with its claims, using the book as a basis to develop new lines of argument. Either way, O'Donnell's ideas about democratization were the starting point and foundation for most subsequent analysis of democratization around the world.

The later stages of O'Donnell's career were hardly a period of “winding down.” Rather, O'Donnell's late career saw the publication of a series of seminal new works on the quality of new democracies. This work was stimulated by his assessment of the disappointing functioning of democracy in Latin America, especially in his native Argentina. The overriding concern was to make these democracies work better for their citizens. O'Donnell made basic contributions concerning issues of accountability, the rule of law, and the role of the state in democracy. He was fundamental to the movement away from an exclusive focus on regime institutions toward a more robust understanding of democracy, one that includes the capacity of the state to provide political access, resources, and justice for its citizens.

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Guillermo O'Donnell was a remarkable man who used scholarship to contribute to the development of

a better world. He was remarkable for the depth of thought and fair consideration of alternative views that were behind his political convictions. He was remarkable for his passion about genuinely important political issues—questions concerning the lives and wellbeing of regular citizens—even well after he had achieved great fame as a scholar. And he was remarkable for his capacity to deliver answers to these questions with stunning creativity, deep empirical grounding, and practical lessons and utility for going forward.

Whereas O'Donnell was a mostly solitary writer, as a colleague and intellectual he was highly connected to individuals and movements. He was deeply engaged politically throughout his career, and that engagement shaped the content of all of his research. His work on bureaucratic authoritarianism was motivated by the effort to understand these regimes in order to remove them. Unlike some other activists in Latin America, however, O'Donnell sought

2. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

**MAHONEY, CONTINUED**

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*Mahoney*

to dislodge these B-A regimes through non-revolutionary means and with the goal of establishing political democracy, not socialism. When O'Donnell shifted to the study of democratic transitions beginning in the late 1970s, he did so to encourage and promote political democracy. Anyone who reads *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* cannot help but notice the message of hope that it conveys. That message was picked up by journalists and politicians, and it surely played some role in stimulating the optimism that seemed essential to sustaining the original transitions to democracy. Likewise, his concerns with democratic accountability, the rule of law, and the shortcomings of procedural democracy have found voice among important contemporary political movements and leaders in Latin America.

At an institutional level, O'Donnell was a skilled and innovative builder. He was one of the founders of CEDES in Buenos Aires; he also played a founding role in the establishment and direction of the Kellogg Institute for International Studies at Notre Dame; and he was an innovative leader at the Woodrow Wilson Center's Program for Latin America. O'Donnell further was president of the International Political Science Association, and vice-president of the American Political Science Association.

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O'Donnell's influence on generations of scholars from Latin America has shaped the faculty rosters of political science departments around the county. Many of the best Latin Americanists working today are from the region, and they were often inspired by O'Donnell in profoundly personal ways. But O'Donnell also had a major influence on generations of scholars born in the United States who now work on Latin American politics. In my case, I first learned about his work on B-A regimes while taking an undergraduate course taught by Kathryn Sikkink at the University of Minnesota. Reading this work was a life changing experience for me. I do not know if I would have become a political scientist without it. While at Berkeley for graduate studies, my adviser was David Collier, and he kept a little photograph of O'Donnell on his office wall. Once I asked David about whom I should have in mind as an audience when writing about Latin American politics, and he pointed to the photo, and said, "Him." Ever since, O'Donnell has been my imaginary audience. When I met Guillermo in graduate school, I was able to tell him about the influence of his work on me, and my dream to become a comparative-historical analyst of the region. And I will always treasure a special note that Guillermo sent to me in the summer of 2010 after reading my book on colonialism, the idea for which he knew his own work had helped to

inspire more than two decades earlier.

Like many others, I have sometimes tried to pin down the exceptional qualities of O'Donnell's work, in part so that I might emulate them. One aspect is surely O'Donnell's ability to use concepts that capture the core essence of hugely important political phenomena that have not been previously identified but that are instantly recognized when identified by a vivid name. Another aspect is his elegant juxtaposition of detailed information concerning specific cases, on the one hand, with general theoretical issues on the other. Yet another is his extraordinary ability to address some of the most important moral questions facing contemporary humanity in an objective, value-free manner.

Guillermo O'Donnell was a passionate, empathic, and brilliant scholar with an exceptional capacity for theoretical originality. He was an extraordinary human being. His contributions will outlive him, and his presence will remain with us: in his scholarly works, in his many students and protégées, in the institutions that he helped to build, in our quest for democratic justice, and, not least, in our fond memories.

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## SLATER AND WONG, CONTINUED

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This essay builds upon this theoretical corrective with a preliminary exploration of the following empirical paradox: some of the strongest authoritarian parties in the world have not resisted democratization, but have embraced it. Even more strikingly, such concessions of democracy have occurred in regimes that commanded exceptionally strong state apparatuses that were tightly fused with powerful ruling parties, providing these regimes with ample “incumbent capacity”<sup>3</sup> to resist democratization if they had so chosen. Yet they did not so choose, and history has shown that they chose wisely. In Taiwan, South Korea (hereafter Korea), and Indonesia, for example, dominant ruling parties conceded democracy without conceding power, and indeed with the confident expectation that they would not lose power. Rather than conceding and withdrawing, ruling parties in these Asian developmental states conceded and thrived.

But why, when, and how does such a “conceding-to-thrive” scenario come to pass? We contend that dominant parties can be incentivized to concede democratization from a position of exceptional strength and not only from a position of exceptional weakness. Paradoxically, the very strength that helps dominant parties sustain authoritarianism can also help motivate them to end it. Untangling this paradox of “strong-state democratization”<sup>4</sup> requires that attention be paid, first and foremost, to the historical sources of strength that make this strategy viable for some party leaders and not for others. It also demands sensitivity to the proximate conditions that make

3. Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

4. Dan Slater, “Strong-State Democratization in Malaysia and Singapore,” *Journal of Democracy* 23:2 (April 2012), pp. 19–33.

a conceding-to-thrive logic more likely in some settings than in others.

Our working causal argument is conjunctural and historical, and unfolds in three steps. First, ruling parties are only likely to embark on such a risky democratization path when they possess substantial antecedent resources and marked relative strength vis-à-vis the opposition, such that they confidently expect to win fully democratic elections. Second, and in some tension to the first point, ruling parties must nonetheless receive a strong and clear signal that they are passing their apex of power and legitimacy. This signal can take the form of an economic, electoral, contentious, or geopolitical shock, or some combination thereof. Third, ruling parties must be commanded by leaders who strategically calculate that pursuing democratic reform promises to give themselves and/or their parties a more enduring means of maintaining power. In short, conceding-to-thrive scenarios require a confluence of particular *strengths, signals, and strategies*.

**Strengths**

Party leaders are only likely to adopt the risky strategy of conceding-to-thrive when their antecedent resources continue to provide them with a marked power advantage over any and all of their political opponents. This provides confidence that the ruling party enjoys excellent prospects to maintain its dominance, at least for the founding democratic elections, even without deploying authoritarian coercion and manipulation. A conceding-to-thrive strategy therefore does not require the kind of imminent threat of a violent overthrow that many leading scholars stress as being conducive to democratic concessions,<sup>5</sup> on the contrary, it requires

5. Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson,

sufficient party strength to engender the confidence that democratization will not mean a withdrawal from office at all.

Where do such antecedent resources come from? We argue that the most important antecedent resource a dominant party can possess is a long-term connection to a highly capable state apparatus.<sup>6</sup> Nowhere in the postcolonial world has such state capacity been more impressive than in the “developmental states” of Northeast and Southeast Asia, which have helped produce rates of economic growth and industrial transformation unrivaled anywhere else in the world. To be sure, these Asian party-states are a highly diverse lot, as we have both explored at length elsewhere.<sup>7</sup> State capacity has historically been especially impressive in what were once called the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) of Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. Party domination of the authoritarian regime has been more pronounced in China, Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan than in Indonesia and Korea, where the military clearly played a central role

*Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Geddes, “What Do We Know?”; and Gary W. Cox, “Authoritarian Elections and Leadership Succession, 1975–2004,” Paper presented at the annual meetings of the American Political Science Association, Toronto (September 2009).

6. Dan Slater and Sofia Fenner, “State Power and Staying Power: Infrastructural Mechanisms and Authoritarian Durability,” *Journal of International Affairs* 65:1 (Fall/Winter 2011); Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*.

7. Joseph Wong, *Betting on Biotech: Innovation and the Limits of Asia’s Developmental State* (Cornell University Press, 2011) and *Healthy Democracies: Welfare Politics in Taiwan and South Korea* (Cornell University Press, 2004); Dan Slater, *Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); and Richard Doner, Bryan Ritchie, and Dan Slater, “Systemic Vulnerability and the Origins of Developmental States: Northeast and Southeast Asia in Comparative Perspective,” *International Organization* 59 (Spring 2005), pp. 327–361.



## Slater and Wong

in long-lasting authoritarian regimes alongside party apparatuses. Yet even if Korea and Indonesia were not party-dominated like their developmental state neighbors, we argue that, for purposes of studying democratization, they were both effectively party-led regimes. This is because it was party leaders and not military leaders who made the decision to concede democratization.

A history of state-led rapid development redounds to the political benefit of the ruling party in a variety of ways. An impressive record of transformative accomplishments in the economic realm provides the kind of “usable past” that proves vital for a formerly authoritarian party seeking “regeneration” under democratic conditions.<sup>8</sup> Decades of state-led industrialization and poverty reduction incubate a vibrant middle class with moderate political leanings, making voters less susceptible to the appeals of reformist challenger parties that lack any established record of fostering developmental success. Indeed, when ruling parties in developmental states concede and lead democratic reform during relatively good times,<sup>9</sup> they can puncture the only significant threat to their considerable popularity and legitimacy: their nondemocratic character.

### Signals

Yet even at the best of times and with the most ample of resources at their disposal, ruling parties will always see any concession of democratization as a risk. For conceding to be perceived as a *calculated* risk, however, ruling parties must not only have impressive

8. Anna Grzymala-Busse, *Redeeming the Communist Past: The Regeneration of Communist Parties in East Central Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

9. Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

antecedent strength; they must also confront a clear and strong signal that their apex of domination has passed. A concede-to-thrive scenario is unlikely to unfold when a ruling party appears either to be maintaining power at its very apex or rapidly hurtling toward its nadir. It is most likely to occur when clear and strong signals indicate that the party has passed its prime, but is only slowly sinking toward parity in popularity and resources vis-à-vis its most important rivals.

More specifically, a ruling party will most likely concede-to-thrive when it still expects to win super-majoritarian support in a democratic election, partly thanks to authoritarian legacies of extreme gerrymandering and malapportionment. Democratic concessions become less likely, however, as the prospects for incumbents to secure a solid victory become more uncertain. If, for example, the ruling party resists democratic reform for too long and its popularity plummets, its internal cohesion frays, and its legitimacy formula becomes discredited, the party risks a situation where a democratic election will produce immediate outright defeat and perhaps even retribution against its leaders.<sup>10</sup> In this scenario, the ruling party's only options are to accept defeat and prepare a comeback from the ranks of opposition, or to unleash repression against its opponents in a bid for uninterrupted authoritarian hegemony. This latter outcome is currently unfolding in contemporary Ba'athist Syria and ZANU-run Zimbabwe, for example. Or, as we see with the National Party in South Africa, ruling parties that hold

10. Cedric Jourde, “The Master is Gone, but Does the House Still Stand? The Fate of Single-Party Systems after the Defeat of Single Parties in West Africa,” in Edward Friedman and Joseph Wong, eds., *Political Transitions in Dominant Party Systems: Learning to Lose* (New York: Routledge, 2008).

on for too long can plummet so far that they become effectively obsolete from the moment of political opening. What this suggests is that there is a kind of “sweet spot” in which strongly resourced ruling parties are most likely to concede-and-thrive. Since a party enters this zone upon receiving worrisome signals of declining popularity and legitimacy, however, we call it a *bittersweet* spot.

What kind of events present especially clear and strong signals to an authoritarian party that it has passed its apex? Much as developmental states provide a variety of sources of antecedent strength to ruling parties, signals of their growing vulnerability also take a variety of forms. Since they occur when a ruling party remains dominant, these diverse signals all similarly come as a serious shock. The first type of shock is electoral. When a long-dominant ruling party first suffers noticeable losses of electoral support in a “competitive authoritarian” or more deeply undemocratic election, it is an especially clear signal that a party's popularity has begun to wane. Such results can be blamed on an unpopular individual leader rather than any secular softening of support for the party writ large, and hence not be taken as a clear signal that a party's apex has passed. Yet the fact that elections directly capture partisan preferences of voters means that electoral shocks can serve as especially clear and strong signals of incipient decline. For instance, the KMT in Taiwan and the DJP in South Korea chose the path of democratic reform after their electoral dominance had begun to wane, even under conditions of considerable repression and severe gerrymandering, during the early 1980s.

A second common type of shock is

economic. Even the strongest economies are far from immune from global financial turmoil, as the developmental states of Northeast and Southeast Asia learned in the late 1990s. Economic shocks are fuzzier signals of party weakening than electoral shocks, since they can be more readily and credibly blamed on exogenous actors and factors. Yet they do tend to increase pressure both outside and within an authoritarian ruling party for political reform, and can be widely perceived as a strong signal that the authoritarian model has passed its prime. In regimes that are deeply dependent upon their track records of economic performance for their deeper historical legitimacy as well as for their more proximate popularity, economic signals can be among the most powerful of all. Even when electoral support remains relatively good, suddenly bad economic tidings can signal that a regime is passing from its apex to a “bittersweet spot” most conducive for conceding-and-thriving.

Outbursts of contentious politics represent a third common kind of shock. The issue here is not simply the size of public protest, but its *type*. A signal of party decline will be especially strong and clear if protests not only target the ruling party’s policies, but broadly question its right to rule. Signal strength and clarity are also enhanced to the degree that the opposition movement is cross-class in composition and nationalist in rhetoric. The cross-class nature of contentious opposition – as we see emerge in Taiwan, Korea, and Indonesia – neutralizes state strategies to divide and conquer, particularly for those regimes originally founded on “protection pacts” aimed at stabilizing the polity by containing and suppressing the forces of the radical Left.<sup>11</sup> The

nationalist orientation of opposition movements challenges the existential core of the ruling party’s legitimacy formula, which lies in its credible claim to have saved the nation from chaos and backwardness.

