



**Discussion Paper**

**THE PROBLEM OF SUBNATIONAL UNEVENNESS IN  
DEMOCRACY**

*Workshop “Local democracy today and tomorrow - Learning from global  
knowledge and practices”*

*November 2014*

*Dr. Kelly M. McMann*



This International IDEA Discussion Paper is independent of specific national or political interests. Views expressed in this paper do not necessarily represent the views of International IDEA, its Board or its Council Members.

## Executive Summary

The problem of subnational unevenness in democracy has received considerably less attention than other obstacles to democratization. Subnational unevenness in democracy refers to subnational political units—villages, towns, cities, and provinces—that exhibit different levels of democracy within a country that has undergone democratic transition. Data from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project suggest that this problem afflicts more than half of the countries of the world. It is most common in countries with hybrid national governments—those that combine authoritarian and democratic elements. In fact, looking back over this and the last century, it is evident that this problem occurred in countries with hybrid regimes, regardless of the region of the world. Contrary to conventional wisdom, subnational unevenness in democracy is not just a problem in countries with federal systems of government, according to preliminary analysis of the V-Dem data.

This unevenness manifests itself as pockets of weak or nonexistent local democracy. These pockets take three forms, according to an analysis of cases from multiple regions of the world. The most common type seems to be locales where informal practices restrict contestation, or the ability to challenge or oppose government leaders or policies. In these pockets of weak democracy, formal democratic institutions exist and people are engaged in political activities, but they avoid challenging local officials or policies. Informal, and sometimes illegal, government harassment in the form of firings, unfounded business inspections, and lawsuits, for example, stifle opposition activities. Faced with actual or possible harassment, citizens tend to self-censor, further contributing to the absence of contestation. The second type of weak or nonexistent local democracy is those subnational governments that restrict both contestation and participation through a mix of formal and informal practices. The limits to participation are typically codified into law. Restricted contestation and participation seem to be considerably less common than restricted contestation alone. Part of the reason is likely that subnational governments do not need to limit participation in order to maintain control. The third type, the absence of contestation and participation, is typically found when discrimination against regionally concentrated minorities has escalated to a military crackdown against insurgents. This situation is relatively common; however, it has typically fallen outside of the purview of scholars concerned about local democracy, being instead categorized as “conflict.” Legally, members of the minority group are equal to members of the majority; however, social discrimination results in unofficial state discrimination. In response to discrimination, minorities will sometimes initiate insurgencies, rebellions, or secessionist movements. Often a military crackdown results and the rights to participate and contest are abolished. Examples from Africa, Asia, Latin America and the former Soviet Union illustrate these three types.

What factors enable subnational governments to limit or prohibit participation and contestation? Economic dependence on local authorities, lack of national support for local democracy, and certain national laws help these undemocratic subnational governments to develop and endure. When citizens are economically dependent on local leaders they are more susceptible to government harassment and self-censorship with the end result that they do not

engage in democratic activism. When undemocratic subnational governments are in national leaders' interests, these pockets of non-democracy are more likely to develop and survive. Undemocratic subnational governments are also likely to endure when national leaders are inattentive to them or lack the capacity to democratize them. National laws granting local authorities the right to design local elections enable formal restrictions on participation and contestation.

From the analysis it is clear that efforts to support local democracy should be directed more toward discouraging detrimental informal practices rather than focusing exclusively on reforming legal institutions. Undemocratic formal institutions seem to be less of a problem than undemocratic informal practices. While efforts should continue to be made to reform institutions and laws to promote democracy, this does not seem like the central task at hand. Attention should be directed to ensuring that even when national laws allow subnational governments to establish their own legal systems that certain democratic standards be met.

Tackling the factors that enable informal practices—discrimination, lack of economic autonomy, and national government incapacity and inattention—would address the more common obstacles to local democracy. Proven programs to improve relations among ethnic groups would be useful to discourage informal political discrimination and to prevent the situation from deteriorating to one of insurgency and military crackdown. Efforts can be made to increase citizens' economic independence from local authorities by creating jobs outside the public sector and in work places owned by neither local authorities nor their families or friends. Credit, besides enabling private businesses to start and also hire more individuals, can enable them to expand beyond the locale and thus limit possibilities for local government harassment. Standard efforts to build state capacity through infrastructural development and tax collection reform can also help national governments better democratize villages, towns, cities, and provinces. Better access to outlying areas and more resources are helpful to such political endeavors. Greater local and international focus on the problem of subnational unevenness in democracy can bring to the attention of national governments locales in their countries where citizens are unable to exercise democratic rights. This attention also helps diffuse norms about democratic institutions and rights to citizens and local leaders. For a country to be democratic, all citizens, regardless of where they reside, should be able to exercise their rights.

## Biography

Kelly M. McMann is an associate professor of political science at Case Western Reserve University. She is the project manager for subnational government for Varieties of Democracy, a global effort to measure more than 400 indicators of democracy for each country of the world from 1900 to the present. Her publications include *Corruption as a Last Resort: Adapting to the Market in Central Asia* and *Economic Autonomy and Democracy: Hybrid Regimes in Russia and Kyrgyzstan*. She earned her Ph.D. from the University of Michigan and conducted postdoctoral research at Harvard University's Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies.

In the last four decades more countries than ever before have experienced democratic transition, meaning they have extracted themselves from authoritarian governments, held multicandidate elections, and introduced or expanded civil liberties. Many of these countries, however, have never consolidated democracy and instead have hybrid regimes, governments that exhibit a combination of democratic and authoritarian elements. Scholars' and practitioners' identification of this problem of incomplete democratization has focused on the national government: they typically find that national government institutions and laws are democratic, but informal practices by national officials are non-democratic. An equally troubling problem, but one that has received considerably less attention, is subnational unevenness in democracy—the focus of this paper.

Subnational unevenness in democracy refers to subnational political units—villages, towns, cities, and provinces—that exhibit different levels of democracy within a country that has undergone democratic transition. Differences can manifest themselves among the same type of units—villages, for example—or across types of units—villages versus cities, for example. Countries such as Brazil, Chile, India, Italy, Mexico, Spain, and the United States have had pockets of non-democratic rule at times when they were widely considered democracies. Living outside a city limit or beyond a provincial border should not reduce one's rights, such as the rights to voice one's opinion, access objective media, form an opposition group, compete for public office, vote in free and fair elections, or have government policies reflect one's preferences. Yet in practice, such geographic disparities do exist.

This paper describes the problem of subnational unevenness in democracy, specifies three manifestations of it, and examines factors that enable it. The paper then explores ways that the problem of subnational unevenness has been and might be overcome. The analysis is based on preliminary statistical data from the Varieties of Democracy project and case studies from Africa, Asia, Latin America, and post-Soviet states. Examples from Argentina, Indonesia, and Senegal illustrate major points.

## **Subnational Unevenness in Democracy**

Pockets of weak or non-existent democracy in a country with a democratic national regime are particularly troubling. Local, rather than national, government typically has a greater impact on everyday life; "local" here refers to any governments below the national level. And citizens often have more influence in local political institutions, when they are elected, because they are more accessible geographically. These local institutions also can serve as training grounds for officials who will later serve in the national government.

When unevenness exists, local governments can range from democratic to hybrid to authoritarian. For that reason, this paper uses phrases such as "weak democracy or non-democracy," rather than labelling all these pockets as "authoritarian enclaves." Although "authoritarian enclave" is a catchy phrase, it does not capture the variation in local governments.