Finally, a fourth kind of clear and strong signal that a regime has passed its apex of power can be geopolitical. Many if not most authoritarian regimes in the postcolonial world have depended to at least some degree on superpower patronage, especially during the Cold War. When such sponsors credibly threaten to retract support unless meaningful steps toward democratization are taken, it lends added weight to those forces within the ruling party who wish to attempt a concede-to-thrive strategy. As with electoral, economic, and contentious signals, such geopolitical signals by no means make a ruling party’s decision to risk a concede-to-thrive strategy inevitable. Yet they make it more probable, and it is a probabilistic argument that we are developing here.

### Strategies

Conceding-to-thrive is never a structural imperative, but a structured choice. Hence we need to complement structural considerations with examination of the more contingent and agentive factors that turn conceding-to-thrive from a viable and likely outcome to an actual one. Since powerful dominant party institutions tend to invest extremely strong decision-making powers in the hands of their top leaders, democratic concessions ultimately result from the strategic considerations of the very top party leadership such as Chiang Ching-Kuo in Taiwan, Roh Tae-Woo in Korea, and B.J. Habibie in Indonesia. We thus do not argue that a majority of ruling-party members must find a conceding-

to-thrive strategy to be in their personal interests. It is more important that such a strategy be incentive-compatible for the party leadership when the party enters the “bittersweet spot” that lies much closer to its apex than its nadir. In sum, parties with the *strength* to concede have only adopted the *strategy* to concede after receiving clear and strong *signals* that their power was in incipient but gradual decline.

### Conceding and Thriving in Asia

Our three initial cases of conceding-and-thriving are Korea, Taiwan, and—doubtlessly most controversially—Indonesia. The case of Indonesia might seem at first glance to appear a strange one to compare with Korea and Taiwan. Yet in fact it brings into sharper relief the importance of the key factors we contend shape the likelihood of a concede-and-thrive scenario: antecedent strengths, worrisome signals, and leader strategies. Whereas Korea’s and Taiwan’s experiences of “strong-state democratization” are often explained by these countries’ intense security concerns with their communist neighbors, this factor was absent in Indonesia’s democratic transition. Nor did Indonesia’s ruling Golkar party have any of the “democratic narrative” running through its history that is often invoked to explain the KMT’s democratic exceptionalism in Taiwan. Furthermore, Indonesia shows that neither the developmental state nor the ruling party need be extraordinarily strong for a concede-and-thrive scenario to be viable. Despite the reputational damage it suffered from its association with the discredited dictator, Suharto, Golkar has leveraged its antecedent territorial infrastructure to position itself at the heart of every coalition government since President B.J. Habibie conceded democratic elections in 1999.

11. Slater, *Ordering Power*.

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Indonesia's experience thus suggests that the threshold of antecedent party-state resources necessary for conceding-and-thriving might be lower—and thus more potentially generalizable to a wider array of cases—than the experience of Korea and Taiwan alone would imply.

After considering these three positive cases, we intend to gain variation on our dependent variable by assessing the absence (at least to date) of strong-state democratization in three additional Asian cases: Malaysia, Singapore, and China. In Malaysia, we contend that UMNO entered its bittersweet spot at the same time as Indonesia's Golkar in 1998. Yet what was perceived as an ambivalent signal of impending trouble for the ruling party resulting from the Asian financial crisis, plus an especially coercive incumbent, led UMNO to miss its prime opportunity to concede-and-thrive. By contrast, Singapore's ruling PAP is currently in the ideal position to concede and thrive, having just suffered unexpected but quite mild setbacks in the 2011 elections. The big question in Singapore is whether this will be taken as a strong enough signal to warrant democratic concessions, given the PAP's continued super-majoritarian strength. Finally, we argue that China's CCP will have an especially difficult time at calibrating its bittersweet spot in the absence of "competitive authoritarian" elections, an absence that also reduces confidence that it could reliably win free and fair elections if they were permitted. The key point, however, is that whereas most scholars suggest that China's best hope for

democratization lies in either a near-term economic crash or an irreparable internal party rift, we offer a scenario in which the CCP might be more likely to concede democratic reform from a position of increased strength than one of extreme weakness. Indeed, our framework suggests that the classic claim by O'Donnell and Schmitter that democratic transitions universally require "important divisions within the authoritarian regime itself" might not always hold true.<sup>12</sup>

Apologists for Asian authoritarianism have long maintained that the region is distinctly ill-suited for democracy. Our framework suggests, by stark contrast, that the developmental states of Northeast and Southeast Asia are especially well-suited for democratization. Unlike regions of the world where the failure of an authoritarian regime threatens the failure of the entire state apparatus, Asia is stocked with states that are sufficiently robust to deliver good governance, whether manned by authoritarian or democratic leaderships. They are also "blessed" with moderate and conservative middle-class electorates that tend to prefer parties with solid developmental records over untested if more reformist and redistributive party challengers. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have proven these points most emphatically. Even a country with a wobblier Leviathan that suffered a more tumultuous authoritarian exit such as Indonesia has

12. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

shown that democratization in the wake of decades of rapid state-led growth tends to be marked by continuity more than upheaval in governing coalitions. The key implication is that dominant authoritarian parties can similarly change their regime *type* without ceasing to be the central player in the regime *itself* in developmental party-states such as Singapore, Malaysia, and even China.

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**Wimmer, CONTINUED**

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operationalized with the number of power sharing partners and the percentage of the population excluded from representation at the highest level of government.

In what follows, I show that political institutions do not affect these ethno-political power configurations in systematic ways and there is thus no indirect causal relationship between institutions and peace. Furthermore, these institutions also don't show much of a direct effect on the probability of armed conflict—they don't seem to provide strong enough incentives to steer the dynamics of political competition onto peaceful tracks. I conclude that rather than institutional engineering, prevention efforts should focus on the de-facto power configuration and try to foster inclusive government, whatever institutional form it takes. The next section evaluates whether political institutions affect the power configuration and thus indirectly also the likelihood of conflict. Section two discusses possible direct associations between institutions and conflict and section three concludes.

Before I proceed, a note on the data sources is in order. For the ethno-political power configuration, I rely on the EPR dataset. Based on the expertise of several dozen country specialists, it lists all ethnic categories that are minimally politically relevant for each year and each country. For each of these categories, the level of access to and representation in the central government was determined for each year, using a series of ordinal categories: monopoly power, dominance, senior and junior partners in power sharing arrangements, regional autonomy, powerless and discriminated against.<sup>2</sup>

2. The data can be accessed at: <http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/epr>.

Table 1: Democracy and Ethno-Political Exclusion

	Dependent variable				
	Proportion of population excluded			Future change in exclusion	Democratic transition next 5 years
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Democracy, lagged	-0.5630** (0.216)	-0.8109** (0.297)	-0.5796* (0.237)	-0.0048 (0.009)	
Fully proportional systems		0.4561 (0.280)			
Fully parliamentary systems		0.0753 (0.358)			
Fully federal systems		-0.3006 (0.525)			
Democratic transition during past 10 years			0.0303 (0.212)	-0.0147 (0.012)	
Proportion of population excluded					-0.9679* (0.465)
Number of observations	7,024	3,404 Without autocracies	6,819	6,092	4,439 Non-democracies only
Notes on No. of observations					

Notes: Controls for the size of the largest ethnic group and the number of groups (models 1-4), GDP, cubic splines on calendar year, and constant not shown; robust standard errors in parentheses; \* significant at 5%; \*\* significant at 1%.

For the present purpose, I will use a less fine-grained distinction between included groups and those excluded from central government power. The coding of the dependent variable is taken from the Ethnic Armed Conflict dataset, which is based on the Uppsala Armed Conflict Dataset (UACD) dataset<sup>3</sup> and adds information on whether or not a rebel organization fights in the name of and predominantly recruits among a specific ethnic community. Given the topic of this essay, all following analyses are restricted to this universe of ethnic conflicts.

To assess the impact of political institutions, I will use all the available datasets that have been assembled in the past decade: Gerring and Thacker's coding for non-autocratic countries since 1945 (GT for short), the World Bank dataset on political institutions<sup>4</sup>

3. Ibid.

4. Thorsten Beck, George Clarke, Alberto Groff,

which starts in 1975 (WB for short), Polity3 for federalism from 1946 to 1994, and the Institutions and Elections Project data<sup>5</sup> that covers all countries since 1972 (IAEP for short). Both the IAEP and the WB data contain very fine-grained codings of electoral systems and federalism and I will use several measurements that can be derived from their data. The Polity3 dataset has the advantage of the broadest coverage.

Maybe the association between democracy and inclusion is produced by a reverse causal effect? Do high levels of exclusion inhibit democratization? This is exactly what Model 5 suggests, in

Philip Keefer and Patrick Walsh, "New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions," *World Bank Economic Review* 15 (June 2001): 165-176.

5. Patrick Regan, and David Clark, Institutions and Elections Project. Accessed at <http://www2.binghamton.edu/political-science/institutions-and-elections-project.html>. Department of Political Science, Binghamton University.



which the transition to a full democracy is the dichotomous dependent variable and the model is specified as a logistic regression. The same results from a country fixed effect model based on the 72 countries that underwent a democratic transition since 1945 (results not shown).

The correlation between democracy and inclusion may therefore result from a selection mechanism: Ethnocratic regimes that exclude large proportions of their population cannot possibly risk democratization since this would most likely mean that they would have to vacate the throne. Think of current Rwanda dominated by a small Tutsi elite of former exiles from Uganda; or think of Saddam Hussein's ethnocratic and Sultanistic regime. These certainly tentative and preliminary findings run parallel to other studies that show how economic inequality hampers the prospects of democratization.<sup>6</sup>

### Direct Effects on the Probability of Armed Ethnic Conflict

However, could democracy, proportionalism, majoritarianism, and federalism have a direct effect on conflict propensity? Shouldn't democracies allow for the peaceful resolution of conflicting interest via a simple and legitimate mechanism of adjudicating between them? The entire quantitative research literature agrees that democracies are not more peaceful than other types of political regimes. Even the more modest claim that democracies and autocracies are both more peaceful than the "anocratic" regimes that lie in between them has

6. Charles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, "Endogenous Democratization," *World Politics* 55 (July 2003): 517–549. For a more nuanced interpretation, see Christian Houle, "Inequality and Democracy: Why Inequality Harms Consolidation but Does Not Affect Democratization," *World Politics* 61 (October 2009): 589–622.

been put into question. Previous studies that reported that anocracies are more war-prone<sup>7</sup> were mostly based on the Polity IV dataset, whose measurement of "anocracy" includes intense political conflict or even violence<sup>8</sup>—such that the previous findings boiled down to showing that conflict explains violence. Gleditsch et al.<sup>9</sup> attempt to defend the democratic civil peace argument by using another measurement of democracy. However, the postulated inverted U-shape only holds when controlling for a host of other political variables,<sup>10</sup> but not in a simple model with only basic covariates.<sup>11</sup>

What is left to examine is whether there is a direct effect of proportionalism, parliamentarism, or federalism. Many have argued that presidential democracies such as the United States increase the zero-sum character of political competition and thus the chances of violent conflict,<sup>12</sup> while parliamentary systems are more conducive to political compromise and negotiation. Others maintain the

7. Tanja Ellingsen, "Colorful Community or Ethnic Withces' Brew? Multiethnicity and Domestic Conflict during and after the Cold War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44 (April 2000): 228–249 and Havard Hegre, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates and Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816–1992," *The American Political Science Review* 95 (March 2001): 33–48.

8. James Raymond Vreeland, "The Effect of Political Regime on Civil War: Unpacking Anocracy," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52 (June 2008): 401–425.

9. Nils Petter Gleditsch, Håvard Hegre, and Håvard Strand, "Democracy and Civil War," in Manus I. Midlarsky, *Handbook of War Studies III: The Intrastate Dimension* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009), 155–192.

10. Ibid.:184, model 1.

11. Ibid., model 2.

12. Juan J Linz, "The Perils of Presidentialism," *Journal of Democracy* 1 (Winter 1990): 51–60 and Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).

opposite: that dividing power between a strong president and a parliament helps to avoid such zero-sum competition.<sup>13</sup> Furthermore, elected presidents will be oriented toward the common good of the broader electorate, it has been argued, rather than their narrow ethnic clienteles, thus avoiding the escalation of ethnic competition.<sup>14</sup>

The literature is equally divided when it comes to the peace promoting effects of federalism. Nordlinger and Roeder<sup>15</sup> argue that federalism provides a strong institutional platform from which regional elites can launch a violent secessionist project. Advocates of federalism<sup>16</sup> have defended the opposite hypothesis: Federalism often leads to ethnic self-rule at the regional level, thus decreasing the relevance of the power configuration at the central state level.<sup>17</sup>

Finally, consociationalists also argue that proportional systems of electing

13. Stephen M. Saideman, David J. Lanoue, Michael Campenni and Samuel Stanton, "Democratization, Political Institutions, and Ethnic Conflict. A Pooled Time-Series Analysis, 1985–1998," in *Comparative Political Studies* 35 (February 2002): 103–129 and Philip Roeder, "Power Dividing as an Alternative to Ethnic Power Sharing," in Philip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild, *Sustainable Peace. Power and Democracy after Civil War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 51–82, according to whom power sharing exacerbates and entrenches ethnic divisions and ultimately leads to instability and conflict escalation).

14. Donald L Horowitz, "Constitutional Design: Proposals vs. Process," in Andrew Reynolds, *The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) and Benjamin Reilly, *Democracy and Diversity: Political Engineering in the Asia-Pacific* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

15. Nordlinger, 1972 and Roeder, 2007.

16. Lijphart, 1977.

17. In line with the theory of nationalist violence by Michael Hechter, "Containing Nationalist Violence", in Andreas Wimmer et al., *Facing Ethnic Conflicts. Toward a New Realism* (Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 283–300.

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members of parliament enhances substantial minority representation compared to majoritarian rules, which tend to produce two-party systems in which minority candidates fare less well.<sup>18</sup> Independent of the power configuration at the level of central government, which as we have seen above is not influenced by parliamentarism, such minority representation in the legislative branch of government could help to moderate minority demands and on the other hand acquaint majority representatives with the perspectives and needs of minorities.<sup>19</sup>

I will discuss the relation between these three institutional arrangements and armed conflict in two different steps. In the first step, I seek to find out whether institutions affect ethnic armed conflicts in general. The second step proceeds to a more fine-grained analysis in which I distinguish between infighting between power sharing partners and rebellions in the name of excluded ethnic groups. This allows

18. See, however, the finding of Andrew Reynolds, *Designing Democracy in a Dangerous World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011: 114-116 that majoritarian rules have resulted in more minority representation in parliaments than other electoral systems. It is based on the study of election results in 50 countries. See also Lijphart, 1994 and 1999.

19. For a review of the debate between "centripetalists", advocating presidentialism, majoritarianism, and unitarian systems, and "consociationalists", who favor parliamentarism, proportionalism, and federalism, see Reilly, 2006. Many other institutional features, including a trans-regional support basis as a pre-requisite for party registration or more complex electoral rules such as the alternative vote system, are often associated with centripetalism. See Benjamin Reilly, "Centripetalism: Cooperation, accommodation, and integration", in Stefan Wolff and Christalla Yakinthou, *Conflict Management in Divided Societies: Theories and Practice* (London: Routledge, 2011). The same goes for the consociational approach, which also advocates mutual veto rights in a grand coalition of ethnic parties. These more detailed institutional arrangements are outside the purview of this chapter's analysis, either because global data is not available or because some of these institutional features have been applied only very rarely.

seeing whether political institutions offer different incentives for those included into the central government power structures and for those excluded from it, with correspondingly different effects on armed conflict.

### *Ethnic Armed Conflict as the Dependent Variable*

Other researchers have already shown that there is no evidence that proportional systems reduce the likelihood of armed conflict in general, including ethnic and non-ethnic conflicts.<sup>20</sup> But maybe proportionalism affects specifically ethnic conflicts, as argued by consociationalists? Table 2 evaluates this proposition. Models 1 to 3 use the same model specification and the same set of independent variables as the analysis in Wimmer et al.<sup>21</sup> Each model uses a different coding of proportionalism, based on the GT, WB, and IAEP datasets respectively. None of these variables produce statistically significant results, even though the coefficients at least all point into the same (negative) direction.<sup>22</sup>

Models 4 to 6 evaluate if presidential systems are more or less violence prone. Previous research both on full scale civil war and on lower intensity armed conflict has again shown that

20. Gerald Schneider and Nina Wiesehomeier, "Rules that matter: Political institutions and the diversity conflict nexus," *Journal of Peace Research* 45 (March 2008): 183-203 and Gleditsch et al., 2009.

21. Wimmer et al., 2009.

22. This contrasts, at least in part, with Marta Reynal-Querol, "Ethnicity, political systems, and civil wars," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46 (February 2002): 29-54, who reports that "inclusionary" political systems, defined as proportional and parliamentary systems, are less prone to ethnic civil war from 1960 to 1995. It is difficult to determine, however, which political institutions produce which effect, since she codes a variable that cross-classifies various elements with each other: 0 is defined as "unfree" political systems, 1 refers to "free", majoritarian, and parliamentary systems, 2 to free presidential systems, and 3 to free proportional and parliamentary systems.

presidential systems are not more, nor less conflict prone.<sup>23</sup> But what if we focus specifically on ethnic conflicts, since these are at the core of the debate among constitutional engineers? Again, no significant effects emerge (Models 4 to 6), whether in the model using the GT, the WB, or the IAEP datasets. The same non-result is obtained, I should note, when we evaluate whether parliamentary systems are more or less prone to experience armed conflict (results not shown).<sup>24</sup>

The final five models (7 to 12) investigate a possible relationship between federal structures of power and armed ethnic conflict. On the most general level, when not distinguishing between various types of armed conflict, Gleditsch, Hegre and Strand<sup>25</sup> have again already established that federalism is not associated with more or with less conflict in the post-1945 world. But again, maybe federalism prevents specifically ethnic conflict, as argued by consociationalists? Models 7 to 9 use different codings of how the constitution defines the division of power between different levels of government.<sup>26</sup> Models 10 to 12 go beyond the basic constitutional set-up of a state and code how far sub-national units do indeed wield political power: whether provinces have governments that are chosen independently of the center (Model 10), elect governors

23. Gleditsch et al., 2009 and Jack A. Goldstone, Robert H. Bates, David L. Epstein, Ted Robert Gurr, Michael B. Lustik, Monty G. Marshall, Jay Ulfelder and Mark Woodward, "A global model for forecasting political instability," *American Journal of Political Science* 54 (January 2010): 190-208.

24. Both of these findings stand in opposition to those of Roeder, 2005.

25. Gleditsch, Hegre and Strand, 2009.

26. Gerring and Thacker, for example, code a state as federal if it has a bi-cameral legislature with one of the chambers composed of the delegates of the provinces.

Table 2: Political Institutions and Ethnic Conflict (logit analyses)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
<i>Proportionalism</i>												
Proportional systems, 1946-2002, G&T	-0.0372 (0.396)											
Proportional systems, 1975-2005, WB		-0.0003 (0.000)										
Proportional systems, 1972-2005, IAEP			-0.3325 (0.332)									
<i>Presidentialism</i>												
Presidential systems, 1946-2002, G&T				-0.6375 (0.327)								
Presidential systems, 1975-2005, WB					-0.0702 (0.288)							
Presidential systems, 1972-2005, IAEP						0.4115 (0.328)						
<i>Federalism</i>												
Federal systems, 1946-2002, G&T							0.9364 (0.485)					
Federal systems, 1946-1994, Polity 3								-0.1899 (0.354)				
Federal or federated systems, 1972-2005, IAEP									0.0554 (0.236)			
Auton. provincial governments, 1972-2005, IAEP										-0.7074* (0.316)		
Elected provincial governors, 1975-2005, WB											-0.0013 (0.001)	
Autonomous regions, 1975-2005, WB												-0.0006 (0.001)
Number of observations	3,369	4,049	3,729	3,366	4,185	4,032	3,366	5,123	4,502	4,408	2,914	3,987
Notes on No. of observations	Without autoc.			Without autoc.			Without autoc.					

locally (Model 11), or are granted a special status as an autonomous region (Model 12).

Clearly, constitutional federalism has no effect whatsoever on conflict propensity (Models 7 to 9). But at least one of the de-facto-power variables does produce a significant result: Autonomously chosen provincial governments, as coded by the IAEP, are associated with less armed ethnic conflict (Model 10). This results holds up, albeit at a reduced level of significance, even if we control for the ethno-political power configuration, that is, if the share of the excluded population and the number of power sharing partners are considered in the Model (not shown). Thus, we can be

quite certain that there is no indirect effect between provincial autonomy and conflict, as one could assume if inclusionary states or those with fewer power sharing partners would allow regions to choose their own governments.

Unfortunately, however, the results are not upheld when using a similar WB coding of autonomous provincial government (Model 11) and Model 10 relates to years after 1972 only, such that we cannot be entirely sure how much we should rely on this finding. This caution is reinforced by additional analysis (results not shown here): When using Fearon and Laitin's coding of ethnic civil war—relating to conflicts with at least 1000 battle deaths—

the finding reported in Model 10 disappears completely as well.

*Disaggregating the Dependent Variable: Infighting and Rebellion*

Maybe we arrive at a more positive conclusion regarding the peace-promoting effects of political institutions if we disaggregate the dependent variable? Isn't it likely that institutions affect representatives of ethnic groups that form part of a governing coalition differently from those excluded from central government representation? The picture that emerges is slightly more complex (see Table 3). There is again no support for the idea that proportional systems of representation affect conflict probability—neither of infighting nor of rebellions (see

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Table 3: Political Institutions and Infighting (columns 1) and Rebellion (columns 2) (multinomial logit analyses)

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
<i>Proportionalism</i>												
Fully proportional systems, 1946-2002, G&T	-1.3970	0.2523										
	(1.144)	(0.409)										
Proportional systems, 1975-2005, WB			0.0006	-0.0005								
			(0.001)	(0.000)								
Proportional systems, 1972-2005, IAEP					-0.8359	-0.2244						
					(1.164)	(0.353)						
<i>Presidentialism</i>												
Fully presidential systems, 1946-2002, G&T							-1.0798	-0.5126				
							(0.675)	(0.352)				
Fully presidential systems, 1975-2005, WB									-	0.3651		
									1.543**	(0.595)	(0.315)	
Presidential systems, 1972-2005, IAEP											0.4419	0.3909
											(0.991)	(0.328)
Number of observations	3,369	3,369	4,049	4,049	3,729	3,729	3,366	3,366	4,185	4,185	4,032	4,032
<hr/>												
	Model 7		Model 8		Model 9		Model 10		Model 11		Model 12	
	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
<i>Federalism</i>												
Federal systems, 1946-1994, Polity 3	2.6257**	-										
	(0.666)	0.949**										
		(0.324)										
Fully federal systems, 1946-2002, G&T			1.4013	0.8757								
			(0.886)	(0.560)								
Federal or federated systems, 1972-2005, IAEP					0.4391	-0.0517						
					(0.520)	(0.261)						
Auton. provincial gov., 1972-2005, IAEP							-	-0.4914				
							2.0082*	(0.925)	(0.330)			

Notes: Controls for GDP, population size, linguistic fractionalization, mountainous terrain, political instability, anocracy, oil production, ongoing war, calendar year, cubic splines, and constant not shown; robust standard errors in parentheses; \* significant at 5%; \*\* significant at 1%

Models 1 to 3). And for only one coding of presidentialism—the one based on the WB dataset shown in Model 5—do we find a significant effect. Presidentialism is associated, in this model, with a lower likelihood of infighting between power sharing partners, but not with rebellions.

This is consistent with the analysis of infighting as a consequence of a commitment problem:<sup>27</sup> A strong president might be better able to hold a fractious coalition together than a prime minister who is dependent on parliamentary support. Further supporting this view with a relational argument, Hale<sup>28</sup> finds that in the post-27. Wimmer et al., 2009 and Roessler, 2011.

Soviet world, presidentialism produces strongly integrated, hierarchical patronage networks focused on the president, while parliamentarism tends to result in a more fragmented system of competing alliance networks. The above finding would also lend support to those constitutional engineers who emphasize that strong presidents are less likely to cater to their own ethnic clientele and, if elected by popular vote, need to seek those votes across ethnic divides.

However, the association between infighting and presidentialism

28. Henry E. Hale, "Formal constitutions in informal politics: Institutions and democratization in post-Soviet Eurasia", *World Politics* 63 (October 2011): 581-617.

disappears once we take the ethno-political power configuration into account. This is not due to an indirect effect since presidential systems do not have more power-sharing partners (not shown). Furthermore, presidentialism reduces infighting only with one particular coding of presidentialism and does not show up when using the other two codings (Models 4 and 6), thus raising doubts about the robustness of this finding.

In sum, neither proportionalism nor presidentialism has any significant effect on rebellions in the name of excluded populations. And there are only weak and not very robust signs that presidentialism might reduce the



chances of infighting. This leaves us with federalism. The results are rather contradictory, in line with Horowitz's<sup>29</sup> assessment of the qualitative evidence. In four of the six codings of federalism, no effect whatsoever can be discerned (Models 8, 9, 11, and 12). But when using the Polity3 data (Model 7), which covers all countries from 1946 to 1994, an interesting finding appears: Federal states are significantly more likely to see infighting, but also experience significantly less rebellions in the name of excluded populations (in line with consociationalists arguments). However, the coding of federalism provided by the IAEP (Model 10) produces quite different results: Autonomously chosen provincial governments are associated with less infighting but not with rebellion. We already found a negative significant result for this variable when regressing on all ethnic conflict (Model 10 in Table 2). We can now add more precision to the analysis, since we now know that the effect is limited to conflicts between power sharing partners.

How to adjudicate between these two conflicting findings that we get from the Polity and IAEP codings of federalism? Much more detailed analysis of the actual coding rules and the case universes that they create would be needed to answer this question. For the moment, it suffices to note that there are good reasons to trust the results based on the IAEP dataset more than those derived from the Polity data. First, the Polity3 based results disappear when India (a federal state with many infighting conflicts) is excluded from the analysis, or if linguistic fractionalization is not part of the equation, or if the ethno-political power

configuration is taken into account by adding the number of power sharing partners as well as the percentage of the excluded population to the regression model (results not shown). The IAEP results are more robust and hold up without India, without controlling for linguistic fractionalization, or with the ethno-political variables added to the equation. In addition, a similar coding of provincial autonomy (based on whether or not provinces have locally elected governors) is also associated with infighting, even if the coefficient is only borderline significant (Model 11).

In sum, federalism does not affect rebellions in any significant way, but it may well be that autonomously chosen provincial governments reduce the chances of infighting between power sharing partners. One might object to this series of rather sobering results—from the point of view of constitutional engineers—that one needs to take combinations of institutions into account and disentangle the effects that presidentialism, federalism, and proportionalism have in democracies from those they show in autocracies. Electoral rules might only influence conflict processes when votes can indeed change who is in power; federalism could show its pacifying effects in autocratic regimes only, where conquering the center is unfeasible.<sup>30</sup> To test for this possibility, I ran all models presented in Tables 2 and 3 with subsamples of autocracies and of non-autocratic regimes. The results remain substantially similar to those reported above.