How common is subnational unevenness and where does it exist? Preliminary analysis of data from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project provides some tentative answers. V-Dem is a global collaborative effort to collect data for more than 400 indicators of democracy in all countries of the world from 1900 to the present (Coppedge et al. 2014). It is the first democracy dataset to include measures of subnational democracy. Two measures are especially helpful in understanding subnational unevenness: they consider to what extent the freedom and fairness of subnational elections and government respect for civil liberties vary across different areas of the country. Free and fair elections and civil liberties represent central components of democracy. The questions country experts answered to generate the data are as follows: *Does the freeness and fairness of subnational elections vary across different areas of the country? Does government respect for civil liberties vary across different areas of the country?* (Coppedge, et al. 2014) For additional detail about data collection, refer to Appendix A.

From the V-Dem data, in the table below, we see that unevenness in the freeness and fairness of elections is a problem in 53 per cent of countries and unevenness in government respect for civil liberties is a problem in 68 per cent of countries.

<b>Table 1. Unevenness in...</b>		
	<b>Free and Fair Subnational Elections</b> (percentages)	<b>Government Respect for Civil Liberties</b> (percentages)
<b>No unevenness</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>32</b>
<b>Unevenness</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>68</b>
<small>ALL DATA ARE FOR 2011, THE LATEST YEAR FOR WHICH V-DEM HAS COLLECTED DATA SO FAR. THE STATISTICS FOR FREE AND FAIR SUBNATIONAL ELECTIONS ARE BASED ON 122 COUNTRIES AND FOR GOVERNMENT RESPECT FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES ON 125, REFLECTING THE DATA THAT ARE CURRENT AVAILABLE. THE DATASET WILL BE COMPLETED AND AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC VIA THE INTERNET IN 2015. COUNTRIES FOR WHICH DATA STILL NEED TO BE COLLECTED ARE MICROSTATES AND A SMALL NUMBER OF NON-MICROSTATES IN ASIA, EUROPE, AND LATIN AMERICA (COPPEDGE, ET AL. 2014).</small>		

The unevenness that these V-Dem statistics capture is not only unevenness after democratic transition, but also unevenness under an authoritarian national government; this is evident from the full question wording, appearing in Appendix A. Both types of unevenness are important: the former robs some citizens of their democratic rights, and the latter may be a precursor to a democratic breakthrough. Under what type of national government is unevenness most likely to occur? Preliminary analysis of these data indicates that unevenness is most likely to occur when the national government is a hybrid (McMann et al. 2014). This make intuitive sense: pockets of authoritarianism are unlikely to exist under a highly democratic national government, and pockets of democracy are unlikely to exist under a highly authoritarian national government. This is also consistent with our understanding that unevenness is a problem after national democratic transition. Soon after these transitions, democracy is unlikely to exist evenly throughout the country. Also if democracy never consolidates and stalls as a hybrid national regime, democracy is unlikely to exist evenly

throughout the country.

Examining the data back to 1900 suggests that subnational unevenness has been a long-term problem that has plagued all regions of the world. Across the time span it has not been more likely to occur in certain regions of the world (McMann et al. 2014). In a particular era, wherever there are hybrid national regimes, subnational unevenness is likely.

Interestingly, preliminary analysis suggests that the problem of subnational unevenness is not confined to countries with federal systems of government. Scholars have limited their studies of subnational democracy to a small number of federal countries, implicitly assuming that they would find subnational variation only in such systems. Some have explained that only a federal structure would allow subnational leaders the autonomy to stifle local democracy in a country with a democratic national government. The V-Dem data suggest, however, this is not the case. Tests of these two V-Dem indicators with four sets of data that measure whether a federal system exists or whether provinces are granted powers over taxing, spending, or legislating showed that unevenness is not more likely in a federal system (McMann et al. 2014). Future analysis with the V-Dem data may indicate that particular powers granted to subnational leaders may promote unevenness. So far, however, the findings suggest that federalism generally is not a factor.

### **Three Types**

What is it like to live in a country with subnational unevenness in democracy? What do people living in the pockets of weak or absent democracy experience? There are three main scenarios or models, based on analysis of countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the former Soviet Union: first, informal practices restrict contestation; second, formal and informal practices restrict participation and contestation; and third, formal and informal practices, including violence, prevent participation and contestation. Participation refers to engagement in political activities such as producing information for the public, forming and joining organizations, running for office, and voting. However, participation alone is not sufficient for democracy to exist; contestation, or the possibility to compete against and oppose government officials and policies, is also necessary (Dahl 1971). It must be possible for independent media outlets and organizations to challenge and oppose government officials and policies. Likewise, individuals must be able to express opposing viewpoints and run against incumbents in electoral races. When both participation and contestation exist, responsive, or democratic, government is more likely. Unfortunately, residents living under these three types of subnational governance do not enjoy democracy.

The three types are models, designed to be exclusive of each other, so some of the examples that come to mind fall in between categories. Types one, two, and three range from hybrid regimes to increasingly authoritarian ones. Within each type there can also be different degrees of restrictions and prohibitions on democratic institutions and rights. Of the three types, the first and third seem most common, as judged by case study research in four regions of the world—Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the former Soviet Union. Future research with the V-Dem data might further illuminate the frequency of different types. Reflecting the

apparent frequency, this section devotes the most attention to the first and the third— locales where informal practices restrict contestation and locales where formal and informal practices, including violence, prevent participation and contestation.

### *Informal Practices Restrict Contestation*

Subnational governments that restrict contestation allow participation, but activities such as publishing news, operating civic organizations, running for office, and voting have little significance when they cannot challenge government officials and their policies. These restrictions are often placed only on opposition to subnational officials and programs, not to those at higher levels of government. “We can swear at the president, but we can only question the governor,” explained the head of a media outlet in Ul’ianovsk Oblast, a province in Russia where democracy was weak during the national democratization of the 1990s (McMann 2006: 78). Subnational governments that restrict contestation through informal practices seem to be the most common type of weak local democracy. Examples span the globe from numerous locales in the Philippines, to Naryn province in Kyrgyzstan, to northern Senegal, to Corrientes and San Luis in Argentina (Beck 2008, Behrend 2011, McMann 2006, Sidel 1999).

From the outside these pockets of weak democracy can actually look quite democratic. People are engaged in political activities: independent media outlets, civic organizations, and multicandidate elections exist. Scratch below the surface, however, and it is evident that the media do not engage in investigative or critical reporting about local officials and policies, civic organizations avoid politics, and “opposition” candidates are often plants to make elections seem competitive. A look back into their recent history, furthermore, reveals that media outlets and civic organizations that once challenged local officials are now defunct and true opposition challengers never joined or dropped out of races.

What tactics do subnational officials use to restrict contestation? The techniques are largely informal and sometimes illegal. The laws and institutions in these polities indicate that their residents have a right to contest. Yet, government harassment discourages individuals from exercising these rights. Media outlets and civic organizations face tax, fire, and sanitation inspections and unfounded fines as well as loss of utilities and office space. They are threatened with lawsuits or become victim to lawsuits decided by judges under the thumb of local leaders. Media outlets lose advertisers because local authorities make similar threats against those firms. Journalists, civic leaders, potential candidates, and their family members experience exclusion from plum employment, job loss, threat of job loss, and expulsion from university. (Gervasoni 2010b, McMann 2006). Government officials will also resort to the threat of violence or beatings, torture, and homicide typically carried out by hired individuals.

Governments often target participants in organized political activities, such as independent media, civic groups, and electoral campaigns, more than individuals who act alone by writing a complaint to an official or letter to an editor, for example, or those who periodically engage in street protests or voting. Media outlets, civic groups, and electoral campaigns bring together large numbers of discontented people on a regular basis for a long



period of time. Consequently, they pose a greater threat to authorities than an individual or an occasional street protest.

Faced with actual or possible harassment, citizens tend to self-censor, further contributing to the absence of contestation. Journalists avoid taboo topics, civic organizations steer clear of political activity, and potential candidates decide not to run. Those who initially choose to risk challenging officials and their policies later abandon activism, often with the result that independent media outlets, political parties, and human rights organizations dissolve (McMann 2006).

Subnational leaders' motivation in limiting contestation is to ensure that they remain in power. They might consider themselves the best people for the job, sometimes viewing themselves as "saviors" in difficult environments. They might also be motivated by material benefits that accrue, often illegally, to those in power. Finally, as ethical and legal violations accumulate, leaders may also fear informal or formal punishments if they lose office.

Government harassment and resulting self-censorship is usually sufficient to ensure that incumbents remain in power. In fact, government leaders can typically be assured that they or their chosen successors will win office without resorting to electoral fraud. By election day, opposition has already been effectively squelched. Nonetheless, leaders sometimes couple harassment of potential and actual opposition with unethical and illegal tactics to build support during electoral campaigns. These include using government funds and state media for campaign purposes and paying independent media for positive media coverage (Gervasoni 2010a, Gervasoni 2010b). Incumbents and their campaign managers might also need to work to quash opposition efforts during the electoral period if anyone risked harassment and decided to run as an opposition candidate. Electoral commissions under the thumb of local authorities can interpret candidate registration requirements to favor the incumbent. Members of the campaign team can face the harassment described above, and campaign events can encounter obstacles, such as padlocked facilities and individuals hired to physically intimidate supporters. Although not typically necessary when contestation is limited, some subnational governments also resort to electoral fraud (Giraudy 2013).

Restrictions on alternative media, civic groups, and opposition campaigns are sufficient to preclude democracy because they also undermine its other components—freedom of expression, the right to vote, free and fair elections, and responsive government institutions. Freedom of expression has minimal impact under these conditions because people's views cannot be disseminated widely. The right to vote is less meaningful because voters' abilities to judge candidates are impaired without media and civic groups sharing information about the contenders. Harassment of potential candidates reduces their number and pressures on political groups and campaign workers limit assistance to those who decide to run. Without vibrant independent media and civic groups, the number and quality of election observers from the country declines. The objectivity of electoral commissions is questionable when opposition groups do not hold seats on them. Elections are less likely to be free and fair without objective election observers and electoral commissions. Ultimately, government is less responsive when alternative media, civic groups, and opposition campaigns are weak or non-existent. Government officials cannot turn to independent media and civic groups as sources of

information about societal problems and instead hear only favorable reports from state media and scattered complaints from individuals. Without a public forum to assess government policies, people are less likely to mobilize to demand improvements. Opposing voices are also not heard in government institutions because restrictions on opposition candidates prevent their electoral success (McMann 2006).

Relative to the other components of democracy, alternative media, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and opposition campaigns are easy for authorities to restrict. Due to the public nature and duration of their work, journalists, members of civic groups, and opposition candidates are more readily identifiable than the periodic protestor or discontented voter. The cost of repressing these activities is also lower relative to destroying formal institutions, banning voting, and tampering with ballots. Undermining the latter spoils the democratic façade because this repression is more difficult to hide from national and international observers, who can more easily monitor laws and elections than discern pressure on journalists, civic leaders, and potential opposition candidates. It is more difficult for observers to discover limitations on opposition than limitations on participation. Allowing the latter creates a positive “paper trail” of registered media outlets, civic groups, and candidates. Some harassment, such as tax inspections and firings, creates a paper trail as well, but it is one that can be attributed to business and employment problems, rather than political repression (McMann 2006).

Subnational governments that restrict contestation and allow participation are not only undemocratic but troubling on other accounts. Their façade nature offers the false promise to citizens of responsive government and defiles the term “democracy.” Elections to these governments often win national and international praise for being democratic because restrictions on contestation are not discerned. Citizens who believe these claims lose faith in democracy. Those who doubt this praise see hypocrisy in these claims of national leaders and international organizations (McMann 2006).

### *Case Study: Northern Senegal*

The example of northern Senegal illustrates the use of informal restrictions on contestation. Despite completing a national democratic transition in the early 2000s with the election of an opposition candidate for president, Senegal has pockets of weak or absent democracy. In the north the Toorobe nobles use informal practices to restrict lower castes’ contestation. The nobles influence lower castes’ votes through both caste authority and the threat of economic retaliation. The nobles used their traditional right to rule and landholding power to capture the newly decentralized local governments that national policy makers had originally designed to promote democratization (Beck 2008).

Members of the lower castes participate in politics: they vote, join parties, establish civil society organizations, run for elected office, and seek ministerial posts. However, social and economic pressures severely limit the lower castes’ ability to contest the Toorobe nobles’ political dominance (Koter 2013). Unlike other nobles in Senegal, a small number of Toorobe

nobles claim to be descendants of powerful dynastic families. Through their control of land cooperatives, these Toorobe nobles secured the ability to appoint 1/3 of the councilors in rural councils. Control over the land cooperatives and local councils also meant that nobles have “held a monopoly on nominations” for political party lists during elections (Beck 2008). Casted individuals rarely appear on party lists and, when they do, they stand little chance of winning because of their “inferior descent” (African Assembly for the Defense of Human Rights 2012). At party meetings, lower caste members have limited informal rights to speak, self-censoring in deference to the upper classes. As a result of these obstacles, members of lower castes represent only a small minority of elected officials at both local and national levels (Beck 2008). Control over most elected offices in turn granted the nobles powers to appoint most ministerial and bureaucratic posts. As a result, the lower castes had very little hope to reach elected office or obtain other government positions (Gellar 2005). Local dominance also translates into significant national influence. Through a near monopoly on land resources, control of local government, and ingrained caste trust and social pressure, the nobility have a huge influence on voting. The nobles expect the lower castes to follow their preferences and act as “vote bundlers” for national political parties in Senegal’s patronage system. Because of caste expectations, the casted people often do (Koter 2013).

Not only the social norms of the caste system but also the economic dependence of the lower castes enables these restrictions. The lower castes continue to be economically dependent on the nobles because of the nobles’ control of agricultural lands. Though once a formal “feudal” relationship, following independence the nobles’ control over the peasants and the rural council appointment process became an informal practice rooted in the national government’s limited state power and dependence on local leaders for political support. The national government passed several laws intended to circumscribe the traditional powers of the nobility. Most important among such efforts was the 1974 National Domain Law which placed most of the country’s land under state control. However, the law failed to actually curtail the nobility’s power for two reasons. First, the nobles made strong informal deals with both local and national politicians and political parties, trading their own political support as local authorities and the electoral support of their social inferiors for state resources. These state resources included, among other benefits, appointments to local councils, administrative boards, and official posts that in part allowed the nobles to retain their previous control over land in the north. Second, the social norms of the caste system helped the nobles maintain their power. The nobles’ control of agricultural lands through the councils combined with caste-related social pressures enabled the nobles to violate the peasants’ democratic rights. Enduring informal relationships dating back to Senegalese independence permitted the nobility to essentially capture the formal institutions of northern Senegal’s local government (Koter 2013).