#### But perhaps parliamentarism shows its

30. As reported by Saideman et al., 2002 and Nancy Bermeo, "A new look at federalism. The import of institutions," *Journal of Democracy* 13 (April 2002): 96-110.

moderating effects on the dynamics of political competition and conflict only if combined with proportionalism—as argued by consociationalists? Indeed, for the Gerring and Thacker as well as the IAEP datasets, the combination of proportionalism and parliamentarism is associated with a significantly lower risk of infighting but does not affect rebellions. However, using the World Bank dataset produces the opposite result: Infighting between power sharing partners is significantly more likely in such consociational regimes, while rebellions are again not less frequent in consociational states (results not shown). I conclude that there is no robust and consistent association here. The only consistent finding is that combinations of political institutions have no association whatsoever with the risk of rebellion in the name of excluded population—by far the most frequent type of ethnic conflict in the post-war world.<sup>31</sup>

#### **Inclusion Rather than Institutional Engineering**

In sum, it might be that federalism or presidentialism have an independent effect on the dynamic of political competition and conflict between power sharing partners and reduce the chances of escalation into armed violence. Autonomous provinces make it perhaps less urgent to fight for the spoils of government at the center; independent presidents might overcome commitment problems in a ruling coalition of ethnic elites better than prime ministers responsible to

31. One might argue that political institutions are effective conditional on a particular ethno-demographic make-up of the population. As a simple test of this proposition, I ran all models of Table 2 with an interaction effect between the political institution and the size of the largest politically relevant ethnic group. No noteworthy effects appeared in the results (not shown).

29. Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

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the representatives of these elites in parliament. The results reported above quite unequivocally indicate, however, that presidentialism, proportionalism, federalism, or a combination of such institutions have no effect on the much more prevalent form of ethnic conflict, i.e. on rebellions by excluded groups. Recalling that 90 out of the 110 ethnic conflicts in the dataset represent rebellions, this suggests a limited overall role for institutions in mitigating conflict.

Given that exclusion is far more risky than the prospects of infighting, it becomes evident that peace results not from a specific institutional form of government, but rather from inclusive power configurations—whatever the institutional forms that sustain them. Thus, no general recommendation can be made regarding the institutional setup best suited to guarantee peace. These might be democratic or undemocratic, consociational or centripetal, federal or unitarian, depending on context, historically established actor configurations, and institutional legacies.<sup>32</sup> No recipe of institutional reform—democratization, electoral systems engineering, and decentralization—seems universally suited to bring about political inclusion and sustainable peace.

The best strategy to avoid armed conflict and war is therefore to foster a power structure that either integrates political actors from all politically relevant ethnic groups or that is not based on ethnic alliances at all but on a sustained process of nation building, which promises to depoliticize ethnicity over time. Effective and long-term prevention of ethnic conflicts might therefore need to touch the very fundamentals on which a nation-state is built: both the definition of the people in whose name a state is governed and the degree to and the ways in which ethnic background shapes access to central state power. If ethnic conflict is mostly the result of the capture of the state by specific ethnic elites and their constituencies, then nothing less than a lasting rearrangement of such power structures will suffice to bring durable peace.

Unfortunately and ironically, such exclusionary regimes can often only be overthrown through violence and war. The political elites in power and the ethnic constituencies they privilege might not be willing to give up their monopoly over the state and its institutions. No prevention policy and no local “peace-building” initiative will be able to overcome such obstacles. It is unlikely, to illustrate, that Saddam Hussein’s tribalistic ethnocracy could have transformed gradually—under benevolent prodding by the

“international community”—into a regime that would include Kurdish and Shiite elite segments into the ruling coalition. Similarly, Rhodesia under white rule showed little prospect, despite harsh international sanctions, to move toward a broad based government with adequate representation of the black majority. As neighboring South Africa shows, however, negotiated transitions away from ethnocracy are possible, if unfortunately rare. To increase the likelihood of such peaceful transitions, it may help to foster the willingness of the ruling elites to share power, including by building up corresponding pressure from their constituencies, and to steer leaders of excluded populations toward moderation and away from maximalist claims or revanchist programs.

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32. See the new realism among constitutional engineers: Horowitz, 2004 and Ellis, 2003.

## McMann, CONTINUED

(continued from page 4)

### What Have We Learned?

Subnational democratization studies have posed numerous challenges to the conventional wisdom about regimes and regime continuity and change.<sup>3</sup> By presenting evidence of different subnational regimes within individual countries, these studies call into question regime typologies, which treat each country as a homogeneous unit. These findings also lay bare weaknesses in our theories of democratization. Crafting theories focus on national elites' decisions to permit civil liberties and elections, the initial stages of a democratic transition.<sup>4</sup> Yet, subnational democratization studies show that such decisions do not automatically result in these new democratic practices existing throughout a country. Socioeconomic theories focus on how certain social and economic conditions in a country are conducive to democracy.<sup>5</sup> Subnational

3. In addition to these works, see those listed in footnotes six and seven as well. Edward Gibson, "Boundary Control: Subnational Authoritarianism in Democratic Countries" *World Politics* 58 (October 2005): 101-132. Patrick Heller, "Degrees of Democracy: Some Comparative Lessons from India," *World Politics* 52, 4 (July 2000), 484-519. Jonathan Hiskey and Damarys Canache, "The Demise of One-Party Politics in Mexican Municipal Elections," *British Journal of Political Science* 35 (April 2005): 257-284. Kelly M. McMann, *Economic Autonomy and Democracy: Hybrid Regimes in Russia and Kyrgyzstan* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Nikolai Petrov, "Regional Models of Democratic Development," in Michael McFaul, Nikolai Petrov, and Andrei Ryabov, eds., *Between Dictatorship and Democracy: Russian Post-communist Political Reform* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004), 239-267

4. Representative works from this large literature include: John Higley and Michael Burton, "The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns," *American Sociological Review* 54 (February, 1989). Giuseppe Di Palma, *To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). Dankwart A. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," *Comparative Politics* 2 (April, 1970).

5. Two key recent works include: Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, "Endogenous Democratization," *World Politics*, 55 (July 2003). Adam Przeworski and Fernando Papaterra Limongi Neto, "Modernization: Theories and Facts," *World Politics* 49 (January 1997).

democratization studies, however, demonstrate that socioeconomic theories overpredict democratic consolidation by relying on national averages that mask subnational variation. More generally, the studies have highlighted how undertheorized the process between democratic transition and consolidation is. Most broadly, the studies remind us how territory has been frequently overlooked in political science research.

In addition to documenting subnational regime variation, subnational democratization studies have begun to explain it. Explanations can be divided into those that focus on center-periphery relations and those that focus on features of subnational regions.<sup>6</sup> That said, most scholars also pay some attention to the other set of factors. This is obvious in the work of Carlos Gervasoni, who has examined the interaction between regional features and center-periphery relations.<sup>7</sup> All

6. This point is a slight adaptation of Agustina Giraudy's observation in the previous issue of this newsletter. On center-periphery explanations see, for example: Gibson (2005); Agustina Giraudy, *Subnational Undemocratic Regime Continuity after Democratization: Argentina and Mexico in Comparative Perspective* (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2009); Alfred Montero, "No Country for Leftists? Clientelist Continuity and the 2006 Vote in the Brazilian Northeast" *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 2 (2010): 113-153; Richard Snyder, "After the State Withdraws: Neoliberalism and Subnational Authoritarian Regimes in Mexico," in Wayne Cornelius, Todd A. Eisenstadt, and Jane Hindley, eds., *Subnational Politics and Democratization in Mexico* (La Jolla: Center for US-Mexican Studies, University of California San Diego, 1999). On explanations focusing on provincial features, see Heller "Degrees of Democracy"; Tomila Lankina and Lullit Getachew, "A Geographic Incremental Theory of Democratization. Territory, Aid, and Democracy in Postcommunist Regions" *World Politics* 58 (July 2006): 536-82; McMann; Nicolai N. Petro, *Crafting Democracy: How Novgorod Has Coped with Rapid Social Change* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).

7. Carlos Gervasoni, "A Rentier Theory of Subnational Regimes: Fiscal Federalism, Democracy, and Authoritarianism in the Argentine Provinces"

this work holds promise for filling in the theoretical void between democratic transition and democratic consolidation by revealing obstacles and pathways to consolidation. Information about less democratic enclaves in democratizing countries helps reveal obstacles to consolidation. Research on enclaves that are more democratic than the national regime can suggest means to further democratization of a country.

### What Do We Need to Know?

For subnational democratization studies to realize their promise of improving regime typologies and theories of regime continuity and change, we need evidence about patterns of subnational regime variation within countries, across countries, and across time. Most information about subnational regime variation comes from studies contrasting a few subnational units within a country. This work has made valuable contributions, as described above; however, from it we cannot assess how many enclaves exist within a country. We also lack information about the local level because these studies have focused on regions.<sup>8</sup> Evidence about the distribution of enclaves within countries at regional and local levels would be helpful to improving regime typologies. Likewise, information about whether certain components of democracy, such as civil liberties and free and fair elections, are consistently weaker or stronger in enclaves would be useful. For example, it seems as if a country with two regions where most components of democracy are weak and eight regions where they are strong should be categorized differently from a country where throughout the territory one

*World Politics* 62 (April 2010): 302-40.

8. Giraudy, "Subnational Democracy," 25.

component of democracy is weak and all others are strong. This line of thinking may help us refine the concept of a “hybrid regime,” in particular. Defined as a regime “combining democratic and authoritarian elements,”<sup>9</sup> the concept has, problematically, become a catch-all category with an enormous number of subtypes.

Subnational democratization studies have also been limited by a lack of cross-national and cross-regional research, as Tomila Lankina and Agustina Giraudy noted in the previous issue of this newsletter.<sup>10</sup> We do not have systematic evidence about the existence of enclaves in different countries and regions of the world. How common are enclaves throughout the world? Are enclaves that are less democratic or more democratic than their national regimes more common? Research has tended to focus on less democratic enclaves, driven in part by the logic that a national regime would not let a more democratic enclave exist.<sup>11</sup> Is there empirical evidence to support this logic?

Once we have identified enclaves we can search for patterns to help explain why they exist. Do less democratic or more democratic enclaves in different countries share similar features or similar relationships with their national governments, as existing research would predict? Are enclaves more common when the country has certain characteristics? We can hypothesize that they are more common in larger

9. Larry Diamond, “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes,” *Journal of Democracy* 13 (April 2002): 23.

10. Lankina “Sisyphian Endeavor,” 14. Giraudy, “Subnational Democracy,” 26

11. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 19.

countries, in countries with federal systems of government, and in countries that have recently undergone democratic transition, for example. But, these ideas require investigation. The payoff of more systematic study will be improved democratization theories. For example, information about enclaves cross-nationally and about country characteristics will help us refine our explanations of obstacles to consolidation and contemplate explanations of democratization from below.

Most subnational democratization studies span only a short, contemporary time period and thus leave many questions unanswered.<sup>12</sup> Investigations of long stretches of time within each wave of democratization would be illuminating. Did first and second wave democracies experience periods of subnational regime variation as many of their third wave counterparts have? Were the components of democracy that were weaker or stronger in enclaves in past waves the same as we see in the third wave? How was unevenness in democratic development overcome? We can imagine possible pathways to overcoming unevenness: 1) the national government imposed democracy and eradicated less democratic enclaves, 2) more democratic enclaves demanded or forced national democratization, 3) democracy developed in many subnational units simultaneously or through diffusion, or 4) some combination of these. Data across a long stretch of time would allow us to test these hypotheses.

The first and second waves also have certain characteristics that make them particularly useful to study. The first wave initiated some of the world’s most responsive, stable, and productive

democracies, so it would be worthwhile to learn more about them. While there are many factors that have contributed to their success, their ability to overcome unevenness in democracy may have been one of them. By contrast, the second wave has been characterized by reversals to authoritarianism. To what extent did a failure to overcome subnational regime variation contribute to these reversals? Data stretching back through the second and into the first wave will allow us to explore these issues.

Evidence from all three waves will be helpful in understanding how democratic transition can result in democratic consolidation. How is it that multiple components of democracy come to be adopted and used throughout a country? This is a central puzzle existing democratization theories have not answered.

### How Can We Know?

Subnational data from the V-Dem project will enable us to explore these questions about regime typologies and regime continuity and change by providing information about patterns of subnational regime variation within countries, across countries, and across time. In terms of subnational information, the project aims to provide data on elections, civil liberties, and government constraints and authority at local and regional levels each year from 1900 to the present for all countries of the world.

The subnational data collection is part of V-Dem’s overall effort to create a democracy dataset that is multidimensional, highly disaggregated, historical, and transparent. No existing dataset exhibits all these characteristics. V-Dem is multidimensional in

12. Giraudy, “Subnational Democracy,” 24-25.



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that it collects data for numerous conceptualizations of democracy—electoral, liberal, majoritarian, consensual, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian—instead of just one or only electoral and liberal, as is common. To capture these seven conceptualizations of democracy, V-Dem includes approximately 400 measures, making it highly disaggregated. The aim is to collect data for all sovereign or semi-sovereign polities for as many of these indicators as possible back to 1900. The process by which we are collecting the data and the quality of the data are transparent. Descriptions of the data collection strategy are available from the project web site and in an article in *Perspectives on Politics*.<sup>13</sup> Assessments of systematic bias and intercoder reliability will be provided for data from country experts so that users can evaluate the quality of the information. The data will be available on-line for free to anyone. The project completed a 12-country pilot in the fall of 2011 and has begun actual data collection this spring.

V-Dem's subnational dataset will be the first of its kind. Datasets and reference materials on subnational democracy are scant. Most sources of subnational information examine government performance and decentralization,<sup>14</sup>

13. See <https://v-dem.net/> and Michael Coppedge and John Gerring, with David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Steven Fish, Allen Hicken, Matthew Kroenig, Staffan I. Lindberg, Kelly McMann, Pamela Paxton, Holli A. Semetko, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jeffrey Staton, and Jan Teorell, "Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: A New Approach," *Perspectives on Politics* 9 (2011): 247-267.

14. See, for example, The Fiscal Austerity and Urban Innovation Project (FAUI), <http://faui.uchicago.edu/> and Daniel Treisman's decentralization dataset available from <http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/treisman/Pages/publishedpapers.html>. The following publications describe datasets the authors created: Daniel Kaufmann, Frannie Léautier and Massimo Mastruzzi, "Governance and the City: An Empirical Exploration into Global Determinants of Urban Performance," Discussion Paper, (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2004). Jonathan Rodden and

not democratic institutions or processes. Sources that focus on subnational democracy typically provide data for only one part of the world. The Council of Europe's *Structure and Operation of Local and Regional Democracy* reports on European countries, for example.<sup>15</sup> Those that cover numerous parts of the world do not include all countries and provide data for only one year or a short period of time. An additional problem is that data are often not comparable across countries. For example, the Global Observatory on Local Democracy and Decentralisation (GOLD) has profiles of 101 countries in recent years, but the data provided are not consistent across countries.<sup>16</sup>

V-Dem's subnational data will come from country experts. The country experts are recruited by the V-Dem team to complete on-line surveys measuring specific components of democracy. There are surveys on elections, civil liberties, media freedom, civil society, political parties, the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, direct democracy, deliberative democracy, and sovereignty. The experts are typically academics, such as political scientists and historians, who are citizens or residents of the countries they are coding. Individuals are selected who are deeply knowledgeable

Erik Wibbels, "Fiscal Decentralization and the Business Cycle: An Empirical Study of Seven Federations," *Economics & Politics* 22 (March 2010): 37-67. Jeffrey M. Sellers and Anders Lidström, "Decentralization, Local Government, and the Welfare State," *Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions* 20 (October 2007): 609-632.

15. The Council of Europe, *Structure and Operation of Local and Regional Democracy*, available from [http://www.coe.int/t/dgap/localdemocracy/WCD/Structure\\_Operation\\_Complete\\_Series\\_en.asp#](http://www.coe.int/t/dgap/localdemocracy/WCD/Structure_Operation_Complete_Series_en.asp#).

16. Global Observatory on Local Democracy and Decentralisation, *Decentralization and Local Government in the World: Country Profiles*, available from [http://www.cities-localgovernments.org/gold/country\\_profile.asp](http://www.cities-localgovernments.org/gold/country_profile.asp)

about a country and about one or more specific substantive areas. Each expert completes only those surveys in his or her area(s) of expertise. Five experts code each indicator for each country.

In theory, the 400 or so indicators V-Dem uses to measure national institutions and processes could be replicated at each subnational level for each country for each year. In practice this is not possible because of the funds and time that would be required. Instead, we limit subnational data collection in ways that enable V-Dem to be both feasible and still highly disaggregated, especially compared to other democracy datasets, which ignore subnational variation.

Specifically, subnational indicators for only three components of democracy—elections, civil liberties, and government constraints and authority—are included. These three were selected because they are central to the general understanding of democracy; and they are important to different conceptualizations of democracy, including the electoral, liberal, and participatory conceptualizations. In addition, existing research suggests that subnational regime variation is often characterized by differences in elections, civil liberties, and government constraints and authority.

Two subnational levels were selected for data collection—regional and local. Regional refers to the second-highest level of government, just below the national government, and local refers to the level below the region. Selecting two levels means that, for most countries, we will collect data about all subnational levels. Approximately 56 percent of countries have two subnational levels and 18 percent have one, based on a sample of 82 countries

from GOLD's Local Governments in the World database.<sup>17</sup> To deal with countries that have more than two subnational levels, the survey instructs the country experts to select the regional level and the local level "that, in practice, has the most responsibilities (e.g. making laws, providing primary education, maintaining roads, policing, etc.) and resources to carry out those responsibilities." Nearly all countries with more than two subnational levels have only three, so data for most of their subnational levels will be collected.

To ensure that experts are answering questions about the same subnational levels, the survey asks them to name the types of units at the regional and local levels they identify, for example "municipios" at the local level in Mexico. Besides enabling us to check for data reliability, this information will also be useful in itself. Currently there is no dataset that describes subnational governmental structure historically for all countries of the world. Most helpful at this point is the volume *Administrative Subdivisions of Countries*, which, nonetheless, provides only a summary of changes in subnational governmental structure for each country.<sup>18</sup> For this reason, the V-Dem data will also be useful to scholars studying other issues of subnational government, such as federalism and decentralization, and to anyone interested in increasing the number of observations in his or her study by scaling down to a subnational level.<sup>19</sup>

17. Global Observatory on Local Democracy and Decentralisation, *Local Governments in the World: Basic Facts on 82 Selected Countries*, 2007 edition, available from [http://www.cities-localgovernments.org/gold/indicators\\_keys.asp](http://www.cities-localgovernments.org/gold/indicators_keys.asp).

18. Gwillim Law, *Administrative Subdivisions of Countries: A Comprehensive World Reference, 1900-1990* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2008).

19. Richard Snyder, "Scaling Down: The Subnational Comparative Method" *Studies in Comparative*

The number of units at a single level in a country can be enormous, making data collection for individual units prohibitively costly and time-consuming. For example, Brazil has 5,562 *municipios*.<sup>20</sup> To overcome this obstacle, we collect information about averages and enclaves.

The election survey asks two questions about practices on average across units at each level. One question solicits information about whether executives and assemblies at each level generally exist and are, in practice, elected. In a second question, experts evaluate the extent to which subnational elections are free and fair on average. This information will help illuminate how far down (non)democratic practices, typically measured only at the national level, extend.

The election and civil liberties surveys each ask questions to determine whether enclaves exist and how different they are from the rest of the country. For elections, experts indicate whether subnational elections throughout a country are equally free and fair (or, alternatively, not free and fair); subnational elections in some parts of a country are somewhat more (or, alternatively, less) free and fair; or subnational elections in some parts of a country are significantly more (or, alternatively, less) free and fair. A parallel question about government officials' respect for civil liberties is posed as well.

The election survey then will enable us to identify specific enclaves.<sup>21</sup> Experts

*International Development* 36 (2001): 93-110.

20. Global Observatory on Local Democracy and Decentralisation, *Local Governments in the World*.

21. If a country came into being after 1900, then data collection begins with the year of its founding. Data for the larger entity of which it was a part, such as a

name the parts of a country where subnational elections are significantly more free and fair than the average for the country and the parts of a country where subnational elections are significantly less free and fair. They are asked to use proper names of territorial units or, when applicable, broad categories such as "the north."

To avoid expert fatigue, the civil liberties survey does not ask experts to name specific geographic areas where government respect for civil liberties is significantly stronger and areas where it is significantly weaker. We do not want the experts to be overwhelmed: they are also responding to questions about elections and civil liberties nationally. Moreover, we suspect that geographic areas where civil liberties are stronger or weaker should overlap with areas with more or less free and fair elections, respectively.

To help establish the significance of electoral and civil liberties enclaves, experts estimate the percentage of the total population of the country that lives in those areas. That is, experts indicate the percentages of the population that live in areas they designated as having elections that are significantly less free and fair, as having elections that are significantly more free and fair, as having government officials who have significantly less respect for civil liberties, and as having government officials who have significantly more respect for civil liberties.

Another set of questions will help us identify characteristics that enclaves may share. The survey asks experts to indicate whether parts of a country he or she designated as having elections that are significantly less free and fair colonial empire, is collected prior to its founding.

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and then parts of a country he or she designated as having elections that are significantly more free and fair can be described as 1) rural, 2) urban, 3) more economically developed, 4) less economically developed, 5) inside the capital city, 6) outside the capital city, 7) in the north, 8) in the south, 9) in the east, 10) in the west, 11) areas of civil unrest, 12) areas where illicit activity is widespread, 13) sparsely populated areas, 14) remote areas, 15) areas where there are indigenous populations, 16) areas where the national ruling party or group is weak, 17) areas where the national ruling party or group is strong, 18) areas subject to a longer period of foreign rule, 19) areas subject to a shorter period of foreign rule, 20) areas subject to foreign rule recently, or 21) areas subject to foreign rule long ago. Comparable questions are asked for areas where government officials have significantly more or less respect for civil liberties.

The election survey poses the subnational questions for every country for every year back to 1900. A limitation, however, is that these data about subnational regime variation and enclaves will not exist for those time periods when no subnational elections took place. The civil liberties data provide a useful complement because their coverage is not limited in this way.

Also located in the election survey are questions about government constraints and authority at the subnational level. The purpose is to help us determine the practical importance of subnational elections and by extension the significance of electoral enclaves. Can citizens,

through the electoral process, limit the actions of government? Do elected offices have the authority to act on voters' preferences? To illuminate these issues, we ask the experts whether elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices, equal in power to non-elected offices, or more powerful than non-elected offices at each level.

The election and civil liberties surveys will provide data about the extent of subnational regime variation within countries on two measures of regime type—the freeness and fairness of elections and government officials' respect for civil liberties. With this information we can better understand the distribution of enclaves and explore whether less democratic ones are, in fact, more common than more democratic ones. These sets of evidence can help us refine regimes typologies. Data about enclaves' characteristics will enable us to look for similarities among less democratic enclaves, as well as among more democratic enclaves. This information will help us better understand obstacles to consolidation and pathways to democratization and thus improve those theories.

The subnational data coupled with the national data from V-Dem over time will provide clues as to how territorial unevenness in democracy was overcome in some countries in each of the three waves of democratization. Is there evidence of a more democratic national polity and a decreasing number of less democratic enclaves over time? Or, do we see a less democratic national polity and a growing number of more democratic enclaves over time? This information

will be helpful in connecting theories of transition and consolidation and as a result having a more complete explanation of democratization and other forms of regime change.<sup>22</sup>

The V-Dem subnational data and earlier research approaches complement each other. Case studies of individual enclaves and large-n analyses of territorial units within one or two countries have revealed puzzles and developed hypotheses that could now benefit from study across countries and in different eras using the V-Dem data. Analysis of the V-Dem data will also identify puzzles that studies of individual enclaves and countries can help us understand. Together these approaches can help improve our regime typologies and theories of regime continuity and change as well as understand subnational democratization.

*Kelly M. McMann is an associate professor of political science at Case Western Reserve University and the subnational government project manager for Varieties of Democracy. Her work on subnational democratization includes Economic Autonomy and Democracy: Hybrid Regimes in Russia and Kyrgyzstan (2006).*

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22. Other V-Dem surveys on political parties, deliberative democracy, and sovereignty collect additional information about subnational levels, such as political parties' reach into subnational units; the role of subnational units in plebiscites, referenda, and initiatives; and state control over a country's territory.

## SECTION NEWS

**Call for Applications: Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellowships in Washington, D.C.:**

The Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellows Program at the International Forum for Democratic Studies (IFDS, U.S.) invites applications for fellowships in 2012–2013. This federally funded program enables democracy activists, practitioners, scholars, and journalists from around the world to deepen their understanding of democracy and enhance their ability to promote democratic change. Dedicated to international exchange, this five-month, residential program offers a collegial environment for fellows to reflect on their experiences; conduct independent research and writing; consider best practices and lessons learned; engage with counterparts in the United States; and develop professional relationships within a global network of democracy advocates.

The program is intended primarily to support practitioners, scholars, and journalists from developing and aspiring democracies; distinguished scholars from established democracies may also apply. A working knowledge of English is required. All fellows receive a monthly payment, health insurance, travel assistance, and research support. The program does not fund professional training, fieldwork, or students working towards a degree. The program will host two five-month fellowship sessions in 2013–2014: Fall 2013 (October 1, 2013–February 28, 2014) and Spring 2014 (March 1–July 31, 2014). **The online application system will open July 15, 2012, and applications are due by October 15.** Please see [www.ned.org/fellowships](http://www.ned.org/fellowships) for more information.

**New Data from Americas Barometer Available**

Data from a new round of the Americas Barometer 2012, carried out by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) within Vanderbilt's department

of political science, is now available. It covers 26 countries and features more than 40,000 interviews and information on every independent country from Canada to Argentina, including several countries in the Caribbean. New themes for this round include discrimination, the military, and China. LAPOP is also very pleased to announce that raw files from the entire Americas Barometer series, which date back to 2004, are downloadable for free at [www.LapopSurveys.org](http://www.LapopSurveys.org). Institutional subscribers, however, will receive "Premium Access," which includes tech support, access to merged data bases across country and across time, and Stata programming files.

**NEWS FROM MEMBERS**

**Michele Penner Angrist**, associate professor of political science, Union College, published "War, Resisting the West, and Women's Labor: Toward an Understanding of Arab Exceptionalism," in the March 2012 *Politics & Gender*. Ms. Angrist argues that countries with Muslim majority populations are viewed as places where women are particularly oppressed due to large male-female literacy gaps and higher male-female population sex ratios. She uses previous research to explain that whether referring to the substance of Islamic sharia law or to the ways in which politicians defer to conservative interpretations of sharia law in order to build and consolidate their legitimacy, interpretations of Islamic law and the prevailing attitudes they create are a key culprit in many accounts of gender inequality in Muslim countries.

**Allyson Benton**, research professor of political studies, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE), Mexico City, published, "Bottom Up Challenges to National Democracy: Mexico's (Legal) Subnational Authoritarian Enclaves" in the April 2012 *Comparative Politics*, which examines the ways Mexico's community-based democratic institutions, known as

Uses and Customs systems (UyC), have affected local and national politics. Ms. Benton uses statistical analysis of national election results to show that municipalities in the state of Oaxaca, which formally adopted UyC systems, experienced higher first-place party margins and higher levels of abstention compared to non-UyC systems. She concludes that UyC rules appear to preserve local authoritarian enclaves, with negative consequences for democracy.

**Jason Brownlee**, associate professor of government, University of Texas at Austin, was awarded a grant from the United States Institute of Peace to support research on "Preventing Inter-Communal Violence during Egypt's Transition." The project tests rival hypotheses of inter-communal conflict to determine whether anti-Coptic violence has originated in selective law enforcement by officials or, instead, if confessional tensions stem from a lack of crosscutting ties in civil society. Data will be collected in Cairo from major newspapers and interviews, then coded and analyzed in Austin. The dataset will help explain variations in attacks across geography and time, including the last years of Mubarak's rule and first year after his ouster. Its paramount objective is to reduce inter-communal insecurity and violence.

**Javier Corrales**, professor of political science, Amherst College, published "LGBT Rights in the Americas" in the Spring 2012 *Americas Quarterly*. Mr. Corrales asserts that citizens and nations increasingly recognize that freedom and equality under the law requires protecting the rights, status, and expression of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people, but claims that although Latin America is a leader in providing rights to its LGBT citizens, popular attitudes in the region still lag behind the rest of the world.

Mr. Corrales, along with Daniel Altschuler,



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also published “The Spillover Effects of Participatory Governance: Evidence from Community-Managed Schools in Honduras and Guatemala,” in the May 2012 *Comparative Political Studies*. Using a large survey of participants in community-managed schools throughout Honduras and Guatemala, the authors find that civic participation in one domain of public life can lead to more participation elsewhere, so-called “spillover effects.”