### ***Formal and Informal Practices Restrict Participation and Contestation***

A different type of weak or nonexistent local democracy is those subnational governments that restrict both contestation and participation through a mix of formal and

informal practices. Again, the subnational leaders' motivation is to retain power. Where limits to participation do exist, they are typically codified into law. The right to vote and have responsive government institutions has been restricted by not allowing voters, typically those in rural areas, to select local representatives. Representation can be further reduced, typically for either rural or urban voters, by designing malapportioned assemblies or legislatures. When governors legally undercut the power of municipal officials, representation also suffers. Eligibility for public office can be restricted by having not only the standard age and residency requirements for candidates, but also by requiring that candidates be of a certain sex or marital status. Legal restrictions on civic groups include prohibitions on political parties participating in elections. Examples include certain municipalities in the state of Oaxaca in Mexico, Santiago del Estero province in Argentina, and KwaZulu-Natal province in South Africa (Benton 2012, Gibson 2012, Munro 2001). Informal restrictions on contestation typically resemble those described for the preceding type.

Restricted contestation and participation seem to be considerably less common than the first model, restricted contestation alone. Part of the reason is likely that subnational governments do not need to limit participation in order to maintain control, as described in the preceding section on restricted contestation. Legal restrictions on participation are a greater challenge to the *Zeitgeist* of democracy than informal limits on contestation. Mass suffrage is a more widely-accepted norm globally than challenging one's leaders. Also because laws are easier to monitor than behaviors like harassment and self-censorship, it is more difficult for subnational leaders to hide legal restrictions on participation than informal limits on contestation.

### *Case Study: Santiago del Estero, Argentina*

The example of Santiago del Estero province in Argentina demonstrates some of the ways law and formal institutions can be used to restrict both participation and contestation. In 1983, with the first free elections held in decades, party competition, especially between the two national parties—the Radical Party and the Peronist Party—increased dramatically at the national and subnational levels. That year in Santiago del Estero Peronist Governor Carlos Arturo Juárez won a third term with 48 percent of the vote; however, the provincial election system, which had been in place for decades, guaranteed that the first-place party in the elections would receive two-thirds of the seats in the provincial legislature, giving Juárez a legislative supermajority. This rule reduced representation in the province by greatly overrepresenting the Peronist Party in the legislature. Juárez regained the governorship in 1995, after facing a term limit and serving in the national legislature. At this point, the Peronists drew up a new constitution, without opposition input, that allowed governors to be reelected an unlimited number of times, and reformed the electoral system to cement their majority. The reforms increased the size of the provincial legislature by five representatives, for a total of 50. Of these, 22 would be elected under the old system, where the leading party would receive two-thirds of the seats, and other parties would receive a share of the remaining third. The other 28 seats would be divided among six new electoral districts; five of these were

rural, where the Peronist Party was very powerful, and each received at least four seats in the legislature. These reforms further skewed representation in the province: for example, the Peronist Party won 73 percent of the seats with only 51 percent of the vote in 1999. From this point opposition challenges grew less common (Gibson 2012).

Additionally, Juárez was able to use economic controls and simple repression to limit contestation of his dominance in Santiago del Estero. More than 85 percent of the province's budget in the mid-1990s consisted of central government transfers; the governor received almost all of this money and had full control over how it was used. The governor's control of provincial funds made provincial mayors economically dependent on him, preventing opposition mayors of Santiago del Estero's cities from challenging Juárez (Gibson 2012). Furthermore, "[t]he economic shadow of the provincial government prevented the growth of an independent local business class. Instead, business opportunities were to be made through lucrative contracts with the provincial government" (Gibson 2012: 102). Juárez also used repression, including surveillance of citizens, to limit challenges to the regime. These techniques helped Governor Juárez control Santiago del Estero until his removal in a 2004 federal intervention (Gibson 2012).

### *Formal and Informal Practices Prevent Participation and Contestation*

The absence of contestation and participation is typically found when discrimination against regionally concentrated minorities has escalated to a military crackdown against insurgents. This situation is relatively common; however, it has typically fallen outside of the purview of scholars concerned about local democracy. Instead, scholars label these "conflicts" and pay little to no attention to democratization. Examples include Casamance in Senegal, Caprivi in Namibia, Mindanao in the Philippines, Aceh in Indonesia, West Papua in Indonesia, Pattani in Thailand, the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh, Jammu and Kashmir and the "Tribal Belt" in India (Kennedy 2013, King 2004, Kreuzer 2005, Malik 2005, McCargo 2012, Melber 2009, Mietzner 2007, Panday and Ishtiaq 2009, Schaffer 1998). While it is true that democracy requires a minimal level of security, it seems that violent conflicts arose because of the weakness of contestation and participation. Discrimination unofficially reduces minorities' civil rights and political representation leading to violence that ultimately results in the denial of the rights to participation and contest. Furthermore, these conflicts often last for long periods meaning that individuals also are denied the right to participate and contest for significant stretches of time.

These pockets where participation and contestation are absent often develop from discrimination against an ethnic minority. Legally, members of the minority group are equal to members of the majority; however, social discrimination results in unofficial state discrimination. Typically a majority considers itself superior in some way and thus places some social stigma on the minority group. Minorities may simply be ignored in politics because they are considered inferior and thus unwanted. For example, in Botswana, the San have been viewed as an unsettled and difficult to govern population because of their traditional nomadic

lifestyle. Elected San political leaders frequently have little power and are ignored outside their communities (Good 2008). Minorities may also be viewed as politically unimportant—unable to deliver large numbers of votes, for example. Consequently, they benefit less from the state’s resources or patronage networks. The “hill tribes” of northern Thailand have experienced this fate. They represent less than one percent of the total Thai population, making them an unimportant constituency to court since the reintroduction of electoral politics in 1979. Because they can deliver so few votes they have little protection against abusive government officials or discriminatory social policies (Jonsson 2005). The relationship with the majority can also include economic exploitation. This was the case for the Aceh region of Indonesia: the national government’s claims to nearly all the oil revenue from Aceh was a catalyst to the regional insurgency that worsened the prohibitions on participation and contestation (King 2004). Ultimately, in these scenarios minorities tend to find their civil liberties unofficially curtailed, and they receive poor representation in both subnational and national government.

This discrimination deteriorates to outright denial of the rights to participate and contest when military crackdowns occur. In response to discrimination, minorities will sometimes initiate insurgencies, rebellions, or secessionist movements. In those areas with active insurgencies, otherwise democratic national governments often seem to grant the military substantial powers to govern. It is especially common to suppress the freedom of expression and the right to organize by branding activists or opposition supporters “rebel sympathizers.” In many cases, the military essentially rules through *de facto* martial law with suspension of civil rights; frequent irregularities in, delays of, and cancellations of elections, and human rights abuses related to combating the insurgency. The province of Maguindanao on the Philippines’ Mindanao Island, for example, has experienced *de jure* and *de facto* martial law even after the country experienced democratic transition (Kreuzer 2005). Complicating the erosion of democratic rights and institutions by the state in these situations are the human rights abuses often carried out not only by security forces but also rebels and common criminals. These abuses include arbitrary arrest, kidnapping, torture, rape, and extrajudicial killings. Rape, unlike the other abuses, tends to disproportionately be committed against women. For example, in Senegal’s Casamance insurgency, both security forces and rebels have targeted women believed to support the opposing side with kidnappings and rape (Amnesty International). Sometimes the military and rebels become involved in illegal economic activities in the region, often related to extortion. In Indonesia’s West Papua, security forces have become well integrated into the region’s criminal underworld. For example, both the police and military offer protection rackets to the large mining and logging operations on the island or simply engage in illegal logging themselves (King 2004). In these cases, the income from criminal activity gives violent actors an economic incentive to continue the conflict as a cover for crimes.

Harsh responses do not always involve a severe military crackdown. Problems also arise when the national government ineffectively intervenes in local politics or grants national agencies significant power over a certain territory, leading to abuses by administrators. In both Botswana and Thailand the national governments granted authority to national park officials. By creating national parks in regions predominately populated by indigenous people, both Botswana and Thailand forced residents to leave their homes and move into government-



created villages were they could be more easily managed. In both cases, forest and park officials denied the indigenous people their rights through intimidation, extortion, arbitrary arrest, and occasional beatings (Good 2008, Jonsson 2005).

As is evident from the description above, the source of these undemocratic practices is often the national government, rather than subnational leaders. The national government acts undemocratically in a locale, in effect preventing participation and contestation, regardless of the practices and institutions of the subnational government.

### *Case Study: West Papua, Indonesia*

The example of West Papua in Indonesia illustrates this type. Dissatisfaction with the Indonesian government began long before democratization during the rule of military dictator Suharto. West New Guinea joined Indonesia after the Dutch withdrawal from the island in 1963. Indonesia's authoritarian national government presided over a rigged vote for self-determination called the "Act of Free Choice" in which Papuan representatives were coerced into joining with Indonesia. Following a unanimous vote widely considered unfree and unfair, the highly popular Papuan guerilla movement OPM ("Free Papua Movement") organized to resist integration (King 2004). Suharto's military launched a severe crackdown on the Papuans and in the process imbedded itself in most aspects of the territory's life, political, social, economic, cultural, and even religious, to better exert control over the populace in an explicit policy called the "dual function doctrine." Under a similar policy called the "territorial system," the military monitored and took de facto control over West Papua's civil administration (King 2004).

Following democratization, the military's role on the island roughly continues as before. The military retains tight control over the civil administration in the state despite the *reformasi* ideal of civilian supremacy. The right to organize opposition groups and assemble protests is severely limited as the military and police shut down assemblies and arrest opposition leaders. The opposition leaders, falsely labeled separatists or traitors, themselves risk frequent harassment and occasional beatings by security forces. Civil society in West Papua is weaker than in the rest of Indonesia as NGOs face coercion and occasional attacks by the military and criminal thugs (King 2004). The media, both national and local, engages in a significant amount of self-censorship when reporting on events from Papua (Vltchek 2012). Elections, when not repeatedly delayed, run extremely poorly, according to the Philippine election monitor NAMFREL, through a lack of necessary resources at polling stations or simple apathy on the part of election officials. The problem of weak polling disproportionately affects remote areas with a majority ethnic Papuan population (Maligaya 2011). Human rights abuses against Papuans have continued after democratization, even culminating in accusations of genocide against ethnic Papuans (Vltchek 2012). Security forces in West Papua are strongly connected to criminal elements related to the region's vast natural resource wealth, including logging and some of the world's most profitable mining operations. The military and police run extortion rackets connected to natural resource operations, fighting with each other over opportunities to take a

cut. Resource extraction sites have also become important targets for the OPM guerillas, who see them as symbols of government exploitation and repression (Vltchek 2012). Though a 2001 Special Autonomy plan promised Papuans a cut of the region's resource profits, little reaches ethnic Papuans because of corruption, failed implementation, and generally poor governance (Widjojo 2013).

## **Enabling Factors**

What factors enable subnational governments to limit or prohibit participation and contestation? Economic dependence on local authorities, lack of national support for local democracy, and certain national laws help these undemocratic subnational governments to develop and endure. When citizens are economically dependent on local leaders they are more susceptible to government harassment and self-censorship with the end result that they do not engage in democratic activism. When undemocratic subnational governments are in national leaders' interests, these pockets of non-democracy are more likely to develop and survive. Undemocratic subnational governments are also likely to endure when national leaders are inattentive to them or lack the capacity to democratize them. National laws granting local authorities the rights to design local elections enable formal restrictions on participation and contestation.

### ***Lack of Economic Autonomy***

When citizens are economically dependent on their government leaders, a large number of non-violent tools of repression are available to the officials. Threats and actual firings are viable tools as are costly inspections of businesses. Citizens are aware of potential risks to their livelihoods so they are inclined to self-censor. An absence of economic autonomy is, therefore, often central to the first type of undemocratic subnational government, those where informal practices limit contestation, and also important to the second type.

Certain characteristics of territorial administrative units limit residents' economic autonomy and thus make democracy less likely. Economic autonomy is reduced when the local government dominates the employment sector. In some places, jobs in government administration and the public sector, such as education, are most common. Elsewhere government elites control most jobs through ownership of industrial or agricultural enterprises. This ownership can reflect the long-term political and economic dominance of a particular group in a society, as in the case of the nobility of northern Senegal, or the recent capture of economic resources by a political elite, as in the case of nomenklatura privatization in the former East bloc. Government dominance of employment is especially likely when the territory does not offer features to attract national and international employers. The local government or local government elites can also control entrepreneurs when their businesses are located



exclusively in the territory of the province, city, or village. This is especially true when the locale is physically isolated and when constraints to expanding business, such as scant credit, are great (McMann 2006). Economic autonomy is further limited when the local government receives a large portion of its revenue from central government subsidies. Under these rentier-like circumstances, the exchange of good governance for tax payments is less critical to the government's survival. Instead, it can use the national funds to stifle contestation (Gervasoni 2010b).

Traditional leaders—those whose positions existed far back in time and are linked to religion, heritage or other cultural traditions—often enjoy this economic dominance. In fact, in some cases it seems that their influence derives less from custom and more from economic power. This is particularly evident when the economy changes, robbing traditional elites of their economic power and consequently their influence. This has been evident in Kyrgyzstan where *aksakals*, respected male elders, literally “white beards,” lost their influence. In their younger years, they had held important positions in the socialist economy, but, unlike their predecessors, they have had little power in their later years because of the transition from a socialist to a market economy. Their economic knowledge and connections are simply not useful any more.

When traditional elites do maintain economic control, the combination of economic dominance and cultural practices can result in voters willingly supporting them. Jacqueline Behrend writes about this situation—what she calls “closed games” in two Argentine provinces, Corrientes and San Luis:

*Closed games are strongly based on popular electoral preferences: elections are not subject to manipulation nor a farce but reflect the support the elite elicits through other forms of control grounded in cultural practices and economic processes. Voters vote for the [ruling] families because it makes sense to do so: provinces with closed games tend not to have a strong economic structure, and voters know through experience that the ruling elite delivers—even if what it delivers is not all that much—and they cannot be certain that the opposition will do the same... In closed games, families do not persist in power for “traditional” reasons, but because well-organized political systems with stable institutions, highly structured political practices, newspapers, voters, and a judicial system sustain them... (Behrend 2011: 153-154)*

The traditional elite in many cultures is exclusively or predominantly male. As a result women are often excluded from these positions of economic and political dominance. Whereas a man might be either in the economically and politically dominant or subordinate role in society, a woman is more likely to be in the subordinate role in these cultures.