**Todd A. Eisenstadt** was promoted to full professor in the department of government at American University. His 2011 book *Politics, Identity, and Mexico's Indigenous Rights Movements* (Cambridge University Press) won the 2012 Van Cott Prize from the Political Institutions Section of the Latin American Studies Association. A manuscript he co-edited with Michael S. Danielson, Jaime Bailon, and Carlos Sorroza, *Latin America's Multicultural Movements and the Struggle Between Communitarianism, Autonomy, and Human Rights*, has just been accepted for publication by the Oxford University Press.

**Carlos Gervasoni**, assistant professor, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella in Buenos Aires, Argentina, is the 2012 recipient of the Eli J. and Helen Shaheen Graduate School Award, Ph.D. in Social Sciences Division, from the University of Notre Dame. Mr. Gervasoni defended his dissertation, “A Rentier Theory of Subnational Democracy: The Politically Regressive Effects of Redistributive Fiscal Federalism in Argentina,” in July 2011.

**Elliott Green**, lecturer in development studies, London School of Economics, published “On the Size and Shape of African States,” in the June 2012 *International Studies Quarterly*. It claims that while African state size and shape have been previously shown to be correlated with negative development outcomes, no one has heretofore examined the origins of either

phenomenon. Mr. Green shows that African state size and shape are not arbitrary but are rather a consequence of Africa's low pre-colonial population density, whereby low-density areas were consolidated into unusually large colonial states with artificial borders. He also demonstrates that state size has a strong negative relationship with pre-colonial trade, and that trade and population density alone explain the majority of the variation in African state size. Mr. Green also will be conducting field work this summer in Botswana on the political economy of urbanization.

**Kenneth F. Greene**, associate professor of government, University of Texas at Austin, served as principal investigator for “The Mexico 2012 Panel Study,” a multi-wave panel survey designed to capture changes in voters' political attitudes and preferences during the country's 2012 general election campaigns. He was also named a fall 2012 residential fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC.

**Mary Alice Haddad**, associate professor of government, Wesleyan University, published *Building Democracy in Japan* (Cambridge University Press), which develops a new approach to the study of democratization that examines state-society interactions as a country adjusts its existing political culture to accommodate new democratic values, institutions, and practices. With reference to the country's history, Ms. Haddad focuses on how democracy is experienced in contemporary Japan, highlighting the important role of generational change in facilitating both gradual adjustments as well as dramatic transformations in Japanese politics.

**Debra Javeline**, associate professor of political science, University of Notre Dame, and Elizabeth Brooks, published “The Health Implications of Civic Association

in Russia” in the May 2012 *Social Science & Medicine*. The authors investigate whether civic and political participation can influence health outcomes, and if so, if a general aversion to joining community activities has some connection to poor health outcomes in Russia. Using data from surveys of more than 18,000 urban Russians conducted from 2003 to 2005, the authors find that individuals who join collective civic and political activities report better health than non-joiners, and that living in a participatory community may enhance one's health, regardless of participation.

**Judith Kelley**, associate professor of public policy and political science, Duke University, published *Monitoring Democracy: When International Election Monitoring Works and Why It Often Fails* (Princeton University Press). By analyzing the evolving interaction between domestic and international politics, she refutes prevailing arguments that international efforts cannot curb government behavior and that democratization is entirely a domestic process. Yet, she also shows that democracy promotion efforts are deficient and that outside actors often have no power and sometimes even do harm.

**Catherine Lena Kelly**, Ph.D. candidate, Harvard University, is the recipient of the Harvard Sciences-Po Exchange Fellowship for 2012–13. After spending 2011–2012 in Senegal studying its political parties and democratization process, she will write her dissertation as an affiliate of the Centre Americaine at Sciences-Po Paris.

**Ray Kennedy** has accepted a position as UNDP Senior Electoral Advisor to the new Independent Elections Commission of Jordan through the end of 2012.

**Barry S. Levitt**, assistant professor of politics and international relations, Florida International University, published *Power in the Balance: Presidents, Parties and*

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*Legislatures in Peru and Beyond* (University of Notre Dame Press). Building on the insights of institutionalist theory, Mr. Levitt shows how shifting norms of constitutionalism and rule of law, and changes in the organizational forms of political parties, shaped power relations between legislatures and executives in Peru and Latin America from 1985 through 2006. Mr. Levitt is also the recipient of a prestigious Award for Faculty from the National Endowment for the Humanities, which (since 2011) has enabled him to pursue new avenues of research on political humor and freedom of expression in Latin America.

**Staffan I. Lindberg**, associate professor of political science, University of Gothenburg and the University of Florida, received a grant from the Canadian Development Agency (CIDA) in support of the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. Mr. Lindberg is one of the principal investigators for this project, along with John Gerring at Boston University, Michael Coppedge at the University of Notre Dame, and Jan Teorell at Lund University. The project will measure seven principals and two dozen components of democracy with 329 indicators across the world between 1900 and 2010. For further details, see [www.v-dem.net](http://www.v-dem.net).

**Jana Morgan**, associate professor of political science and research fellow at the Center for the Study of Social Justice, University of Tennessee, was awarded the 2012 Van Cott Outstanding Book Award from the Political Institutions section of the Latin American Studies Association for *Bankrupt Representation and Party System Collapse* (Pennsylvania State University Press).

**Cas Mudde** is joining the department of international affairs of the University of Georgia in August 2012. In April 2012, he gave the annual Stein Rokkan Lecture

at the ECPR Joint Session of Workshops in Antwerp, Belgium, which was entitled “Thirty Years of Populist Radical Right Politics in Europe: So What.” The lecture will be published in a forthcoming issue of the *European Journal of Political Research*.

**Ragnhild Louise Muriaas**, postdoctor in the department of comparative politics, University of Bergen, Norway, and Vibeke Wang, published “Executive Dominance and the Politics of Quota Representation in Uganda,” in the June 2012 *Journal of Modern African Studies*. Through a qualitative study of official documents, newspaper articles, and interviews conducted during two field studies in Uganda in 2005 and 2010, the authors show how the understanding of quota policies in Africa may gain from the corporatist debate on interest representation. They reveal that the incumbent National Resistance Movement has employed the reserved seat policy strategically to maintain its dominant position, and that strategies for using the quota system have evolved gradually over time in response to key political events and the interests of group activists at the local and national level with vested interests in its survival.

**Monika Nalepa**, assistant professor of political science, University of Notre Dame, and a visiting research fellow at the Center for the Study of Democratic Politics at the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, published “Tolerating Mistakes: How Do Popular Perceptions of Procedural Fairness Affect Demand for Transitional Justice?” in the April 2012 *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Ms. Nalepa uses original opinion poll data collected in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to investigate how perceptions of procedural fairness shape the preferences that citizens have for transitional justice (TJ) in post-authoritarian countries. She shows that differences in the demand for TJ are explained by how citizens

perceive whether the TJ process commits errors—that is, whether the innocent are condemned (falsely convicted) or the guilty are exonerated (falsely acquitted). Ms. Nalepa also published the chapter “Reconciliation, Refugee Returns, and the Impact of International Criminal Justice: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” in *NOMOS, Proceedings of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy* (New York University Press).

**Tsveta Petrova**, fellow at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University, was awarded a spring 2012 Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellowship at the International Forum for Democratic Studies at the National Endowment for Democracy. Her fellowship, “From Recipients to Donors of Democracy Assistance,” will examine the evolution of the democracy promotion community since the 1980s.

Ms. Petrova also authored an article, “How Poland Promotes Democracy,” in the April 2012 *Journal of Democracy*, which examines the democracy-promotion efforts of Poland, a new EU member and a regional leader in the postcommunist world. She asserts that Polish democracy promotion has its origin in the international solidarity tradition of the country’s anticommunist opposition movement, and that Poland has made concerted, if at times inconsistent, efforts to support the democratization of its eastern neighbors, primarily as part of a geopolitical security strategy to deter a resurgent Russia.

**Anne Pitcher**, professor of political science and African studies, University of Michigan, published *Party Politics and Economic Reforms in Africa’s Democracies* (Cambridge University Press). Ms. Pitcher offers an engaging new theory to explain the different trajectories of private sector development across contemporary Africa, and argues that the outcomes of economic reforms depend not only on the kinds of

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institutional arrangements adopted by states in order to create or expand their private sectors, but also on the nature of party system competition and the quality of democracy in particular countries. The study underscores the importance of formal institutions and political context to the design and outcome of economic policies in developing countries.

In April, **Marc F. Plattner**, vice president for research and studies, editor of the *Journal of Democracy*, and director of the International Forum for Democratic Studies, National Endowment for Democracy, gave the Bronisław Geremek Lecture Series on European Civilisation entitled, "Europe's Democratic Odyssey," at the at the College of Europe, Natolin (Warsaw Campus).

**Megan Reif**, Ph.D. candidate in political science, University of Michigan, was named an assistant professor of political science (tenure-track) at the University of Colorado-Denver.

**Meg Rincker**, assistant professor of political science, Purdue University Calumet, Candice Orbals, and Celeste Montova, published "Politics Close to Home: the Impact of Meso-Level Institutions on Women in Politics," in the Winter 2012 *Publius*. The authors examine the advantages and disadvantages that meso-level institutions present for women's political representation and ask whether women are represented in meso-level legislatures, women's policy agencies, and women's movements in Italy, Spain, and Poland. They find that gains in meso-level legislatures are slow, but meso-level women's policy agencies and movements provide women important access to politics.

Ms. Rincker and Martin F. Battle also published "Dissatisfied with Decentralization: Explaining Citizens' Evaluations of Poland's 1999 Health Care

Reforms," in the September 2011 *Journal of East European Politics & Societies*. The authors use public opinion, interview, and elite survey data to examine the critical case of Poland's 1999 health decentralization, and demonstrate that Poles were more dissatisfied with their health care during health decentralization (1999–2001) than when it was centralized (1994–1998 and 2002–2007). Aggregate public opinion data suggests support for decentralization dwindles when it becomes synonymous with offloading state responsibilities to private citizens.

**Richard Rose**, director of the Center for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, released "New Russia Barometer XIX. The 2011 Duma Election." It details results of the most recent survey, which interviewed 1,600 Russians after the recent Duma election, and puts in perspective journalistic reports based on interviews with those attending street protests in Moscow at the time of the election. The survey contains public assessments of the Russian government and Vladimir Putin, and full details of the electoral behavior of respondents, including their experience, if any, with electoral irregularities. The results show that, while their support for the current political system is not as high as before, it remains on balance positive, although people regard it as halfway between a democracy and a dictatorship.

**Bo Rothstein**, professor and principal investigator at the Quality of Government Institute, University of Gothenburg, launched a comprehensive large scale research project, ANTICORRP (Anti-Corruption Policies Revisited: Global Trends and European Responses to the Challenge of Corruption) on March 1. The project—which will last five years—is funded by the European Commission's Seventh Framework Program and is the largest social science research project funded

by the EU. It consists in total of 21 research groups in 16 European countries, and its central objective is to investigate factors that promote or hinder the development of effective anticorruption policies.

Mr. Rothstein, along with Soren Holmberg, also published *Good Government – The Relevance of Political Science* (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd). It asserts that in all societies, the quality of government institutions is of the utmost importance for the well-being of its citizens. However, problems like high infant mortality, lack of access to safe water, unhappiness, and poverty are not primarily caused by a lack of technical equipment, effective medicines, or other types of knowledge generated by the natural or engineering sciences. Instead, the critical problem is that the majority of the world's population lives in societies that have dysfunctional government institutions. The book explores issues such as conceptualizing and measuring good government, the effects of "bad government," and improving quality of government, which are crucial to solving the problems of society.

**Dietrich Rueschmeyer**, professor of sociology, emeritus, Brown University, published a chapter, "Democratization," in the *Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology* (Oxford: Blackwell), edited by Kate Nash, Alan Scott, and Edwin Amenta.

**Sanjay Ruparelia**, assistant professor of politics, and a fellow at the India China Institute, New School for Social Science Research, was recently awarded a visiting fellowship at the Project on Democracy and Development, Princeton University, as well as a fellowship from the American Council for Learned Societies for the 2012–2013 academic year. The title of his new research project is "Enacting a Right to Basic Social Welfare: India's Great Transformation in Comparative Perspective." Mr. Ruparelia also organized a multidisciplinary

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**Section News**


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conference on April 28, Prosperity Amidst Poverty and Inequality: A Symposium on India and China, at the India China Institute of the New School.

**Andreas Schedler**, professor of political science, Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economicas (CIDE), Mexico City, published “The Measurer’s Dilemma: Coordination Failures in Cross-National Public Data Collection,” in the February 2012 *Comparative Political Studies*. Mr. Schedler contends that during the past decades, (mostly) private actors have been providing the public good of cross-national political data in a decentralized, uncoordinated, and unregulated fashion, and have been successful in generating an incessant supply of data. However, the success of current practices of data production has been masking severe structural limitations. Mr. Schedler claims that to resolve these structural problems, the scholarly community will need to mobilize established collective actors and above all their professional associations.

**Oxana Shevel**, assistant professor of comparative politics, Tufts University, published “The Politics of Citizenship in Post-Soviet Russia,” in the January-March 2012 *Post-Soviet Affairs*. Ms. Shevel asserts that Russian citizenship policy has evolved in puzzling ways since the 1990s, when all former Soviet citizens were entitled to simplified access to Russian citizenship, to the 2002 citizenship law, which put an abrupt end to this policy, giving few but those born on the territory of Russia the right to citizenship. Since 2002, the right to Russian citizenship has been extended to some additional categories of former Soviet citizens, but without a return to the expansive policy of the 1990s. Drawing on legal and governmental sources and scholarly literature, Ms. Shevel looks at elite debates over citizenship rules to analyze Russian citizenship politics and policies, focusing on citizenship rules affecting

former Soviet citizens. These are examined to uncover the causes of legislative zigzags and ascertain the applicability of existing citizenship theories to Russian realities.