### ***Lack of National Government Support for Democracy***

Subnational governments operate within the wider context of national governments, so national leaders' interest, capacity, and attention also have an effect on the nature of subnational regimes. Even leaders of “democratic” countries have found that pockets of weak

democracy can be helpful. Non-democratic subnational leaders can provide legislative or electoral support to national leaders (Gibson 2012; Giraudy 2010). For example, the nobles in northern Senegal provide national parties and politicians with significant political and electoral support because they control peasants' votes and peasants represent a majority of the population (Koter 2013). When undemocratic subnational governments are in national leaders' interests, these pockets of non-democracy are more likely to develop and survive. Not only the desire to retain power, but also prejudice, personal enrichment, and security concerns can motivate national leaders to enable undemocratic subnational governments. Interaction with the national government can be important in all three types.

Even when national leaders prefer that democracy exists evenly throughout a country, they may not have the capacity to make that happen (McMann 2014). We would expect that provinces, cities, and villages can be more difficult to democratize when they are financially strong and are incorporated into a strong political party represented in the highest national offices, although studies, so far, are not conclusive (Giraudy 2010). Pockets of weak or absent democracy also can simply not attract national leaders' attention. In the 1990s Russian President Boris Yeltsin was so preoccupied in his struggle with the national parliament that he paid less and less attention to the types of governance taking hold in the country's provinces.

Subnational leaders use tactics to prevent national leaders from taking notice. Central to this is making sure that conflicts remain local and residents do not gain access to national allies and resources in these conflicts (Benton 2012, Gibson 2012). In addition to maintaining control in their jurisdictions, subnational leaders try to influence national decisions that affect their territories. They can do this by holding national positions or ensuring that national legislators from their territories are loyal. American Southern Democrats used these tactics in the late nineteenth century: they developed a legislative bloc in the U.S. Congress that protected subnational non-democratic regimes in the South (Gibson 2012). Subnational leaders also try to control economic and political linkages between their territories and the national level. For example, subnational leaders prefer to be in charge of nominating local representatives to national institutions and controlling revenue flows from the national government (Gibson 2012). In the Mexican state of Oaxaca in the 2000s, for instance, Governor José Murat took actions to neutralize national government oversight of transfer payments—which represented more than 90 percent of Oaxaca's revenue—and thus strengthening his non-democratic rule (Gibson 2012). Influencing national decisions and linkages to the center further strengthens subnational leaders' control over their territories.

## **National Laws**

National laws that enable subnational leaders to create electoral systems for their territories can facilitate the creation and endurance pocket of weak or non-existent democracy. These national laws provide subnational leaders with a set of legal tools to stifle democracy. These tools can include the ability to design laws to create malapportioned subnational assemblies that overrepresent areas loyal to the incumbent leader or party (Gibson 2012). The

national laws are most important to the second type of undemocratic subnational government, formal and informal restrictions on participation and contestation.

## **Overcoming Subnational Unevenness in Democracy**

The challenge of overcoming subnational unevenness in democracy has been a focus of neither practitioners nor scholars. Practitioners concentrate on specific municipalities or provinces where democracy is weak rather than consider pockets of non-democracy a countrywide phenomenon. When they do take a more general approach they are likely to focus more on the local political institutions and rights themselves and the extent of decentralization rather than local economic relations and other national-subnational government factors, such as national governments' interests and attention to weak or nonexistent local democracy. Scholarship also does not provide significant insight as to how to overcome subnational unevenness in democracy. As described below, two approaches have made some headway but leave work to be done. For that reason examining historical cases of how democracy developed evenly within countries might prove helpful.

### ***Existing Scholarship***

Subnational democracy research has mostly examined the maintenance of these pockets of weak or non-existent democracy; however, a few studies have offered explanations for how they democratize. These explanations focus on either diffusion or national intervention. There are two drawbacks in using this work to help determine how to overcome subnational unevenness in democracy. First, the process by which a single subnational authoritarian government collapses may not be the same process by which a country's entire territory democratizes. Second, these studies are based on only four countries, all with federal systems of government—Argentina, Mexico, Russia, and the United States (McMann 2014).

Diffusion from neighboring municipalities and provinces might democratize subnational non-democratic governments. It is possible that an opposition victory nearby might embolden opposition in a neighboring non-democratic area and increase election turnout there. Non-democratic leaders might introduce civil and political rights to protect themselves when they eventually lose office. They might also establish electoral institutions so that they or those loyal to them have a chance to win office in the future (Hiskey and Canache 2005). These are all viable ideas but so far they have been explored only in Mexico.

Another possibility is that democratization of subnational governments occurs when national leaders intervene. A challenge to national leaders' interests motivates their involvement (Gibson, Giraudy). As discussed above, subnational leaders make an effort to isolate local oppositions from national political allies and resources (Behrend 2011, Benton 2012, Gibson 2012). When subnational leaders fail in this effort—when a local crisis mobilizes a local opposition that links the local conflict to the interests of the national leaders—

democratization of the subnational government occurs. If subnational leaders have used informal and illegal practices to stifle democracy, transition occurs by a national party providing resources to a local opposition party, which enables the local activists to oust the incumbent. If subnational leaders have limited democracy by creating non-democratic institutions and laws, democratization occurs by the national government changing the local rules and institutions. Under the new legal regime the local opposition can win power (Gibson 2012)

Each of the theorized modes of transition relates to a type of non-democratic subnational government described above. The importance of non-democratic laws and institutions in the second resembles the restricted participation and contestation type described above. The starting point of the first—informal practices to stifle democracy—seems similar to the restricted contestation type. However, this highlights some weaknesses in the idea of national government intervention democratizing subnational governments. As the restricted contestation type demonstrates it is not always easy for local opposition to form. Without economic autonomy, individuals are unwilling to engage in political activism. Without a local opposition there is no group to whom a national party can provide resources. Subnational leaders maintain a lock on their village, city, or province. Also, especially in newer democracies political parties are not necessarily strong. Consequently, there might not be an organized national political force that can assist local protestors. The national leaders themselves might not be able to intervene to change non-democratic subnational laws and institutions because national governments do not always have the capacity (McMann 2014).

An historical case provides clues beyond this scholarship as to how democracy can develop evenly within countries. Specifically, France in the late 1800s exhibited pockets of weak and absent democracy of the restricted contestation type throughout its territory. How this unevenness was overcome is a story of surmounting obstacles to forming local opposition, but not a story of national political party support or national government intervention. The French case is thus instructive for contemporary challenges in ways that existing scholarship has not been.

### *Case Study: France*

By 1877 France had undergone national democratic transition—at least by the standards of first-wave democracies. The former national government had been dismantled and a new one created. National politics were competitive and civil liberties existed. The national government did not meet contemporary standards because “universal” suffrage excluded women. Otherwise it is reasonable to consider the national government of France had experienced democratic transition.

Yet, even after this national democratic transition, pockets of non-democracy and weak democracy endured. Everyone (who was male) could participate, but people in certain areas of the country could not contest. Residents of all communes, the lowest level of government, voted for governing councils and mayors. Nonetheless, some rural communes were dominated by one man. Typically this individual was a landlord who held a large portion of the property

and lived in the commune. These rural areas resembled fiefdoms while urban and other rural areas more closely resembled representative governments.