**Jae Hyeok Shin**, visiting assistant professor of political science, Duke University, published “The Choice of Electoral Systems in New Democracies: A Case Study of South Korea in 1988.” Mr. Shin examines the choice of a single-member district plurality voting system by the South Korean legislative electoral system in 1988 as an example of electoral institution decisions in new democracies that may differ from those in Western European countries. He reaches three conclusions: in new democracies, labor parties can only induce old parties to shift to a proportional representation system if they have mobilized the working class prior to democratization; parties in the developing world at times face unusual systems that are neither majoritarian nor fully proportionally representative; and when parties choose a legislative electoral institution in a presidential system, they tend to prefer an institution that helps them in the subsequent presidential election even though the institution might harm them in the upcoming legislative election.

**Ben Smith**, associate professor of political science, University of Florida, received a grant from the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation to support research for a book tentatively titled *History and Rebellion: The Origins of Self-Determination Conflicts in the Modern World*.

**Gunes Murat Tezcur**, associate professor of political science, Loyola University Chicago, published “Democracy Promotion, Authoritarian Resiliency, and Political Unrest in Iran,” in the February 2012 *Democratization*. He argues that the recent authoritarian backlash in Iran can be best understood as an interplay of domestic political struggles and two external developments, and claims that the color

revolutions in several post-communist countries and U.S. policies toward Iran contributed to a political climate that resulted in the reformist movement.

**Milada Anna Vachudova**, associate professor of political science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, was awarded an IREX fellowship to support her research on democratization, political contestation, and external leverage in post-communist states, which focuses on the Western Balkans. Ms. Vachudova, along with Aneta B. Spendzharova, published “Catching Up? Consolidating Liberal Democracy in Bulgaria and Romania after EU Ascension,” in the January 2012 *West European Politics*. The authors explore how EU and domestic incentives trigger domestic institutional change, and how the two interact with one another. They argue that political leaders and parties will only continue and deepen reforms in response to the twin forces of EU and domestic influence.

**Leonardo A. Villalon**, associate professor of political science and African studies, University of Florida, published “Between Democracy and Militancy: Islam in Africa,” in the May 2012 *Current History*. Mr. Villalon claims that it is now clear that militant movements in Muslim Africa present larger challenges than previously believed and their disruptive potential in the region must be emphasized. At the same time, such movements represent only a tiny sliver of the contemporary dynamics of Islam in African politics, and fully understanding both the threat they present and their limitations requires that we consider radical Islamists in a broader context of religious trends south of the Sahara.

**Denise Walsh**, associate professor in the Woodrow Wilson Department of Politics and Studies in Women and Gender, University of Virginia, published “Does the Quality of Democracy Matter for Women’s



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Rights? Just Debate and Democratic Transition in Chile and South Africa,” in the March 2012 Comparative Political Studies, which offers a new explanation that targets the quality of democracy in leading institutions in the public sphere. She argues that open and inclusive debate conditions, or women’s access and capacity for contestation in the legislature, civil society, and the media, enable them to shape debate content and pressure the state to respond with legislative reform. Ms. Walsh also published the chapter “Party Centralization and Debate Conditions in South Africa,” in The Impact of Gender Quotas: Women’s Descriptive, Substantive, and Symbolic Representation, edited by Susan Fracneschet, Mona Lena Krook, and Jennifer Piscopo and published by Oxford University Press.

Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro, Stanley J. Bernstein Assistant Professor of Political Science and Public Policy, Brown University, published “What Wins Votes: Why Some Politicians Opt Out of Clientelism,” in the July 2012 American Journal of Political Science. Ms. Weitz-Shapiro explores the previously unexamined

electoral costs of clientelism and finds that clientelism decreases support from non-poor constituents even while it generates votes from among the poor. Taking into account these costs and other factors that shape political incentives, she posits that the interaction between political competition and poverty will explain variation in clientelism, and tests this claim using an original measure of clientelism that assesses mayoral involvement in social policy implementation in Argentine municipalities. The results of the statistical analysis suggest that high levels of political competition are compatible with clientelism when poverty is also high.

Matthew S. Winters, assistant professor of political science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, published “The Obstacles to Foreign Aid Harmonization: Lessons from Decentralization Support in Indonesia,” in the April 2012 Studies in Comparative International Development. Looking at foreign-funded support for decentralization initiatives in Indonesia, Mr. Winters explores the political and

bureaucratic obstacles faced by development organizations trying to harmonize foreign aid at the country level. He finds evidence that the lack of harmonization can be linked to some of the characteristic pathologies of foreign aid: the dominance of the strategic interests of some donors and the structure of bureaucratic incentives within aid agencies. Mr. Winters also received a grant from the Lemann Institute for Brazilian Studies at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign to continue his work with Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro on corruption and accountability in Brazil.

Steve Wuhs, associate professor of government, University of Redlands, will end his term as the Director of the University of Redlands Salzburg, Austria Semester Program in June 2012 to begin a research fellowship from the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung/Foundation at the Technische Universität-Dresden. He will research the territorial development of political parties in the former German Democratic Republic after reunification.



## NEW RESEARCH

### *Journal of Democracy*

The April 2012 (Volume 23, no. 2) issue of the *Journal of Democracy* features a cluster of articles on Southeast Asia, as well as individual articles on the Arab revolutions, Tunisia, Nicaragua, Poland's democracy promotion efforts, and the persistence of Peronism in Argentina. The full text of selected articles and the tables of contents of all issues are available on the *Journal's* website.

"The Languages of the Arab Revolutions" by Abdou Filali-Ansary

*The upheavals that have been shaking the Arab-Muslim world are revolutions in discourse as well as in the streets. Arabs are speaking new political languages, some of which are obviously modern and borrowed from the West, and others of which are more traditional and religious.*

### Southeast Asia

I. "Strong-State Democratization in Malaysia and Singapore" by Dan Slater  
*The strong state in Malaysia and Singapore best explains why these regimes have proved so stable and enduring. It is also the reason why democratization would go smoothly in both countries as well as why democratization might never happen there at all.*

II. "Elites vs. Reform in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam" by Martin Gainsborough  
*Vietnam and its smaller neighbors Laos and Cambodia remain bastions of illiberalism and one-party Communist rule despite rapid economic growth and falling poverty. What will it take to dislodge their dominant political cultures of elitism and the use of public office for private ends?*

III. "Thailand's Uneasy Passage" by Thitinan Pongsudhirak  
*In 2011, Thais in effect reelected deposed Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Why is his brand of populism so irrepressible and what can the establishment dug in around the Thai monarchy do to reach at least a modus vivendi with it?*

IV. "Minding the Gap Between Democracy and Governance" by Donald K. Emmerson

*Do democracy and good governance necessarily go hand in hand? In most Southeast Asian countries, a gap exists between the two. How should we understand good governance in an authoritarian context? And what does poor governance mean for the legitimacy of democracy?*

### The Freedom House Survey for 2011

"The Year of the Arab Uprising" by Arch Puddington  
*Beginning with the "Arab Spring," the events of 2011 presented hopeful prospects for democracy. Yet it remains to be seen whether they will lead to a true wave of democratic revolution.*

"Tunisia's Transition and the Twin Tolerations" by Alfred Stepan  
*Of all the "Arab Spring" countries, Tunisia is the only one so far that has managed to make a transition to democracy. Tunisians now have a chance to show the world another example of how religion, society, and the state can relate to one another in a functional way under democratic conditions.*

"Personalism and Populism in Nicaragua" by Forrest D. Colburn and Arturo Cruz S.  
*For much of its history, Nicaragua has shown a predilection for personalist and populist rule. What explains the persistence and allure of these phenomena, and how do they affect the quality of Nicaragua's democracy?*

"Ballots, Bullets, and the Bottom Billion" by Arthur A. Goldsmith  
*Does recourse to the ballot box spur violence and instability in the world's poorest countries? Despite the worries of modernization theorists such as Paul Collier, the evidence indicates that elections are not associated with higher levels of political violence.*

"How Poland Promotes Democracy" by Tsveta Petrova

*Among a new generation of international democracy promoters—often former recipients of democracy assistance themselves—Poland stands out. Its efforts, though mostly in its own neighborhood, show the importance of combining direct assistance with quiet diplomatic pressure.*

"The Persistence of Peronism" by Ernesto Calvo and M. Victoria Murillo  
*Despite a rocky first term, Peronist President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner saw her popularity rebound and lead to a huge reelection victory in 2011. Why is Peronism still the dominant "brand" in Argentine politics, and how has she come to own it so thoroughly?*

### Democratization

The April 2012 (Volume 19, no. 2) *Democratization* features articles on social welfare in Ghana and Cameroon, populism, Indonesia, grassroots democratization, and India's democracy promotion efforts.

"Do New Democracies Deliver Social Welfare? Political Regimes and Health Policy in Ghana and Cameroon" by Giovanni Carbone

"The Ambivalence of Populism: Threat and Corrective for Democracy" by Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser

"Indonesia's Democratic Stagnation: Anti-Reformist Elites and Resilient Civil Society" by Marcus Mietzner

"Democratization at the Grassroots: the European Union's External Impact" by Anastassia V. Obydenkova

"The Power of Arms: Rethinking Armed Parties and Democratization through the Palestinian Elections" by Matthew Longo & Ellen Lust

"India as a Democracy Promoter? New Delhi's Involvement in Nepal's Return to

## New Research

Democracy” by Sandra Destradi

“Caste and Democratization in Postcolonial India: An Ethnographic Examination of Lower Caste Politics in Bihar” by Jeffrey Witsoe

“Islamic Reformation Discourses: Popular Sovereignty and Religious Secularisation in Iran” by Naser Ghobadzadeh & Lily Zubaidah Rahim

“The Local in the Global: Rethinking Social Movements in the New Millennium” by Kim Voss & Michelle Williams

The February 2012 (Volume 19, no. 1) *Democratization* is a special issue on “Reassessing Coloured Revolutions and Authoritarian Reactions.”

“No More Colour! Authoritarian Regimes and Colour Revolutions in Eurasia” by Evgeny Finkel and Yitzhak M. Brudny

“Russia and the Colour Revolutions” by Evgeny Finkel and Yitzhak M. Brudny

“Questioning Democracy Promotion: Belarus’ Response to the ‘Colour Revolutions’” by Elena Korosteleva

“Oil in the Family: Managing Presidential Succession in Azerbaijan” by Scott Radnitz

“Coloured by Revolution: The Political Economy of Autocratic Stability in Uzbekistan” by Jennifer Murtazashvili  
“Tajikistan: Authoritarian Reaction in a Postwar State” by Lawrence P. Markowitz

“Democracy Promotion, Authoritarian Resiliency, and Political Unrest in Iran” by Güneş Murat Tezcür

## SELECTED JOURNAL ARTICLES ON DEMOCRACY

This section features selected articles on democracy that appeared in journals received by the NED’s Democracy Resource Center, January 1– May 15, 2012.

*African Affairs*, Vol. 111, no. 443, April 2012

“Wars Do End! Changing Patterns of Political Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa” by Scott Straus

“The Big Fish Won’t Fry Themselves: Criminal Accountability for Post-Election Violence in Kenya” by Erlend Grøner Krogstad

*African Affairs*, Vol. 111, no. 442, January 2012

“David against Goliath in Côte d’Ivoire? Laurent Gbagbo’s War against Global Governance” by Fiulia Piccolino

“Becoming Indigenous in the pursuit of Justice: The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Endorois” by Gabrielle Lynch

“Botswana: A Development-Oriented Gate-Keeping State” by Ellen Hillbom

“From Patronage to Peacebuilding? Elite Capture and Governance from Below in Sierra Leone” by Melissa T. Labonte

“NGOs and the Formation of the Public: Grey Practices and Accountability” by Laura Routley

“Briefing: Donors, Dependency, and Political Crisis in Malawi” by Daniel Wroe

*Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 31, no. 1, March 2012

“From Sultanism to Neopatrimonialism? Regionalism within Turkmenistan” by Nicholas Kunysz

“Wounds that Won’t Heal: Cartographic Anxieties and the Quest for Territorial Integrity in Georgia” by Peter Kabachnik

“The Rise of the Jama’at al Tabligh in Kyrgyzstan: The Revival of Islamic Ties between the Indian Subcontinent and Central Asia?” by Bayram Balci

*Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 45, no. 6, June 2012

“Authoritarian Responses to Foreign Pressure: Spending, Repression, and Sanctions” by Abel Escribà-Folch

“Reverse Contamination: Burning and Building Bridges in Mixed-Member Systems” by Ellis Krauss, Kuniaki Nemoto, and Robert Pekkanen

*Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 45, no. 5, May 2012

“Does Cheating Pay? The Effect of Electoral Misconduct on Party Systems” by Daniela Donno and Nasos Roussias

*Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 45, no. 4, April 2012

“Assessing the Impact of Lustration on Trust in Public Institutions and National Government in Central and Eastern Europe” by Cynthia M. Horne

“Combining Federalism and Decentralization: Comparative Case Studies on Regional Development Policies in Switzerland, Austria, Denmark, and Ireland” by Jan Biela, Annika Hennl, and André Kaiser

*Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 45, no. 3, March 2012

“Fragile Snapshot or Stable Relationships?: What the Orange and Rose Revolutions Reveal About the Stability of Cross-Sectional Survey Data” by Lowell W. Barrington

“An Irrational Party of Rational Members: The Collision of Legislators’ Reelection

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*New Research*


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Minority Concentration on the Electoral Success of Ethnic Minorities in Russia” by Regina Goodnow and Robert G. Moser

“Welfare State Politics in Privatization of Delivery: Linking Program Constituencies to Left and Right” by Amos Zehavi

“Shadowing Ministers: Monitoring Partners in Coalition Governments” by Royce Carroll and Gary W. Cox

“The Measurer’s Dilemma: Coordination Failures in Cross-National Political Data Collection” by Andreas Schedler

***Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 45, no. 1, January 2012**

“Democracy Promotion, Civil Society Building, and the Primacy of Politics” by Manal A. Jamal

“Out of the Cabinet: What Drives Defections From the Government in Presidential Systems?” by Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo

“Constructing Accountability: Party Position Taking and Economic Voting” by Timothy Hellwig

“Interactive Diffusion: The Coevolution of Police and Protest Behavior With an Application to Transnational Contention” by Donatella della Porta and Sidney Tarrow