These individuals achieved political dominance because of their economic control, the cultural legacies of that control, and the seclusion of some rural areas. Tenant farming and sharecropping enabled a single person to dominate the economy of a commune. Despite conventional wisdom, the aftermath of the Revolution of 1789 saw a revival of aristocratic landowners (Goldberg 1954). This economic control translated into political control. These landlords and their favored candidates ran for office, and peasants consistently voted for them. Peasants did not challenge them because they were economically dependent on them. This economic and political control was more likely in those communes that were most isolated from other communes, towns, and the national capital (Weber 1976).

In those communes where a residential landlord owned most of the property, restricted contestation meant that effectively most democratic rights were not exercised and institutions did not operate democratically. Eligibility for public office, the right of political leaders to compete for support, the right to vote, free and fair elections, and institutions for making government policies depend on voters' preferences were absent or weak. Elections for local officials took place but informal practices prevented local oppositions from forming, much less opposition seeking and competing for public office and voters from supporting them. Electoral corruption stifled competition in other communes in France, especially before the secret ballot was introduced in 1913, but competition was particularly and consistently weak in these rural communes. Consequently, local institutions represented primarily the interests of those in power (McMann 2014).

These fiefdoms transformed into representative governments due to socioeconomic changes and the diffusion of ideas. Representative governments do not seem to have appeared as a result of democratizing pressures from the national government and national political parties nor as a result of the emergence of new formal institutions or rights (McMann 2014).

Changing economic conditions ended the economic dominance of landlords. Increased global competition for different agricultural products beginning in 1875 meant that owning large tracts of land was no longer a good investment. Large landowners sold off their property to peasants (Magraw 1986, Moulin 1991). In the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, road and rail expansion brought new economic opportunities to peasants, additional opportunities to those living near towns and cities and the first opportunities independent of their landlord to those living in isolated villages. These opportunities included piecework, urban employment, factory jobs in rural areas, and access to bank credit (Magraw 1986, Moulin 1991).

Coinciding with these economic developments was the diffusion of ideas of democracy and democratic activism through migrants, the press, schools, and the military. Former villagers visited home from their places of urban employment, bringing ideas from the towns and cities. Improvements in transportation and postal services meant that the press reached more people. A national educational campaign increased literacy so that peasants could read new ideas and also were eligible to serve in public office. Three-year required service in the military meant that young males from rural areas were exposed to new ideas (Magraw 1986, Moulin 1991).

As peasants gained economic autonomy from their landlords and were exposed to ideas and debates from outside their villages, their deference to local leaders diminished. They ran for and won local offices, making politics in villages more competitive. Village mayors and councillors were increasingly members of the peasantry (McMann 2014; Moulin 1991).

Although an historical case, the example of France in many ways resembles the unevenness in subnational democracy evident today, particularly in African and Latin American cases, as described above. What is most striking is how the French landlords' economic dominance and consequent political influence over local citizens is similar to the economic and political control wielded by some traditional elites in Africa and local families in Latin America. In France this dominance ended and local democracy flourished as a result of growing economic autonomy and the diffusion of democratic ideas. It is important to note that the causes of democratization were neither national government intervention nor diffusion through elite and activists' reactions to nearby opposition wins. Democratization was a byproduct of socioeconomic changes and diffusion; it was not directed by local, national, or international efforts. Nonetheless, France's experience offer clues to democracy-supporters today.

## **Supporting Local Democracy**

What measures to support local democracy do the V-Dem data, typology, and case studies on subnational unevenness suggest? It is clear that, rather than focusing exclusively on reforming legal institutions, efforts should be directed more toward discouraging detrimental informal practices. Also, the factors enabling these undemocratic subnational governments point to the need for economic and social, not just political, measures for supporting local democracy. This section elaborates on these possible efforts and measures to support local democracy.

Undemocratic formal institutions seem to be less of a problem than undemocratic informal practices. While efforts should continue to be made to reform institutions and laws to promote democracy, this does not seem like the central task at hand. Regarding institutions and laws, attention should be directed to ensuring that even when national laws allow subnational governments to establish their own legal systems that certain democratic standards be met. Knowledge of local context is critical here to understand how subnational leaders could use electoral design for non-democratic purposes. For example, subnational leaders belonging to parties with strong urban support may design electoral systems in a way that will exclude rural voters. Legal reforms beyond the requirement that subnationally-designed institutions meet democratic standards face other hurdles. For example, efforts to reduce national leaders' motivations to win the support of voters and legislators from subnational political units might alleviate the problem of national support for undemocratic subnational government, but it would also reduce the locales' potential voice in national politics. Finally, legal measures to suspend civil liberties, which national governments turn to in times of conflict, should be evaluated independently of the problem of subnational unevenness

in democracy. For unevenness in democracy addressing the underlying issue of discrimination is a more direct approach.

To address the more common obstacles to local democracy, informal practices, it would be wise to tackle discrimination and the other enabling factors—lack of economic autonomy and national government capacity and inattention. Proven programs to improve relations among ethnic groups would be useful to discourage informal political discrimination and to prevent the situation from deteriorating to one of insurgency and military crackdown.

Efforts can be made to increase citizens' economic independence from local authorities by creating jobs outside the public sector and in work places owned by neither local authorities nor their families or friends. This can be done through foreign investment and credit-lending programs, for example. Credit, besides enabling private businesses to start and also hire more individuals, can allow them to expand beyond the locale and thus limit possibilities for local government harassment. Increasing economic autonomy has the added benefits of promoting economic prosperity and not directly challenging government leaders' political power. Potentially, central government subsidies to subnational political units can be restructured so that they do not provide undue influence to mayors and governors.

Standard efforts to build state capacity through infrastructural development and tax collection reform can also help national governments better democratize villages, towns, cities, and provinces led by recalcitrant officials. Better access to outlying areas and more resources are helpful to such political endeavors.

Greater local and international focus on the problem of subnational unevenness in democracy can bring to the attention of national governments locales in their countries where citizens are unable to exercise democratic rights. This attention also helps diffuse norms about democratic institutions and rights. International IDEA's local democracy assessments combine a grassroots and outside approach by providing a framework for local groups to evaluate their own governments. The Varieties of Democracy database will provide anyone with an internet connection local experts' input on the extent of democracy in the territory of his or her country. Both of the efforts increase attention to the problem.

Greater attention to the problem locally, nationally, and internationally is a good first step. Next it makes sense for local, national, and international democracy-supporters to focus on bringing democracy to those locales where the situations have not yet deteriorated to violence. When violations of minorities' democratic rights have escalated to civil war, at least a ceasefire agreement must be achieved in order to initiate the democratization process. However, where war is not an immediate obstacle, efforts to document the problems of subnational unevenness and address underlying causes, such as lack of economic autonomy, ethnic discrimination, and national government incapacity and inattention, offer promise. For a country to be democratic all citizens regardless of where they reside should be able to exercise their rights.



## APPENDIX A

This appendix provides additional details about the subnational measures from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project. Like most V indicators, the data for the subnational measures comes from country expert coders. The country expert coders are generally academics or members of NGOs and are typically residents or citizens of the country being coded. Potential country experts are identified based on their reputations as known by members of the V-Dem team and as demonstrated by their publications and other works. For each indicator, an average of five country experts with expertise in the area provide answers. The experts do the coding on the V-Dem web site, using one of five languages. They draw on their own knowledge and conduct research as needed. The coders also indicate their level of confidence in each response. These responses are aggregated together in a measurement model that provides values for each indicator as well as estimates of uncertainty (Pemstein, Tzelgov & Wang 2014). Additional details about the project can be found at <https://v-dem.net/>.