***Comparative Politics*, Vol. 44, no. 3, April 2012**

“Bottom-Up Challenges to National Democracy: Mexico’s (Legal) Subnational Authoritarian Enclaves” by Allyson Lucinda Benton

“Parental Transmission of Trust or Perceptions of Institutional Fairness? Generalized Trust of Non-Western Immigrants in a High-Trust Society” by Peter Thisted

“The Authoritarian Advantage of Horizontal Accountability: Ombudsmen in Poland and Russia” by Dinesen Evgeny Finkel

“Structure of Political Opportunities and Threats, and Movement-Counter-movement Interaction in Segmented Composite Regimes” by Eitan Y. Alimi and Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler

***Comparative Politics*, Vol. 44, no. 2, January 2012**

“Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring” by Eva Bellin

“Coercive Capacity and the Prospects for Democratization” by Michael Albertus and Victor Menaldo

“Public Religion, Democracy, and Islam: Examining the Moderation Thesis in Algeria” by Michael D. Driessen

“Between Developmental and Clientelist States: Local State-Business Relationship in China” by Lynette H. Ong

“Patronage and Decentralization: The Politics of Poverty in India” by Anoop Sadanandan

***Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 34, no. 1, April 2012**

“The Perils of Incoherence: ASEAN, Myanmar and the Avoidable Failures of Human Rights Socialization” by Mathew Davies

“Foreign Investment in Myanmar: A Resource Boom but a Development Bust?” by Jared Bissinger

“Myanmar’s Police Forces: Coercion, Continuity and Change” by Andrew Selth

“Politics, Business and the State in Post-

Soeharto Indonesia” by Yuki Fukuoka

“Twin Coalition Politics in Malaysia since 2008: A Path Dependent Framing and Analysis” by Johan Saravanamuttu

***Current History*, Vol. 111, no. 745, May 2012**

“Lions, Tigers, and Emerging Markets: Africa’s Development Dilemmas” by Anne Pitcher

“Somalia at the Tipping Point?” by Ken Menkhaus

“The Regionalization of African Security” by William Reno

“Kenya Struggles to Fix Itself” by Jacqueline M. Klopp

“Between Democracy and Militancy: Islam in Africa” by Leonardo A. Villalón

“Perspective: US Africa Policy: Rhetoric Versus Reality” by Jessica Piombo

***Current History*, Vol. 111, no. 744, April 2012**

“Afghans Look at 2014” by Thomas Barfield

“India Flexes Its Foreign Aid Assistance” by Rani D. Mullen

***Current History*, Vol. 111, no. 742, February 2012**

“The Shifting Landscape of Latin American Regionalism” by Michael Shifter

“Can Santos’s Colombia Turn the Page? By Sebastian Chaskel and Michael J. Bustamante

***Current History*, Vol. 111, no. 741, January 2012**

“Arab Revolts Upend Old Assumptions” by Augustus Richard Norton



***Demokratizatsiya*, Vol. 20, no. 2, Spring 2012**

“Political Leadership after Communism” by Timothy J. Colton

“Two Decades of Post-Soviet Regime Dynamics” by Henry E. Hale

“From the Politics of Economic Reform to the Functioning of Political Economies” by Andre Barnes

“Rethinking Post-Soviet Politics from a Neopatrimonial Perspective” by Oleksandr Fisun

“Political Preferences and Party Development in Post-Communist States: A New Approach with an Illustration of the Russian Case” by Regina Smyth

“Citizenship and the Social Contract in Post-Soviet Russia” by Samuel A. Greene

“Twenty Years of Russian Legal Reform” by William Pomeranz

“Post-Communist Legacies and Political Behavior and Attitudes” by Grigore Pop-Eleches and Joshua A. Tucker

“Lessons and Many More Questions about Nationalism and Self-Determination” by Philip G. Roeder

“The Unexpectedly Underwhelming Role of Ethnicity in Russian Politics, 1991–2011” by Elise Giuliano and Dmitry Gorenburg

***East European Politics*, Vol. 28, no. 2, June 2012**

“Electoral Manipulation and the Development of Russia’s Political System” by Edwin Bacon

“Dynamics of New Party Formation in the Czech Republic 1996–2010: Looking for the Origins of a ‘Political Earthquake’” by

Seán Hanley

“Discourse on Democratization by Russian and Chinese Political Elites” by Jeanne L. Wilson

“We All Agree that We Disagree Too Much: Attitudes of Romanian MPs towards Party Discipline” by Laurentiu Stefan, Sergiu Gherghina, and Mihail Chiru

***East European Politics*, Vol. 28, no. 1, March 2012**

“Governing the Post-Communist State: Government Alternation and Senior Civil Service Politicisation in Central and Eastern Europe” by Jan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling and Tim Veen

“EU-Driven Judicial Reforms in Romania: A Success Story?” by Martin Mendelski

“Modernisation, Neo-Modernisation, and Comparative Democratization in Russia” by Richard Sakwa

“State-Building versus Peacebuilding: The Contradictions of EU State-Building in Bosnia and Herzegovina” by Ana E. Juncos

“European Integration and Minority Politics: Ethnic Parties at the EP Elections” by Maria Spirova

***East European Politics and Societies*, Vol. 26, no. 2, May 2012**

“Lessons from ‘Post-Yugoslav’ Democratization: Functional Problems of Stateness and the Limits of Democracy” by Vedran Džihic and Dieter Segert

“Recruitment and Representation of Ethnic Minorities under Proportional Representation: Evidence from Bulgaria” by Oleh Protsyk and Konstantin Sachariew

***East European Politics and Societies*, Vol. 26, no. 1, February 2012**

“Changing Patterns of Civil Society in Europe and America 1995–2005: Is Eastern Europe Different?” by Claire Wallace, Florian Pichler, and Christian Haerper

“Czech Militant Democracy in Action: Dissolution of the Workers’ Party and the Wider Context of This Act” by Miroslav Mareš

“Struggle of Dimensionality: Party Competition in Western and Eastern Europe” by Jan Rovny and Erica E. Edwards

“The European Dimension of Minority Political Representation: Bulgaria and Romania Compared” by Maria Spirova and Boyka Stefanova

“Recent Developments in the Ukrainian Judicial System and the Impact of International and European Law” by Wolfgang Tiede and Oscar Rennalls

“The European Union, Russia, and the Future of the Transnistrian Frozen Conflict” by Theodor Tudoroiu

***Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 91, no. 2, March/April 2012**

“NATO’s Victory in Libya” by Ivo H. Daalder and James G. Stavridis

“Rethinking Latin America” by Christopher Sabatini

“The Arab Spring at One” by Fouad Ajami

***Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 91, no. 1, January/February 2012**

“The Democratic Malaise” by Charles A. Kupchan

“The Strange Triumph of Liberal Democracy” by Shlomo Avineri

***Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 34, no. 1, February 2012**

“Rescues for Humanity’: Rescuers, Mass Atrocities, and Transitional Justice” by Ron Dudai

“Human Rights, Emergencies, and the Rule of Law” by Evan Fox-Decent and Evan J. Criddle

“Self-Determination and Indigenous Women’s Rights at the Intersection of International Human Rights” by Rauna Kuokkanen

***Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 50, no.2, June 2012**

“Civil–Military Relations and Political Order in Guinea-Bissau” by Birgit Embaló

“Executive Dominance and the Politics of Quota Representation in Uganda” by Ragnhild L. Muriaasa and Vibeke Wang

***Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 50, no.1, March 2012**

“Electoral Competition, Factionalism, and Persistent Party Dominance in Botswana” by Amy R. Poteetea

***Middle East Policy*, Vol. 19, no. 1, Spring 2012**

“The Islamic Republic of Iran: Facts and Fiction” by Jahangir Amuzegar

“Democracy, Autocrats and U.S. Politics in the Middle East” by Timo Kivimäki

“The Syrian Uprising of 2011: Why the Asad Regime Is Likely to Survive to 2013” by Joshua Landis

“Syria’s Stalemate: The Limits of Regime Resilience” by Bassam Haddad

“Jordan’s Arab Spring: The Middle Class and Anti-Revolution” by Sarah A. Tobin

“Turkey: The Politics of a New Democratic Constitution” by Michael M.

Gunter

“Saudi Arabia: Civil Rights and Local Actors” by Raed Abdulaziz Alhargan  
“Constituting Institutions: The Electoral System in Egypt” by David M. Faris

***Orbis*, Vol. 56, no. 1, Winter 2012**

“Religious Relations across the Taiwan Strait: Patterns, Alignments, and Political Elites” by Deborah A. Brown and Tun-jen Cheng

“Jordan: Between the Arab Spring and the Gulf Cooperation Council” by Samuel Helfont and Tally Helfont

“The Arab Spring and the Saudi-Led Counterrevolution” by Mehran Kamrava

“India’s ‘Af-Pak’ Conundrum: South Asia in Flux” by Harsh V. Pant

***Party Politics*, Vol. 18, no. 3, May 2012**

“Policy-Seeking Parties in Multiparty Systems: Influence or Purity?” by Helene Helboe Pedersen

“One-Party Rule or Multiparty Competition? Chinese Attitudes to Party System Alternatives” by Robert Harmel and Alexander C. Tan

“Multi-Party Governance: Managing the Unity-Distinctiveness Dilemma in Executive Coalitions” by Jonathan Boston and David Bullock

“Scripture, Structure and the Formation of Catholic Parties: The Case of Venezuela” by Luis Felipe Mantilla

“Factions with Clout: Presidential Cabinet Coalition and Policy in the Uruguayan Parliament” by Eric Magar and Juan Andrés Moraes

***Party Politics*, Vol. 18, no. 2, March 2012**

“Who Selects the Party Leader?” by William Cross and André Blais

“Party Media Agenda-Setting: How Parties Influence Election News Coverage” by David N. Hopmann, Christian Elmelund-Præstekær, Erik Albæk, Rens Vliegthart, and Claes H. de Vreese

“When Citizens Go against Elite Directions: Partisan Cues and Contrast Effects on Citizens’ Attitudes” by Lene Aaroe

“Party System Types and Party System Institutionalization: Comparing New Democracies in East and Southeast Asia” by Aurel Croissant and Philip Völkel

***Taiwan Democracy Quarterly*, Vol. 8, no. 3, September 2011**

“How the Internet Impacts Social Movements: A Case Study of the Taiwan Wild Strawberry Movement” by Yuan Hsiao

“Analysis on Probability of Election Results: Case Studies of 2006 and 2008 Elections in Taiwan” by Chen-yuan Tung, Tzu-chuan Chou, Jih-wen Lin, and Hsin-yi Lin

***Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 35, no. 1, Winter 2012**

“A North Korean Spring?” by Victor D. Cha and Nicholas D. Anderson

“Why China Will Democratize” by Yu Liu and Dingding Chen

“The Influence and Illusion of China’s New Left” by Charles W. Freeman III and Wen Jin Yuan

“Solving Statebuilders’ Dilemma” by Ben Rowswell

“The Battle for China’s Top Nine Leadership Posts” by Cheng Li

“Russian Foreign Policy: Continuity in Change” by Andrew C. Kuchins and Igor A. Zevelev

**World Affairs, March/April 2012**

“Korea’s Third Kim: Will Anything Change?” by Naoko Aoki

“Egypt’s Elections: Why the Islamists Win” by Samuel Tadros

“Fascistoid Russia: Whither Putin’s Brittle Realm?” by Alexander J. Motyl

“It’s Not Just Al-Qaeda: Stability in the Most Dangerous Region” by Paul D. Miller

“Battle for Bahrain” by Brandon Friedman

**World Affairs, January/February 2012**

“Arab Spring or Islamist Winter? Three Views” by Michael J. Totten, David Schenker, and Hussain Abdul-Hussain

“What Now? Saying Goodbye to the Peace Process Illusion” by Michael Zantovsky

“The Myanmar Moment? Why Washington Made Its Move” by Peter A. Coclanis

**World Politics, Vol. 64, no. 2, April 2012**

“Pathways of Dominance and Displacement: The Varying Fates of Legacy Unions in New Democracies” by Teri L. Caraway

“Democratization and Multilateral Strategy” by Isabella Alcañiz

**SELECTED NEW BOOKS ON DEMOCRACY****ADVANCED DEMOCRACIES**

*The Constitution Before the Judgment Seat: The Prehistory and Ratification of the American Constitution, 1787–1791.*

By Jürgen Heideking, Edited by John P. Kaminski and Richard Leffler. University of Virginia Press, 2012. 552 pp.

*Democracy Beyond Athens: Popular Government in the Greek Classical Age.* By

Eric W. Robinson. Cambridge University Press, 2011. 275 pp.

*Democracy Despite Itself: Why a System that Shouldn’t Work at All Works so Well.* By Danny Oppenheimer and Mike Edwards. MIT Press, 2012. 245 pp.

*The End of Race? Obama, 2008, and Racial Politics in America.* By Donald R. Kinder and Allison Dale-Riddle. Yale University Press, 2012. 309 pp.

*Faith and Race in American Political Life.* Edited by Robin Dale Jacobson and Nancy D. Wadsworth. University of Virginia Press, 2012. 320 pp.

*Georgia Democrats, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Shaping of the New South.* By Tim S. R. Boyd. University Press of Florida, 2012. 302 pp.

*In Chambers: Stories of Supreme Court Law Clerks and Their Justices.* Edited by Todd C. Peppers and Artemus Ward. University of Virginia Press, 2012. 445 pp.

*Political Communication in Direct Democratic Campaigns: Enlightening or Manipulating.* Edited by Hanspeter Kriesi. Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 265 pp.

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# APSA-CD

is the official newsletter of the American Political Science Association's Comparative Democratization section. Formerly known as CompDem, it has been published three times a year (October, January, and May) by the National Endowment for Democracy's International Forum for Democratic Studies since 2003. In October 2010, the newsletter was renamed APSA-CD and expanded to include substantive articles on democracy, as well as news and notes on the latest developments in the field. The newsletter is now jointly produced and edited by faculty members of the University of Florida's Department of Political Science and the International Forum.

The current issue of APSA-CD is available here. A complete archive of past issues is also available.

To inquire about submitting an article to APSA-CD, please contact Staffan I. Lindberg, Benjamin Smith, or Melissa Aten.

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


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