The full questions for the subnational measures used in this paper were as follows:

*Question:* Does the freeness and fairness of subnational elections vary across different areas of the country?

*Clarification:* Subnational elections refer to elections to regional or local offices, as specified above [in questions country experts previously answered].

0: No. Subnational elections in most or all areas of the country are equally free and fair (or, alternatively, equally not free and not fair).

1: Somewhat. Subnational elections in some areas of the country are somewhat more areas of the country.

2: Yes. Subnational elections in some areas of the country are significantly more free and fair (or, alternatively, significantly less free and fair) than subnational elections in other areas of the country.

*Question:* Does government respect for civil liberties vary across different areas of the country?

0: No. Government officials in most or all areas of the country equally respect (or, alternatively, equally do not respect) civil liberties.

1: Somewhat. Government officials in some areas of the country respect civil liberties somewhat more (or, alternatively, somewhat less) than government officials in other areas of the country.

2: Yes. Government officials in some areas of the country respect civil liberties significantly more (or, alternatively, significantly less) than government officials in other areas of the country.



## WORKS CITED

- African Assembly for the Defense of Human Rights, *Alternative Report on the Situation of Castes in Senegal* August 2012 (Geneva: United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 2012)
- Amnesty International, *Senegal: Casamance Women Speak Out* (London: Amnesty International, 2003)
- Beck, Linda J., *Brokering Democracy in Africa: The Rise of Clientelist Democracy in Senegal* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008)
- Behrend, Jacqueline, 'The Unevenness of Democracy at the Subnational Level: Provincial Closed Games in Argentina', *Latin American Research Review*, 46/1 (January 2011), pp. 150-176.
- Benton, Allyson Lucinda, 'Bottom-Up Challenges to National Democracy: Mexico's (Legal) Subnational Authoritarian Enclaves', *Comparative Politics*, 44/3 (April 2012), pp. 253-271
- Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Matthew Kroenig, Kelly McMann, Daniel Pemstein, Megan Reif, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jeffrey Staton, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, 'Varieties of Democracy: Codebook', (2014), unpublished manuscript.
- Dahl, Robert, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971)
- Gellar, Sheldon, *Democracy in Senegal: Tocquevillian Analytics in Africa* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005)
- Gervasoni, Carlos, 'Measuring Variance in Subnational Regimes: Results from an Expert-Based Operationalization of Democracy in the Argentine Provinces', *Journal of Politics in Latin America*, 2/2 (January 2010a), pp. 13-52
- Gervasoni, Carlos, 'A Rentier Theory of Subnational Regimes: Fiscal Federalism, Democracy, and Authoritarianism in the Argentine Provinces', *World Politics*, 62/2 (2010b), pp. 302-340
- Gibson, Edward L., *Boundary Control: Subnational Authoritarianism in Federal Democracies* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012)
- Giraudy, Agustina, 'The Politics of Subnational Undemocratic Regime Reproduction in Argentina and Mexico', *Journal of Politics in Latin America*, 2/2 (January 2010), pp. 53-84

- Giraudy, Augustina, 'Varieties of Subnational Undemocratic Regimes: Evidence from Argentina and Mexico', *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 48/1 (March 2013), pp. 51-80
- Good, Kenneth, *African Issues: Diamonds, Dispossession, and Democracy in Botswana* (Suffolk, United Kingdom: James Currey, 2008)
- Goldberg, Harvey, 'The Myth of the French Peasant', *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, 13/4 (1954), pp. 363-378
- Hiskey, Jonathan, and Canache, Damarys, 'The Demise of One-Party Politics in Mexican Municipal Elections', *British Journal of Political Science*, 35/2 (2005), pp. 257-284
- Jonsson, Hjorleifur, *Mien Relations: Mountain People and State Control in Thailand* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2005)
- Kennedy, Johnathan and Lawrence King, 'Adivasis, Maoists, and Insurgency in the Central Indian Tribal Belt', *European Journal of Sociology* 54/1 (2013), pp. 1-32
- King, Peter, *West Papua and Indonesia Since Suharto: Independence, Autonomy, or Chaos?* (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2004)
- Kreuzer, Peter, 'Political Clans and Violence in the Southern Philippines', *Peace Institute Research Frankfurt* (2005)
- Koter, Dominika, 'King Makers: Local Leaders and Ethnic Politics in Africa', *World Politics*, 65/2 (2013), pp. 187-232
- Liddle, R. William and Mujani, Saiful, 'Indonesian Democracy: From Transition to Consolidation', in Mirjam Kunkler and Alfred Stepan (eds), *Democracy and Islam in Indonesia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013)
- Magraw, Roger, *France, 1815-1914: The Bourgeois Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986)
- Maligaya, Paolo B., 'Golput (Boycott)', *NAMFREL Election Monitor* 2/21 (2011), pp. 3-7
- Malik, Iffat, *Kashmir: Ethnic Conflict, International Dispute* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005)
- McCargo, Duncan, *Mapping National Anxieties: Thailand's Southern Conflict* (Copenhagen, Denmark: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2012)
- McMann, Kelly M., 'Democratization Beyond National Capitals: Clues from the First Wave', Paper presented at the International Conference of Europeanists. Washington, D.C., March 14 2014

- McMann, Kelly M., *Economic Autonomy and Democracy: Hybrid Regimes in Russia and Kyrgyzstan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006)
- McMann, Kelly M., John Gerring, Matthew Maguire, Staffan Lindberg, Michael Coppedge, 'Democratic Unevenness: A Crossnational Analysis', Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting. Washington, D.C., August 30 2014
- Melber, Henning, 'One Namibia, One Nation? The Caprivi as Contested Territory', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 27/4 (2009), pp. 463-471
- Mietzner, Marcus, 'Local Elections and Autonomy in Papua and Aceh: Mitigation or Fueling Secessionism?' *Indonesia* 84/1 (2007), pp. 1-39
- Moulin, Annie, *Peasantry and Society in France since 1789* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991)
- Munro, William A., 'The Political Consequences of Local Electoral Systems: Democratic Change and the Politics of Differential Citizenship in South Africa', *Comparative Politics*, 33/3 (April 2001), pp. 295-313
- Panday, Pranab Kumar and Jamil Ishtiaq, 'Conflict in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh: An Unimplemented Peace Accord and Continued Violence', *Asian Survey* 49/6 (2009), pp. 1052-1070
- Pemstein, Daniel, Eitan Tzelgov, and Yi-ting Wang, 'Evaluating and Improving Item Response Theory Models for Cross-National Expert Surveys', Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting. Washington, D.C., August 30 2014
- Schaffer, Frederic C. *Democracy in Translation: Understanding Politics in an Unfamiliar Culture* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998)
- Sidel, John T. *Capital, Coercion, and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999)
- Van Dyke, Virginia, 'The Khalistan Movement in Punjab, India, and the Post-Militancy Era: Structural Change and New Political Compulsions', *Asian Survey*, 49/6 (2009), pp. 975-997.
- Vltchek, Andre, *Indonesia: Archipelago of Fear* (London: Pluto Press, 2012)
- Weber, Eugen, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France (1870-1914)* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976)
- Widjojo, Muridan S, 'Papua', *The Contemporary Pacific*, 25/3 (2013), pp. 294-403